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Abstract 
This study examines the governance and accountability practices and reforms in UK building 
societies following the 2008 financial crisis. Theoretically, this study explores the notion of 
mutual accountability and governance systems in delineating the (re)structuring of UK 
building societies’ governance and accountability practices, in response to the crisis. Data for 
the study are derived from thirty-eight in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in building 
societies, including executives, non-executives, ex-directors, an auditor, a regulator and 
customers, as well as publicly available documents and non-participant observation of a 
number of members’ meetings. The findings of the study demonstrate that the industry’s 
internal, intermediate and external governance structures have significantly altered in the 
post-crisis era with a positive impact on the mutual accountability. Coercive pressure from 
regulators has led to improvements on building societies’ internal governance structures, 
including but not limited to board composition, internal control and risk management 
frameworks. Intermediate governance structure, unique to mutual organisations, is embedded 
within UK building societies as the fundamental mechanism in achieving democracy and 
mutual accountability. However, the political and economic uncertainty and regulatory 
reforms in the financial services sector have continued to pose challenges in the governance 
and long-term performance of regional building societies. Intensifying regulations have 
increased the costs and workload for building societies and led many of these societies to 
emphasize the “form” rather than true “substance” of good governance practices. There is the 
need for regulators and policy makers to realise the difference among building societies and 
to develop appropriate codes of governance and regulations which are not one-size-fits-all.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
The mutual sector in the United Kingdom is socially and economically valuable to the 
country. It creates diversity in businesses by providing varied types of ownership structures 
from the investor-owned business, and delivers competition and more options for consumers 
in a different range of markets (Mutuo, 2015). It employed over 970,000 employees and 
generated a total income of £115 billion in 2013 (Mutuo, 2013). Mutuo (2013), an advocate 
for mutuals and co-operatives in the UK, reported that one in three people in the UK 
continues to be a customer-owner of at least one mutual or co-operative. 
A mutual organisation is neither typical charities nor businesses. Rather, its business 
philosophy, motivation and nature of activities combine the attributes of both entities. The 
primary objectives of mutuals are to create and deliver social values to their customer-owner-
members and they rely on their commercial activities rather than donations and grants to 
achieve their social objectives and to scale their operations. For these organisations, 
commercial activities are a means toward social ends. Therefore, mutual organisations are 
hybrid organisations that combine the attributes of both charity and business at their core 
values (European Commission, 2003, Drake and Llewellyn, 2002, Hansmann, 1996). 
Unlike shareholder-owned firms, mutuals are customer-owned and controlled in such a way 
that customers hold ownership and control rights and are entitled to the benefits accruing 
from the business (Birchall, 2013a, Birchall, 2011). Customers of mutual organisations are 
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generally also the investors and members of the entities1. They have the rights to decide on 
the sale and takeover of the business and the right to vote on the appointment and 
reappointment of the directors and auditors (Birchall, 2013a, Birchall, 2012). Mutuals exist in 
most societies and are subject to various legal and administrative frameworks, different tax 
benefits, and in many cases, lighter legal requirements. The types of mutuals also vary across 
countries in which they operate, and according to their historical movements (Birchall, 2013b, 
Birchall, 2011). In the UK in particular, history indicates that mutual organisations generally 
consist of financial mutuals such as building societies, credit unions and friendly societies 
(Birchall, 2011, Birchall, 2013a). 
Although mutual organisations are viewed to create both social and commercial values, they 
are at risk of mission drift and losing sight of their social missions while in their efforts to 
generate revenue (Fonteyne, 2007). This concern is greatly highlighted in academic literature 
that the risks for mutuals and their workforces are diversifying from their purposes and 
values while in the quest for organisational survival. It has been argued that mutual 
organisations depend on commercially generated revenue to sustain and scale their operations, 
and they are inherently at risk of emphasising their commercial activities-to generate revenue 
and thereby survive-over their social objectives which enable them to achieve their social 
mission. The consequence of mission drift is severe as it threatens the core reason for their 
existence which are to deliver social value to their customers cum members (Ebrahim et al., 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘customers’, ‘owners’ and ‘members’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. Mutuals are 
incorporated in the first place to serve the needs of their customers who are also the capital contributors of these 
enterprises. As the capital contributors, they are regarded as the investors and owners of the business, which is 
similar to shareholder-owned businesses. According to Hansmann (1996), the term ‘member’ is commonly 
associated with mutual organisations due to their historical movement, which considered the business as a 
membership organisation. 
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2014). Mutual organisations thus face a unique challenge in term of the process in which they 
manage their competing objectives and activities, so as to generate enough revenues without 
compromising their social objectives.  
Governance in mutual organisation is also a rich subject of study as the importance of mutual 
organisations in delivering social activities has grown and they have come under increased 
scrutiny. Serious concerns have been raised about the governing board and their effectiveness 
as key officers and directors had been accused of wrongdoings and had used organisations’ 
funds for personal gain (The Independent, 26 July 2014 , The Telegraph, 16 June 2014). It 
has also been reported that a lack of effective oversight and a shortage of capable individuals 
and management had led to the collapse of a number UK credit unions, building societies and 
friendly societies, such as Equitable Life (HM Treasury 2004, 2014, Jones, 2010).  
These concern have led to the credibility of mutuals being questioned and academic interests 
in the state of their governance and accountability practices (see e.g.Cornforth, 2003, 
Cornforth and Brown, 2013, Cornforth, 2004). In a review of the research literature, 
Cornforth (2003, 2004) concludes that empirical and scholarly research relating to 
governance in mutual organisations is relatively scant, and there were considerable gaps in 
knowledge. Previous research are arguably context-centric and largely dominated by the 
work in Canada (see e.g. Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Fairbairn et al., 2015, Fairbairn, 2003), 
the USA (see e.g. Hansmann, 1996, Schneiberg et al., 2008) and Africa (see e.g. Borda-
Rodriguez et al., 2016, Borda-Rodriguez and Vicari, 2014, Mathuva, 2016). Governance 
research on mutual organisation in the UK is also scarce (Shaw, 2006, Brennan and Solomon, 
2008, Gray et al., 2014a) and mostly generated professional interests after the collapse of the 
mutual organisations such as mutual life insurance companies and building societies (see e.g. 
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HM Treasury, 2009, HM Treasury 2004, HM Treasury 2014). Therefore, the main aim of this 
research is to contribute to this subject by exploring and understanding the organisation 
governance and accountability within a specific mutual organisation, the UK building 
societies. More specifically, the thesis investigates the responsibilities of the board of 
directors, the processes by which members’ rights are protected, the roles of regulators and 
auditors, and key governance and business challenges encountered by building societies 
following the 2008 financial crisis. 
1.2 The Motivation for Studying Governance and Accountability in UK Building 
Societies 
UK building societies are among the oldest financial mutuals in the world. They are owned 
by and run for the interests of the savers and mortgage borrowers who are also the customer-
owner-members of the business. Membership is equally distributed on a one-member one-
vote basis and not on the basis of amount invested. The first known building societies in the 
UK were established in Birmingham in 1775. These building societies originally provided 
collective finance for house purchase and construction for and by members. Over time, 
building societies evolved as a financial intermediary between savers and mortgagors. 
The mortgage and saving markets in the UK was primarily dominated by the building society 
sector from the eighteenth century until the 1980s. Unlike other European countries such as 
France and Germany, where mortgages are provided by a variety of institutions, the financial 
services sector in the UK was highly regulated and controlled by the government. There was 
very limited competition between different financial institutions, and banks were not 
significantly involved in the saving and mortgage markets. An array of regulations and 
control such as the standard tax rate and Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme, also known 
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as the ‘Corset’, were in place to curtail the lending and deposit-taking activities of banks and 
other financial institutions (Harvey, 2005, McKillop and Ferguson, 1993).  
However, the ‘big bang’—the deregulation of the financial market in the 1980s by the 
Conservative government—put intense pressure on the building society sector to compete 
with other financial institutions. The sector experienced increasing competition for personal 
savings and mortgages from banks and National Savings. They also had to compete with 
banks in other non-price forms of competition, including the usage of advanced technologies 
and marketing mechanisms. The small scale nature and limited financial resources of a 
number of building societies posited greater challenges for the building society sector to 
compete with other financial institutions in a highly deregulated financial market (Boleat, 
1982, Boddy, 1989). 
The problems prompted the government and building societies to search for new legislation 
to enable building societies to compete on an equal basis with other financial institutions. The 
BSA responded by setting up a working group to examine the constitutions and power of 
building societies. The report, The Future Constitutions and Power of Building Societies, 
published in 1983, rejected the call for new regulations. Instead, recommendations were 
provided which urged building societies to shift to new ‘banking’ activities. The Governor of 
the Bank of England and the chairmen and chief executives of building societies shared a 
concern that a shift towards general banking activities was inconsistent with building 
societies’ distinguished status and values. They were of the view that building societies 
should remain as financial mutuals specialising in individual savings and house finances.  
In consequence, the Building Societies Act 1986 came into force on 1 January 1987 (Boddy, 
1989, Buckle and Thompson, 2004). The Building Societies Act 1986 provides building 
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societies an opportunity to be demutualised and converted into shareholder-owned banks. 
According to Casu and Gall (2016), there were a number of strategic reasons which 
motivated building societies to convert into a shareholder-owned bank. Conversion into a 
shareholder bank enabled the demutualised building societies to be freed from the Building 
Societies Act 1986, to obtain additional capital from wholesale funds and to engage in 
securitisation practices. In accordance with the 1986 Act, 25 per cent of building societies’ 
lending should derive from corporate lending. International operations for building societies 
are also limited, whereby they are only allowed to operate within the European Union via 
subsidiaries. Building societies also had the difficulty to access the capital market unlike 
investor-owned banks (Buckle and Thompson, 2004, Boddy, 1989). A number of building 
societies such as Abbey National, Halifax, Northern Rock and Alliance & Leicester, 
therefore, demutualised in order to access the wholesale money market and engage in 
securitisation practices. Demutualisation resulted in 61 per cent of the total assets in the 
building society sector shifting to investor-owned banks between the years 1980 and 2000 
(BSA, 2015a). 
Nevertheless, the 2007/2008 financial crisis witnessed all converted building societies failing 
and none of them exist as an independent economic entity. The converted building societies’ 
easy access to the wholesale money market and securitisation practices had led some of them 
to provide subprime mortgage loans to customers, then reselling those subprime mortgages 
on the international capital market. When the international wholesale money markets dried 
up and banks ceased to lend to each other, the lack of capital caused the converted building 
societies to seek emergency funding from government (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). The 
National Audit Office in 2015, estimated that £1,162 billion of taxpayers’ money has been 
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utilised to bail out the banks such as HBOS, Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and Lloyds 
Bank.  
Building societies which are constrained by the Building Societies Act 1986, in terms of their 
funding and investing activities, did not experience the same problems as the shareholder-
owned financial institutions. Instead, the building society sector managed to attract new 
savers in the midst of the 2008 banking crisis. Adrian Coles, the ex-Director General of the 
BSA, pointed out that the 2008 financial crisis has thus demonstrated that:  
[T]he governance arrangements of building societies have proved rather sounder 
than those of the heavily "incentivised" bankers. Building society managements 
may be stuffy and old-fashioned, but at least they don’t go blowing their capital 
on [Collateralised Debt Obligations] CDOs 2  and hare-brained acquisition-
making. They have proved better stewards of their businesses than their 
converted counterparts (The Independent, 07 June 2008). 
 
The coalition government also pledged in its coalition agreement in 2010 to promote the 
customer-owned business model of building societies by stating: 
We want the banking system to serve business, not the other way round. We will 
bring forward detailed proposals to foster diversity in financial services, 
promote mutuals and create a more competitive banking industry (The Coalition: 
our plan for Government, 2010, p. 9). 
 
Despite the growing profiles and importance of building societies, the response of some 
building societies during the 2008 banking crisis has raised concerns over their governance 
structures and accountability practices. Competition from banks continued to exert increasing 
pressures on the mutual business model. In order to maintain competitiveness, a number of 
                                                 
2 A CDO is a by-product of the structured assets backed security (ABS). CDOs involved the ‘repackaging’ and 
‘resecuritisation’ of the lower ranked and riskier ‘tranches’ of the ABS. CDOs are sold to investors according to 
different risks and returns. In some extreme cases, the tranches of CDOs could further be repackaged and 
resecuritised, and sold to investors. 
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building societies, such as the Dunfermline Building Society, Britannia Building Society, 
Derbyshire Building Society, Chesham Building Society and Barnsley Building Society 
increased their risk-taking by undertaking actions that were not accompanied by appropriate 
risk management, governance structures and capital backing (Andrew Bailey, Ex-CEO of the 
PRA at BSA Conference, 2013a). As a result of that, they made losses on loans (specifically 
on commercial loans), losses due to potentially fraudulent borrowers, losses due to large 
deposits held with Icelandic banks and losses on mortgage books acquired from other lenders 
prior to the financial crisis (Casu and Gall, 2016). When the 2008 credit crunch unfolded, 
many of these building societies encountered problems in maintaining the required level of 
capital and their capability to handle the crisis was significantly undermined. This forced 
them to be rescued and merged with other, bigger, mutually-owned financial institutions such 
as Nationwide and the Yorkshire Building Society.  
There is evidence that some building societies were also involved in some high profile 
scandals such as irregular accounting conduct and selling of misleading products to their 
members (The Telegraph, 16 June 2014, FRC, 2015). For instance, the auditor (Grant 
Thornton) of Manchester Building Society was reprimanded by the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) for failures to comply with the required standards in connection with the 
audits of the financial statements of Manchester Building Society for financial year 2006 to 
20011 and provision of inaccurate information or advice in the course of those audits. The 
finance director of Manchester Building Society was also penalised for negligence in 
carrying out his duties (FRC, 2015). Yorkshire Building Society was fined by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) for £4.1 million and £1.4 million in the year 2014, for failing to 
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deal properly with its mortgage defaulters and the dissemination of misleading promotional 
materials to customers (Yorkshire Building Society Annual Report 2014, p.4).  
Furthermore, Sir Christopher Kelly, an independent reviewer who was commissioned by the 
board of Co-operative Bank to investigate the capital shortfall in the Co-operative Bank in 
2013, concluded that one of sources for the capital shortfall in the Co-operative Bank was 
due to its merger with Britannia Building Society. Britannia Building Society was not 
financially strong after the 2008 financial crisis. The then regulator, the Financial Service 
Authority (FSA), argued that Britannia Building Society would not survive as a standalone 
entity if it did not merge with the Co-operative Bank in August 2009. This is primarily 
because Britannia Building Society had ventured into risky loans and “sometimes complete 
transactions which no other lenders would take on”, prior to the 2008 banking crisis. 
Subsequent to the merger, the newly merged Co-operative Bank failed to plan and manage 
capital adequately, and a weak governance system led to the failure of oversight in the Co-
operative Bank (HM Treasury, 2014, p.15). 
These scandals led some observers to criticise building societies for being susceptible to 
mismanagement and misconduct (Womack, 2010). This thesis maintains that with the 
growing prominence of building societies as a result of the 2008 financial turmoil, an 
analysis and understanding of their roles and accountability obligations towards their 
customers, communities, societies, the general public and other stakeholders is important. 
Previous studies on building societies mainly focused on the effects of demutualisation on the 
building society sector and the investor-owned banks (see e.g. Tayler, 2005, Drake and 
Llewellyn, 2002, Shiwakoti et al., 2008), the implications of the 2008 financial crisis towards 
converted building societies such as Britannia Building Society, HBOS, Northern Rock, 
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Bradford & Bingley (see e.g. House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2009, 2008, 
HM Treasury 2013, Kelly, 2014), and the resilience of building societies’ unique ownership 
structure in the event of an economic crisis (see e.g. Birchall and Ketilson, 2009, Michie, 
2011). This is a gap in the literature in terms of lack of understanding the state of building 
society governance and accountability practices. This study therefore aims to fill this gap in 
the literature by exploring and understanding the governance and accountability issues and 
practices in the building society sector. In particular, the research attempts to address the 
following research question: 
• How does the current UK building societies’ governance system achieve 
accountability?  
In answering the research question, the study attempts:  
1. To develop a mutual accountability framework so as to explore and understand the 
governance and accountability practices in building societies;  
2. To review the development of the building societies movement in the UK; and 
3. To obtain views from key stakeholders (such as directors, regulator, auditor and 
customers) with respect to the states of governance and accountability practices and 
issues in UK building societies. 
1.3 Research Design 
In order to address the above research question and objectives, this research adopts 
Laughlin’s (1995, 2004) middle range thinking (MRT) as the methodological approach. MRT 
maintains the mid-point or hybridised ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
interpretivist and positivist. Laughlin (1995) contends that the approach to engage with social 
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phenomena cannot be operated with minimal intrusion of subjectivity (as in positivist) or 
very individualistic set of subjective processes (as in interpretivist). Instead, MRT argues the 
significance of structures around subjective process of discovery in which theory is ‘skeletal’ 
and serves as the structures to explore the empirical world. Theory will always be incomplete 
and subject to revision through engagement in empirical world (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2014). In terms of ‘change’ option, MRT is open to change or to maintain the status quo of 
the social phenomenon (Laughlin, 1995, 2004, Broadbent and Laughlin, 2014).  
This study considers the governance and accountability practices in the building society 
sector are socially constructed and influenced by its key players (e.g. directors, auditors, 
regulators, and customers)(Laughlin, 2004, Laughlin, 1995, Broadbent and Laughlin, 2014). 
Knowledge and ‘truth’ are obtained by studying and understanding key players’ contexts, 
meanings, narratives and accounts about their governance and accountability processes 
(Willis, 2007, Hallebone and Priest, 2009). Due to the lack of empirical works in mutuals and 
building society sector, a mutual accountability framework for mutual organisations was 
developed and served as the ‘skeletal theory’ according to Laughlin (1995, 2004), or the 
conceptual framework to explore and examine the governance and accountability practices 
and issues in building society sector. The mutual accountability framework is also regarded 
as a normative governance and accountability model of mutual organisations. 
The mutual accountability framework conceptualised four types of accountability – financial-
social dual, compliance, personnel and social accountabilities as the core accountabilities in 
mutual organisations (Stewart, 1984, Sinclair, 1995, Bovens, 2007, Mulgan, 2000). 
Financial-social dual accountability entails elected representatives to be financially and 
socially accountable to customer-members in term of financial performances and social 
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impacts that businesses create to customers (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Compliance 
accountability regards mutuals to comply with rules and regulations set out by policymakers 
and regulator (Stewart, 1984, Mulgan, 2000, Bovens, 2007), and personnel accountability 
requires mutuals to be responsible and accountable to their staff by ensuring that proper 
systems and mechanisms are in place to support employees’ benefits and welfares, as well as 
personal and professional development (Sinclair, 1995, Stewart, 1984). Social accountability 
requires mutuals to be responsible and accountable to environment, local community and 
general public by doing good deeds and serving the needs of individuals who are 
disadvantaged, marginalised and helpless (Gray et al., 2014a). The integrated governance 
model introduced by the Confederation of Finnish Co-operatives  and subsequently modified 
by Ketilson and Brown (2011) - which outlines the internal, intermediate and external  
governance structures  is mobilised to understand and evaluate the governance processes in 
achieving the financial-social dual, compliance, personnel and social accountabilities of 
mutual organisations. Furthermore, this research takes the approach of ‘open to change’. 
Change is promulgated towards the end of the research after in-depth understanding into the 
governance practices in building societies.  
Analysing the states of governance and accountabilities practices in building societies 
involves adopting a certain mode of analysis, which involves tracing the conceptualisation of 
the practices from research participants. The thesis uses semi-structured interviews, 
documentary analysis and non-participant observation as the research techniques in exploring 
and understanding the practices. A total of thirty-eight semi-structured interviews were held 
in two stages, between July and November 2015 and between January and February 2016. 
The interviews were conducted with executives, non-executives, ex-directors, regulator, 
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auditor, representative from Building Societies Association (BSA) and customer-members. 
The executive and non-executive directors were selected on the basis that they have direct 
and vast knowledge with respect to building societies’ governance arrangements. The inputs 
from ex-directors, auditor, regulator, BSA representative and members are vital to 
complement and contradict with the insights of executives and non-executives (Bryman, 
2012, Patton, 2002).  
All interviewees were sent a broad outline of issues to be discussed prior to their interview 
and the purpose of the research was reiterated before the commencement of each interview. 
Each interview was audio recorded, fully transcribed and lasted between forty-five minutes 
and one hour and thirty minutes. Interviewees were reassured that their participation was 
voluntary and their names and organisations would not appear in the thesis. Instead, a 
pseudonym would be used to substitute their names (Rubin and Rubin, 2011, Spencer et al., 
2014). Notes were taken throughout each interview, and an analysis of field notes with 
interview transcripts aided in developing issues that require clarification and elaboration for 
subsequent interviews (Bryman, 2012, Yeo et al., 2013). Furthermore, information was 
referenced from public sources such as the Building Societies Act 1986, HM Treasury reports, 
BSA yearbooks, annual reports, press releases, newspaper articles and websites. Data from 
non-participant observations at members’ meetings were also used to supplement, reinforce 
and contrast with interview and documentary evidence and to provide clearer understanding 
of the governance and accountability practices (Bowen, 2009, Patton, 2002). 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters as depicted in Table 1-1: 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
1 Overview of the Study Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the PhD 
thesis. It highlights the research background, 
case context under study, research question and 
objectives, research design and the structure of 
the thesis. 
2 Mutuality and Governance in 
Mutual Organisations 
Chapter 2 provides a review of existing 
literature on governance practices in mutual 
organisations and co-operatives in order to 
identify the empirical and theoretical gaps that 
form the basis of the research objectives and 
question. The chapter considers the definition 
and attributes of mutuality in mutual 
organisations, corporate governance reform in 
the UK and the distinguished features of mutual 
organisations’ governance. The chapter also 
delineates previous theories on governance in 
mutual organisations and prior governance and 
accountability research in mutual organisations. 
3 Conceptual Framework Chapter 3 examines how governance 
mechanisms serve as valuable mediums through 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
which accountabilities are met and discharged 
to wider constituents. The chapter also 
discusses the natures of accountability and the 
limitations of previous theories on mutual 
organisations’ governance. In addition, the 
chapter introduces and discusses the ‘mutual 
accountability framework’ developed. The 
research considers the mutual accountability 
framework which serves as the ‘skeletal’ theory 
to explore and understand the governance and 
accountability issues in the case context.  
4 Introduction to the Case 
Context: The UK Building 
Societies 
Chapter 4 explains the reasons the UK building 
societies were selected as the background and 
context of the study. The chapter also examines 
the development of the UK building society 
sector since its emergence in the 18th century 
and the impacts of deregulation and 
demutualisation in the building society sector. 
The chapter also highlights the effects of the 
2007/2008 credit crunch on all demutualised 
building societies and the responses of building 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
societies through the crisis. Lastly, it explains 
the governance and regulatory reforms in the 
sector, and justifies the significance of studying 
governance and accountability practices and 
issues in UK building societies. 
5 Research Methodology and 
Methods 
Chapter 5 develops and rationalises the research 
design underpinning the study by delineating 
different types of research paradigms in social 
science research. The chapter also explains the 
reasons MRT has been chosen as the 
methodological approach and the rationales 
why semi-structured interviews, documentary 
analysis and non-participant observation were 
considered the relevant research techniques. 
The procedures utilised for data analysis as well 
as the issues of validity and reliability in 
qualitative research also formed part of the 
discussion in this chapter. 
6 Internal Aspects of 
Governance and 
Chapter 6 analyses and delineates the internal 
dimension of governance and accountability 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
Accountability: An Analysis of 
the Views of Key Stakeholders 
practices in building societies. It reports and 
presents directors’ understanding and views on 
the importance of governance and 
accountability. The overall state of the internal 
governance practices in building societies is 
mentioned as well. The final section of the 
chapter highlights the mechanisms employed by 
the sector in discharging personnel 
accountability. 
7 Intermediate Governance 
Structures and Democratic 
Practices: An Analysis of the 
Views of Customer-Members, 
Directors and  Regulator 
Chapter 7 presents the findings from interviews 
conducted with directors, regulator and 
member-customers, and evidence from 
documents and non-participant observation. The 
chapter discusses members’ roles in building 
societies and the extent to which intermediate 
governance structures are employed to 
discharge financial-social dual accountability 
and to foster democracy in the building society 
sector. 
8 External Aspects of Chapter 8 discusses the external aspects of 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
Governance, Accountability: 
An Analysis of the Views of 
Key Stakeholders 
governance and accountability practices in the 
building society sector. It presents the views of 
directors, regulator and auditor pertaining to the 
roles and development of external audit 
practices and the state of corporate social 
responsibility and accountability practices in the 
building society sector. The chapter also 
deliberates the regulatory and legislative 
framework in building societies.  
9 Theoretical Contribution: 
Mutual Accountability 
Framework 
 
Chapter 9 discusses the theoretical contributions 
of the thesis. The chapter explains the mutual 
accountability framework which developed 
from the empirical findings and academic 
literature and the distinctions between the 
framework and the skeletal conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 3.  
10 Discussion, Summary and 
Conclusion 
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter. It restates 
the research background, summarises key 
findings and provides conclusions that address 
the research question. The chapter also proposes 
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Chapter Brief Description Aims of Each Chapter 
some practical reforms for the building society 
sector. The concluding segments of the chapter 
highlight the shortcomings of the study, 
proposed recommendations for future research 
and contributions of the thesis. 
Table 1-1: The structure and organisation of the thesis 
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CHAPTER 2: Mutuality and Governance in 
Mutual Organisations  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present a detailed review of the existing literature on 
governance practices in mutual organisations, so as to identify the empirical and theoretical 
gaps that form the basis of the research question and objectives. The chapter is structured in 
eight parts. The first part of the chapter, Section 2.2 outlines the definition and attributes of 
mutuality in mutual organisations. Section 2.3 conceptualises governance in mutual 
organisations and Section 2.5 discusses corporate governance reform in the UK. While 
Section 2.5 highlights the distinctive features of governance in mutual organisations, Section 
2.6 discusses previous theories on mutual organisations’ governance practices. Section 2.7 
highlights the importance of studying governance in mutual organisations and Section 2.8 
provides concluding remarks for the chapter. 
2.2 Conceptualisation of Mutuality in Mutual Organisations 
Mutual organisations have been variously defined depending on the countries in which the 
organisation is incorporated (Hyndman et al., 2002). In Canada, mutual organisations and co-
operatives are regarded as the same type of entity (Birchall, 2013a, Shaw, 2006). However, in 
the UK, mutual organisations, unlike co-operatives, were developed from different historical 
movements and ‘ownership structure’. The origin of co-operatives could be traced to the 
‘Rochdale Pioneers’, and it adheres to the seven universal co-operative principles (i.e. 
voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic 
participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation 
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between co-ops; and concern for community) and comprise four major forms: consumer, 
worker, producer and shared services co-operatives (Birchall, 2011, Borda-Rodriguez et al., 
2016).  
Mutual organisations in the UK were historically set out to help those in need by providing 
goods and services that were not provided by other entities and they remain the same now. 
They were created during the industrial revolution, in which people collectively grouped 
together searching for a solution to the social and economic problems that they encountered. 
Individuals then pooled some funds together to help one another (Woodin et al., 2010). This 
is  depicted in the case of friendly societies, which enable the poor to contribute to: funeral, 
employment and sickness expenses; the building societies which make it possible for people 
to save and build their own houses; and credit unions which provide pay day loans to 
individuals (Woodin et al., 2010).  
In the current economic context, mutual organisations compete in an open market alongside 
other private businesses such as investor-owned organisations, sole proprietors and 
partnership firms. However, they are distinguishable from other types of business in terms of 
their ownership structure, where they are customer-owned and controlled. Birchall (2013a, 
2012) states that a customer-owned business means that customers have ownership rights, 
control rights and benefits accruing from the business. Ownership rights mean that the 
owners have the power to decide if a business continues to exist, is sold off or wound up. In 
another words, a mutual organisation cannot be sold without its customers’ permission. In the 
case of UK building societies, the board and managers have to campaign among the 
customers cum owners to get them to agree to convert into shareholder-owned banks, even 
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though many customers have never before been consulted and many are unaware that they 
are the ‘owner’ of the business. 
Ownership usually also gives control rights to customers to vote on the audited accounts or 
the appointment and reappointment of the directors and auditors. Customers also have the 
right to remove the board that fails to serve their interests, entitled to share in the benefits 
derived from the business and to decide on  how the benefits are allocated (Birchall, 2013a, 
Birchall, 2012). Besides ownership structure differences, Gough (1982) and Michie and Blay 
(2004) contend that mutual organisations have a different philosophy towards profit which is 
‘optimising’ rather than ‘maximizing’. This is primarily because mutual organisations were 
chiefly established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a self-help mutual to meet 
the needs of individuals which were not fulfilled by other economic entities. Historically, 
customer-owners of mutual organisations were not concerned with the profit of the business 
as long as they could use the services or products provided by the organisations. As a result 
of that, profit in mutual organisations was non-distributing to the customers in term of cash 
dividends or share options (Hansmann, 1996, Cook et al., 2002). Instead, profit is either paid 
to customers as ‘mutual dividends (or patronage dividends)’ or to reinvest into the business 
in order to increase the retained earnings of the business for the future development of the 
entity (European Commission, 2003, Drake and Llewellyn, 2002, Hansmann, 1996).  
This is as depicted in the case of the UK building societies. The savers or depositors of 
building societies supply funds from which house purchase loans are made. The difference 
between the rate of interest received from the borrowers, and that paid to savers, represents 
the margin which enables a building society to meet all its operating expenses (e.g. staff costs, 
utilities expenses). The ‘profit’ or ‘loss’ is derived after deducting all the operating expenses 
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which would either be reinvested into the financial reserves of the business or paid out to 
customers under a ‘mutual dividend’. In profit-maximising firms, profit is distributed to 
shareholders in share options or dividends to compensate them for the risks that they take in 
investing in the firms. In contrast, customers of building societies receive a ‘mutual dividend’ 
in the form of a higher interest rate for their savings or a lower interest rate for their house 
loans, or in the form of a loyalty scheme (Gough, 1982, Drake and Llewellyn, 2002).  
Furthermore, Dyson (2002) argues that the primary objective of a mutual organisation is to 
deliver social value to its customers. They rely on trading activities instead of donations or 
grants to assist them to achieve social objectives, in particular, the provision of mutual aid 
and solidarity without discrimination of the background of those who need help. This 
suggests that membership discrimination of any kind, whether social, racial, religious or 
political is against the fundamental principle of ‘mutuality and mutual aid’. For instance, both 
credit unions and building societies typically provide savings and lending facilities to 
individuals who were not able to obtain personal and mortgage loans through mainstream 
banking (Leadbeater and Christie, 1999, McCarthy et al., 2002, Hyndman and McKillop, 
2004).  
In summary, a mutual organisation is a type of organisation that is owned and controlled by 
customers. They compete in an open market alongside other types of business organisation. 
However, mutual organisations embed social ethos and the idea of mutuality in their business 
philosophy and operations. They provide products or services to individuals whose demands 
are typically not fulfilled by other types of business organisations. Mutual organisations’ 
pursuit of profit is the means to their social ends, but rather than an end in itself, like in most 
profit-maximizing firms. Mutual organisations in the UK include building societies, friendly 
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societies and credit unions. The notion of mutuality is embedded in the governance and 
accountability structures of a mutual organisation, and the latter is crucial in achieving their 
social ethos and purposes. The governance and accountability issues are discussed next.  
2.3 Governance in Mutual Organisations 
Governance is a contentious and elusive concept. Basically, there is no generally accepted 
definition of governance (Almquist et al., 2013). In its broad understanding, the term 
governance derives from the Latin word, ‘gubernare’, which has its roots in the Greek term 
‘kybernan’ (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). It means to rule, direct or steer. Using this 
definition, if the organisation is a ship, then the role of governance is to steer or pilot the ship 
to its goal or destination (which is the accountability, organisation’s goals or mission and 
vision) (Collier, 2008).  
In corporate governance literature, governance is variedly defined as a structure, rules, 
procedures and mechanisms for proper steering and controlling of the organisation towards 
the achievement of organisation’s mission and vision (Almquist et al., 2013, Solomon, 2013, 
Rezaee, 2008). It has also been regarded as the system by which firms are directed and 
controlled (Cadbury, 1992) and is primarily concerned with the accountability relationship 
between firms and their wider constituents, such as the states, employees, communities and 
members of the public. Corporate governance has also been defined by OECD (2004) as a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders, that provides both the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and the monitoring of performance are 
determined. 
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Despite these many definitions of corporate governance, the above definition of governance 
is largely shaped from the governance approaches in investor-owned firms. There is a very 
limited definition of what governance is in mutual organisations. This research claims that 
the definition by the Working Group of the UK Co-operative Group (2007) covers the 
governance attributes of mutual organisations, which is: 
Corporate governance comprises what all of the organs of the corporate entity 
do, not just what the board of directors does, and that corporate governance is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself. It also concluded that the overarching aim 
of corporate governance is to establish arrangements which meet the needs of 
the business, to ensure that those responsible for the business have the necessary 
skills and experience to do the job, to provide a framework of accountability, 
and to drive the efficiency and success of the organisation. The prompt 
availability of appropriate trading information to the appropriate levels for 
members and members’ representatives is needed to assist in driving such 
efficiency and success (p.16). 
 
The key issue in mutual organisations as well as co-operatives is for the entity to be a 
successful business and achieve its mutuality and social values. The above definition is 
useful for the thesis, because it reflects two key features: recognizing the importance of 
organisation’s values and principles, and the supremacy of customers’ and stakeholders’ 
rights and obligations in the business which is intrinsic principles of the business. Hence, the 
thesis regards governance in mutual organisations as structures, mechanisms, systems and 
practices that enable the mutual organisations to achieve its mission, accountability and 
responsibility to customer-owners and other stakeholders (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, 
Cooper and Owen, 2007, Cornforth and Brown, 2013). The following sections deliberate the 
governance reform in the UK and the implications of the reform towards mutual 
organisations. 
C h a p t e r  2   P a g e  | 26 
2.4 Development of Corporate Governance in the UK 
The late 1980s and the 1990s witnessed the rise of awareness of corporate governance issues 
in the UK. The collapse and failures of Barings Bank, the Bank of Credit & Commerce 
International (BCCI), Polly Peck and the Maxwell Group led the regulators, media, 
employees and taxpayers to question the state of corporate governance in the UK. It has been 
claimed that weak regulation had allowed directors to mismanage and misrepresent their 
companies’ financial positions and led to the collapse of many corporations (Veldman and 
Willmott, 2015).  
In response to the crisis, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), established 
the Corporate Governance Committee in 1991. The committee was chaired by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury and looked into aspects of corporate governance relating to financial accounting and 
accountability of corporations (Veldman and Willmott, 2015). The Cadbury Report was 
published in 1992 and recommended that firms improve accountability, transparency and 
financial reporting (Solomon, 2013, Mallin, 2011). The report was regarded as the first 
formal corporate governance report in the UK which was subsequently adopted by many 
countries around the world (Rayton and Cheng, 2004). In 1995, there was a big concern 
about directors’ remunerations. Too often, directors, specifically in privatised utilities 
companies, were alleged to have receive high salaries and lucrative share options while the 
companies underperformed and employees were not well-paid (Elliott et al., 2000). The 
Greenbury Committee was established in 1995 to look into directors’ remuneration and the 
Greenbury Report recommended the significance of the disclosure of the director’s reward 
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package in annual reports, the creation of a remuneration committee and the importance of 
linking directors’ remuneration to corporate performance (Solomon, 2013, Mallin, 2011).  
Following the success of both Cadbury and Greenbury, the Hampel Committee was set up in 
1998 to review the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. The Hampel 
Report (1998) supported the majority of the requirements of the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports, but promoted disclosures as  prominent aspect of accountability to shareholders 
(Short, 1999). The Combined Code, which was published in 1998, further embraced some of 
the principles of the Hampel, Greenbury and Cadbury reports. The Combined Code 
emphasised directors’ responsibilities in maintaining an effective system of internal controls 
and in disseminating the state of the firm’s internal control to the shareholders (Solomon, 
2013, Mallin, 2011).  
The importance of companies’ internal control was emphasised again when the Turnbull 
Committee was established to respond to the internal control provisions in The Combined 
Code. The Turnbull Report (1999) provided an overview of the system of internal control in 
UK companies and made clear recommendations for improvements needed in firms’ internal 
control (Elliott et al., 2000). Nonetheless, the collapse of Enron and Parmalat led to debate 
about the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (NEDs). The Higgs Review (2003) 
was set out to review the role and effectiveness of NEDs and suggested revisions to The 
Combined Code. The review also recommended a greater proportion of NEDs were needed 
on the board and NEDs should assume the responsibility as a champion of shareholder 
interests (Solomon, 2013, Mallin, 2011). 
Following the publication of the Higgs Review, the Tyson Report (2003) and Smith Report 
(2003) were respectively commissioned by the UK government to look into the effects of 
C h a p t e r  2   P a g e  | 28 
diversity, skills and experience of NEDs and the role of the audit committee in UK corporate 
governance. The Tyson Report indicated that greater boardroom diversity could help to 
improve firms’ relationships with corporate stakeholders. On the other hand, the Smith 
Report addressed the relationship between auditing firms and audit clients, as well as the 
responsibilities of audit committees. Following the reviews of these reports, the FRC in 2003, 
2006 and 2008 amended The Combined Code by taking into consideration recommendations 
made in the Higgs, Tyson and Smith reports (Solomon, 2013, Mallin, 2011). 
The 2008 financial crisis further triggered the UK government to commission Lord Turner 
and Sir David Walker to review the causes of the financial crisis. The Turner Review and The 
Walker Review both identified excessive remuneration as a key element of risk taking by 
financial institutions and therefore both reviews called for better alignment between 
remuneration policies and effective risk management and internal control in financial 
institutions. For example, The Turner Review recommended that the remuneration policies of 
banking executives should be designed to avoid incentives for undue risk-taking, and risk 
management considerations should be closely integrated into remuneration decisions (Turner 
Review, 2009a). The Walker Review further suggested that remuneration committees should 
replace the board in overseeing the pay of high-paid executives, increased public disclosure 
about high-paid executives and employees (for those earning above £1 million) and short-
term bonuses of directors should be paid over a period of three years (Walker Review, 
2009b). 
In 2010, following an extensive consultation with companies, auditing firms, academics and 
shareholders, the FRC updated The Combined Code. It incorporated a number of 
recommendations made by The Walker Review (e.g. director’s remuneration should align to 
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corporate performance) and introduced four new principles: (i) the chairperson’s 
responsibility for leading the board, (ii) the need for directors to devote sufficient time to 
their responsibilities, (iii) the requirement for NEDs to constructively challenge the policies 
and strategies of executive directors, and (iv) the need for the board to have a balance of 
skills and experience (FRC, 2010). The Combined Code was also renamed as the UK 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010 and is currently adopted and complied by most 
companies listed at the LSE. 
2.5 Distinctive Features of Mutual Organisations’ Governance  
While the above provide a brief review of the development of corporate governance in UK, it 
is highlighted that most of those reforms mainly affected big corporations or public listed 
companies in the UK, rather than mutual organisations. This is primarily because the 
majority of mutual organisations are small and medium-sized businesses. They are customer-
owned and do not exist solely for the purpose of profit making. Their directors are elected 
among the customers and may not be well versed in business (Leadbeater and Christie, 1999, 
Ketilson and Brown, 2011). Hence, some of the governance issues encountered and 
experienced by big corporations or public listed companies, such as issues of directors’ 
remunerations and the diversity and expertise of NEDs, may not necessarily be applicable 
and relevant to mutual organisations (McCarthy et al., 2002, Hyndman and McKillop, 2004, 
Ketilson and Brown, 2011).  
The Confederation of Finnish Co-operatives (2000) and Ketilson and Brown (2011) suggest 
that the ways to understand the governance practices in mutual organisations is to look into 
the organisation’s internal, intermediate and external governance structures. These three 
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different but related governance structures arguably provide a holistic overview of a mutual 
organisation’s governance practices. 
 The internal governance structure is the internal governance mechanism that assists board of 
directors to achieve its objectives and fulfil its accountabilities and responsibilities. It also 
enables board of directors to monitor management in the interest of customers and other 
stakeholders (Keasey and Wright, 1993). Each different mutual organisation has 
distinguished internal governance structures. For instance, Ketilson and Brown (2011) argue 
that credit unions in Canada are gradually moving towards a corporate model where the 
board structures (e.g. board size, board committees, director term and tenure) and board 
development (e.g. leadership, director recruitment, director training and evaluation) of credit 
unions are similar to private sector organisations in Canada. On the other hand, some mutual 
organisations in the UK have shifted towards a corporate model of governance, while others 
have remained regionally and locally managed by communities, customers and volunteers 
(McKillop and Wilson, 2011, Hyndman et al., 2004). Hyndman and Mckillop (2004) argue 
that Irish credit unions are run and managed by local volunteers of the credit unions who 
have limited experience in accounting-related matters. In contrast, building societies and 
friendly societies are run by a board of directors who are ‘skilled individuals’ and also the 
customers of the business (BSA, 2010b, Birchall, 2013a). Nonetheless, information related to 
the extent of the board structure, board development and internal control structures of mutual 
organisations in the UK are limited. This is one of the motivations for this study.  
Spear (2004) and Cornforth (2004) further suggest that mutual organisations are by virtue 
created and owned by their customers. In order to foster members’ involvement in the 
business and to ensure that the elected board of directors are accountable to customers, most 
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mutual organisations would have in place ‘intermediate (or democratic) governance 
structure’ (Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Leadbeater and Christie, 1999, Pearce, 2003). The 
purpose of intermediate governance structure is to promote democracy, ensure that customers 
could exercise their control rights over the business and to foster customer engagement in the 
business (Birchall, 2013a, Birchall, 2012). This, according to Fairbairn (2003), is also the 
defining feature of customer-owned business. The structure is argued to help developing and 
maintaining a strong relationship between customers and their mutual organisations: 
One common way of seeing [mutual organisations] is to think of them as 
businesses like others, except that they have a democratic member-control 
structure. The structure, in this view, makes the mutual organisation. The 
problem with considering only a structural view is that it is ultimately 
unsatisfying. Why do the members have a democratic control structure, if the 
business is no different from other businesses? Can a democratic control 
structure be an end in itself, worth the effort of creating a [mutual organisation]? 
Would it not be more efficient to deliver the same services without the apparatus 
of member control? Such questions are often asked by those who have doubts 
about the [customer-owned] model (p.6). 
Figure 2-1 reflects the function of the intermediate governance structure. With the 
intermediate governance structure, the elected representative, NEDs and management can 
provide an effective link between customers and board. This link is important to enable the 
customers to inform the board of their needs as well as enable the board to communicate to 
customers on issues that the business is experiencing (Cooperative Group, 2007).  
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Figure 2-1: Function of Democratic or Intermediate Governance Structure (Source: 
Ketilson and Brown, 2011; UK Co-operative Group, 2007) 
 
It also enables the board to remain accountable to the customers, so that the customers are 
encouraged when the business is doing well and constructively criticised when the business 
underperforms and needs to adjust its approach (Cooperative Group, 2007). The implication 
of such an approach is to enrich customers’ loyalty and trust (Fairbairn, 2003), align the 
interests of customers with those of the board and managers and enable customers to control 
the business, which could ultimately increase the likelihood of the business’ success (Birchall, 
2012). Included among the intermediate governance structures are the representatives’ 
structures (e.g. control structures) and participatory structures (e.g. member council, AGM, 
any other communication measures), which are further highlighted in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, similar to any type of business, mutual organisations are subject to varying 
degrees of regulations and legislations. External governance structure set the external 
parameters within which mutual organisations operate such as: the industry specific 
legislations or national and international regulations, and the roles of auditors. Regulations 
C h a p t e r  2   P a g e  | 33 
help mutual organisations to achieve good and effective governance (Hyndman and 
McDonnell, 2009). The next section provides a review into theories on governance in mutual 
organisations. 
2.6 Theories on Mutual Organisations’ Governance Practices 
An array of theories have been developed and used to explain corporate governance practices 
due to different researchers have distinguish perspectives of the role of accounting theory. 
For instance, some researchers believe that accounting theory such as positive accounting 
theory should seek to explain and predict particular phenomena (as opposed to prescribing 
particular activities) (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Research “is designed to explain and 
predict which firms will and which firms will not use a particular [accounting method]” but 
not on which method a firm should use (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.7). Research is also 
to be undertaken to see if particular results can be replicated in different settings and 
observation or empirical evidence helps to test and refine the theory (Deegan and Unerman, 
2011).  
Meanwhile, other researchers believed that accounting theory such as normative accounting 
theory is to prescribe (rather than describe) particular accounting approaches (such as based 
on particular perspective on the role of accounting) and should be based on the values or 
beliefs held by the researchers proposing the theory (Tinker et al., 1982). Empirical evidence 
is not evaluated on the basis of whether theories reflect actual accounting practices. In fact, 
the purpose of most normative research is to suggest radical changes to current practices 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). In the next sub-sections, other theoretical perspectives that 
seek to theorise corporate governance practices in mutual organisations are considered and 
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discussed. Specifically, democratic theory, agency theory and stewardship theory are 
discussed next. 
2.6.1 Democratic Theory 
Goodin (2003, p.386) defines democracy as to: 
…internalize the perspective of the others. Differences of opinion exist within 
the network…but assured that they are all aiming at the same goal, participants 
in networks respect one another’s opinions, explore the bases for their 
differences and try in good faith to resolve them. 
Democracy in mutual organisations means that every customer of a mutual organisation has 
an equal voice in the business operations. The elected representatives or board of directors 
are regarded as representatives who represent the interest of customers and run the business 
on the customers’ behalf. Board of directors are appointed by customers in an open election 
process and on the basis of a ‘one member one vote’ basis. Regardless of the percentage of 
capital a customer invests in the business, no individual customer has a superior position over 
other customers. All customers have only one vote in the organisation’s governance matters 
(Michie and Blay, 2004 Cornforth, 2004, Spear et al., 2009). 
Leadbeater and Christie, (1999) and Cornforth (2004) further suggest that democracy in 
mutual organisations means that any customer in the organisation can put himself or herself 
forward for election as an elected representative. Although expertise may be desirable on the 
board of mutual organisations, Cornforth (2004) claimed that expertise should not be the 
central focus of the board. Instead, any layperson or non-professional member could put his 
or her name forward to be appointed as a board member. This is primarily because mutual 
organisations are incorporated in the first place by the customers, to help out other customers. 
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Hence, customers, regardless of their background and experience, should have equal 
opportunities to be elected as board of directors or elected representatives (Cornforth, 2004).  
Nonetheless, the democratic theory argues that when membership becomes too large, 
dispersed and diverse, there is a greater difficulty for mutual organisations to maintain a 
strong common purpose with their customers and, to promote and preserve democracy in 
mutual organisations (Leadbeater and Christie, 1999). However, Ketilson and Brown (2011) 
and Jones and Kalmi (2012) suggest that having in place intermediate governance structure 
(as explained in Section 2.5) could maintain democracy within individual mutual 
organisation and enhance organisation’s accountability. 
2.6.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is grounded on an economic rationalist perspective and is a dominant theory 
in the corporate governance literature on corporation and shareholder-owned companies. It 
describes the principal (owner/shareholder) and agent (manager) relationship and assumes 
that agents and principals have different interests. The interest of the principal is to maximise 
his own profitability (e.g. maximizing his own dividend) rather than that of the agent. 
Similarly, the interest of the agent is to maximise his/her own bonuses rather than that of the 
interests of the principal (Mallin, 2011). In order to align the goal of the managers and 
shareholders, Spear (2004) claimed that pressures from major shareholders, the threat of 
mergers and takeovers as well as the influence of the rewards structure will affect the way in 
which managers will act in the interests of the shareholders. 
Applying agency theory to study governance in mutual organisations is not entirely 
straightforward. This is primarily because agency theory assumes that the customers are the 
owners and ‘principals’ of the business and the elected board of directors are regarded as the 
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agents. Agency theory also assumes that principal and agent often have competing interests 
and that market control such as threat of takeover, pressure from major shareholders and 
attractive reward packages will align the interest of the principals to the agents (Spear, 2004).  
Nevertheless, the majority of mutual organisations are incorporated in the first place to serve 
their customers and mutual organisations need to make a sufficient amount of profit but are 
not under pressure to maximise the profits of their investors as in most investor-owned 
companies (this is one of the core principles of mutuality: profit optimisation rather than 
maximisation) (Spear, 2004). Members, as argued by Cornforth (2004), are not interested in 
the profitability level of the mutual organisations. Instead, members focus on the ‘mutual 
dividends’ that they receive in terms of higher interest rates for their savings accounts and 
better services from the organisations. The board of directors (or agents) are therefore, not 
under the pressures to maximise shareholders’ dividends which is in contradict with the 
assumptions of agency theory that having in place a reward structure (e.g. promotion, 
disciplinary action, pay linked to share values) would align the interests of agents to 
principals.  
Second, most members do not monitor their mutual organisations and the majority of mutual 
organisations do not have access to the capital markets. Mutual organisations therefore are 
not subject to monitoring and controlling from professional or major investors as in investor-
owned organisations. This also means that mutual organisations may not be subjected to 
threat of takeover and discipline from the capital market (Spear, 2004, Cornforth, 2004). 
Managers  may have greater opportunities to run and manage the mutual organisations as 
their personal business (Buckle and Thompson, 2004). According to Hyndman  and 
McDonnell (2009), legislative and regulative frameworks may balance the power of 
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managers. If managers believe the regulator is monitoring the mutual organisations 
effectively, they will consider the potential for opportunism to be reduced. 
However, Spear (2004, p.50) notes that agency theory mainly focuses on the relationship 
between managers and customer-owner-members and downplays “collective, social or 
organizational factors ” and also “tends to ignore non-financial motivations such as mutual, 
reciprocal benefits, trust, and other features of social economy ideology that often helped 
initiate and support such enterprises.” Ketilson and Brown (2011) therefore argue that in 
order to understand governance practices, it is necessary to develop an approach that 
provides a holistic overview apart from looking at principal and agent relationship. 
2.6.3 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory assumes that board of directors are the stewards or custodian of the 
business. The board of directors have good intentions and the desires to do a good job and act 
as an effective custodian of organisation’s resources (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). They also 
have the responsibilities of preserving and enhancing organisation’s performance, value of 
the assets under their control and to balance the various claims on those assets. This theory 
also notes that board members should be selected on the basis of their expertise, knowledge 
and skills so that they are in a position to add value to the organisations’ decisions 
(Cornforth, 2004). 
Spear (2004) states that the stewardship model of governance may be appealing to 
mutual organisations’ boards because mutual organisations are owned and controlled 
by their members: 
If this model is applied to democratic member owned organisations, it is clearly 
more attractive from the point of view of emphasising the social dimension of 
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DMOs [democratic member-based organisations], where trust and social 
economy values can be functional for good performance and good 
board/manager/ member relations. Most DMOs would recognise the importance 
of considering the interests of all stakeholders, but they would expect some 
privileging of member interests (p.52). 
 
However, Kay and Silberston (1995) and Spear (2004 ) acknowledge that the potential 
weaknesses associated with the assumptions in stewardship model in mutual organisations’ 
governance are first, the problem of resolving and prioritising the divergence of goals of 
different stakeholders and measuring the performance against them (rather than the focus on 
clear goal of shareholder value). Second, Spear (2004) highlights the lack of oversight of 
management and an over-reliance on an expert board contradicts with the democratic 
principles of mutual organisations, in which all customers cum owner-members should 
have an equal opportunity to be appointed as board members. Cornforth also 
emphasises that because directors are democratically elected, it might be impractical to 
expect high levels of expertise, knowledge, and experience from board members as 
promulgated by stewardship theory. As a result, Spear (2004) and Cornforth (2002, 
2004) claim that stewardship theory may not appropriately reflect the role of board of 
directors in some mutual organisations. 
This section has thus shed light into a few theoretical perspectives that have been adopted to 
explain governance in mutual organisations. Each of these theories defines a different way of 
how the board of directors works and also the paradoxes of the theory when applied to study 
governance in mutual organisations. The next section discusses the nature of previous 
governance and accountability studies in the mutual and co-operatives industry, and the 
researcher motivation in conducting research on the governance issues in mutual 
organisations. 
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2.7 The Importance of Studying Governance and Accountability in UK Mutual 
Organisations  
Governance and accountability remains a vital subject in the UK as there have been a number 
of highly publicised scandals involving mutual organisations over the years. These include 
the capital shortfall of Co-operative Bank in 2013 subsequent to its merger with Britannia 
Building Society. The new merged bank’s board was reported in The Kelly Review, headed 
by Sir Christopher Kelly, as unsuccessful in overseeing the executives, and that the executive 
directors failed to exercise sufficient prudent and effective management of the firm’s capital 
and risks (HM Treasury, 2014). The collapse of UK credit unions was also associated with a 
weak standard of governance, internal control and financial accounting system. It was 
reported by Jones (2010) that the lack of effective governance and management led to the 
collapse of many large UK credit unions. Lord Penrose, a reviewer appointed to investigate 
the downfall of Equitable Life (a life insurance mutual in the UK in 2004), also contended 
that the failure of the mutual insurance company was due to ineffective scrutiny by 
executives and the board of directors lacked sufficiently skilled individuals (HM Treasury, 
2004). Therefore, the collapse of some of these mutual organisations had led to the concern 
and debate about the state of governance and accountability in UK mutual organisations 
(Michie, 2013).  
Nonetheless, many previous governance studies that had been carried out in the UK mainly 
focused on large private corporations (Brennan and Solomon, 2008, Solomon, 2013). 
Notably, there is very limited academic research which studies the governance and the 
operations of the board in UK mutual organisations (Shaw, 2006). Previous studies that had 
been conducted about mutual organisation in the UK include but are not limited to the 
following literature: 
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• Studies that investigated the extent of disclosure of financial information in Irish 
credit unions (see e.g. Hyndman et al., 2004, see e.g. Adam and Armitage, 2004, 
Michie and Llewellyn, 2010, Birchall, 2002, Hyndman and McKillop, 2004);  
• Studies that explored and understood the motivation behind members’ participation 
and monitoring in mutual organisations and co-operatives (see e.g. Birchall and 
Simmons, 2004, Birchall, 2013a); 
• Studies which investigated the relevance and resilience of customer-owned business 
in financial institutions, football clubs, water utilities companies, or public sector 
organisations (see e.g. Birchall and Ketilson, 2009, Michie, 2011, Michie, 1999, 
Michie and Blay, 2004, Birchall, 2002); 
• Studies which compared and contrasted how theory, such as democratic theory, 
agency theory and stewardship theory can be extended and applied to study 
governance in mutual organisations (Cornforth, 2002, Cornforth, 2004, Spear, 2004); 
• Inquiries which were carried out by the House of Commons Treasury Committee to 
investigate reasons of the breakdown of mutual organisations such as mutual life 
insurance and building societies (HM Treasury, 2009, HM Treasury 2004). 
This thesis addresses the limited but much needed research in the governance and 
accountability of mutual organisations and building societies. The rationale in which building 
societies have been selected as the context of this study are mainly because the UK. Building 
societies are one of the oldest types of mutual in the world and the UK. The sector was 
argued to have survived the 2008 financial crisis better than most investor-owned banks. 
Nevertheless, there were increasing financial scandals, governance and accountability 
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problems surrounding the industry. Some of these issues received very limited attention from 
policy makers, academics, media, and members of the general public. The next chapter 
provides a review of the conceptual framework developed to explore and understand the 
governance and accountability issues in UK building societies. 
2.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has discussed on the importance of studying governance in mutual organisations. 
The chapter argues that there are increasing debates and discussions about mutual 
organisations’ governance practices. However, research in this area receives very limited 
attention from scholars and practitioners, whether in the emerging economy market or the 
advanced economy market. The chapter also argues that previous theories (e.g. agency theory, 
stewardship theory and democratic theory) on mutual organisations’ governance are mainly 
concerned with the role and responsibilities of the board of directors. There have been few 
studies which attempt to explore and understand the holistic state of governance practices in 
mutual organisations. This chapter concluded by emphasizing the significance of studying 
governance and accountability issues in mutual organisations, specifically within the UK 
building society sector. The next chapter outlines the conceptual framework of the research 
in studying and exploring the governance and accountability issues in mutual organisations, 
vis-a-vis the building society industry. 
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CHAPTER 3: Conceptual Framework  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand governance and accountability practices and issues in mutual 
organisations and building societies, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss how governance 
mechanisms provide a valuable medium through which accountability is met and discharged 
to various stakeholders. The chapter is structured into six main parts. Section 3.2 introduces 
and deliberates the nature of accountability. Section 3.3 highlights forms of accountability, 
which were drawn by prior research, to study accountability practices and processes in 
various economic entities. Section 3.4 justifies the reasons that the ideas of accountability are 
drawn, in order to study governance in mutual organisations. The section also discusses the 
limitations of previous theories of mutual organisations’ governance. The summary of the 
chapter is highlighted in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Nature of Accountability 
The accounting literature on accountability is diverse. Some studies have examined 
accountability practices within specific contexts, such as the public sector (Sinclair, 1995), 
the private sector (Gray et al., 1995, Owen, 2008) or civil society organisations (Agyemang 
et al., 2009, O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). A large body of 
literature has also concentrated on developing a conceptual framework based on 
accountability (see e.g. Dubnick, 2002, Roberts, 2009, Mulgan, 2000). Important issues 
pertaining to accountability as delineated in literature are discussed in the following sections. 
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3.2.1 Accountability as a Relational Concept 
Accountability as a concept is arguably ‘chameleon-like’, abstract and complex in nature. It 
is variously defined in different disciplines and means different things to different people 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996, Ebrahim, 2003a, Sinclair, 1995, Mulgan, 2000). According to 
Dubnick (1998), the meaning of accountability in English (or the Anglian concept) is 
different from Romance languages (e.g. French, Spanish and Italian) and Northern European 
languages (e.g. Dutch, Danish, and German), or in other words, from a linguistic aspect. In 
Romance languages, the term ‘responsibility’ is used in lieu of English accountability, and in 
Northern European languages, accountability is associated with duty or obligation (Dubnick, 
1998).  
From the political science aspect, Dubnick (1998) argues that to understand accountability 
requires tracing the roots of the English idea of accountability. According to the author, the 
history of accountability can be traced to the reign of William I, after the Norman Conquest 
of England. Twenty years after the Norman Conquest, William I required all property holders 
under his realm to ‘render a count’ of what they possessed to the royal surveyors. This 
exercise was not merely for tax purposes, but served as a foundation for royal governance 
(Bovens, 2007, Dubnick, 1998, Dubnick, 2002). Since the reign of William I, accountability 
has then moved from accounting (e.g. bookkeeping and financial administration) to include 
equitable governance and the accountability relationship between citizens holding the 
sovereign to account (Dubnick, 2002). For instance, ministers and public officials are 
required to publicly explain and justify policies to the general public, and to show willingness 
to admit to and provide remedy for errors (Licht, 2002). 
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Despite diverse ideas on accountability, Robert and Scapens (1985) and Gray and Jenkins 
(1993) contend that accountability is to make ones assume the responsibility for  their 
conduct. This idea requires one to be answerable, or to provide an account with information 
through oral or written evidence and not always financial accounts, in order to demonstrate 
the actions that one is responsible for (Gray et al., 1996). According to Gray and Jenkins 
(1993), the right for the accountee to hold the accountor accountable for his action is due to 
the accountability relationship between them, that is mediated by a formal or informal 
agreement. An account is discharged when the accountor provides an account of the actions 
that it has taken up or foreborne to the accountee. The accountee will, in effect, evaluate the 
account and performance rendered, as well as have the right to probe further and request for 
additional information (Mulgan, 2000). As a result of the performance and account 
evaluation, the accountee will apply sanctions and rewards (e.g. formal or informal) to the 
accountor (Bovens, 2007, Mulgan, 2000). However, in certain cases, the accountor has a 
right to protect privacy and is entitled to withhold some information from the accountee if it 
disadvantages other accountees (Ijiri, 1983).  
Mulgan (2000) views the original concept of accountability provided by Gray and Jenkins 
(1993) and Gray et al. (2014) was very much about the external accountability relationship 
between accountor and accountee. According to Mulgan (2000, p.556), accountability has 
also included “an internal sense which goes beyond the core external focus of the term”. The 
internal aspect of accountability, as argued by Roberts and Scapens (1985), is the means by 
which we seek to remind each other of our reciprocal dependence. Such reciprocal 
dependence is due to individual morality values and beliefs that humans are bonded with 
each other, not simply in narrow, calculable ways, but also more broadly in intended and 
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unintended ways. Therefore, accountability can be understood from a number of different 
perspectives involving reciprocal rights and moral responsibility, as well as duties and 
obligations. 
Similar to the notion of accountability provided by Mulgan (2000), Gray and Jenkins (1993) 
and Gray et al. (2014b), this thesis considers accountability to be derived from the 
accountability relationship between two or more parties (not necessarily defined by 
economic or legal contracts). It entails one to be answerable for one’s conduct and 
responsibilities and accounting information is typically an instrument drawn to discharge the 
accountability. Governance is considered the structure, system and mechanisms in place to 
control and monitor the achievement and discharge of accountability. Accounting, 
accountability and governance are therefore inter-related. The next sub-sections synthesise 
multiple forms of accountability as explained in the literature. 
3.3 Synthesis of Accountability in Literature 
As accountability is derived from relationships, Ebrahim (2003a, 2010) and Fry (1995) 
contend that accountability encompasses dual aspects: formal and informal dimensions. 
Laughlin (1990) considers formal accountability as resulting in written forms of recording 
and defining expectations such as contractual and legal obligations. On the other hand, 
informal accountability is derived as a consequence of internal, private, morally right or 
voluntary reasons and the accountability is commonly discharged in less structured settings 
(e.g. in a social setting where defined roles are unclear between colleagues) (Roberts, 1991). 
The following subsection summarises different types of accountabilities as debated in the 
literature under the categorization of formal and informal accountabilities. 
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3.3.1.1 Formal External Accountability 
Formal external accountability is conceived as a type of accountability that is based on an 
external accountability relationship between an accountor and accountee. It is a type of 
accountability that is short term in orientation and favours accountability to group of external 
stakeholders who are mainly influential, powerful and resourceful-such as institutional 
shareholders, NGOs’ donors, regulators and enforcement bodies. These stakeholders 
generally have formal oversight, control or influence on directors, managers and 
organisations (Ebrahim, 2003b, O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).  
In most situations, powerful external stakeholders can instil a sense of anxiety or 
vulnerability in managers. Managers must continually strike to demonstrate ‘performance’ or 
adherence to rules and procedures set out by those dominant external stakeholders (O'Dwyer 
and Boomsma, 2015). Performance tends to be measured around resource use, measuring 
immediate outcomes using short-term quantitative targets, or standardised indicators which 
focus exclusively on financial performances, project outcomes and mission achievement 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Punishment will be imposed by powerful external stakeholders 
if rules are not followed or missions have not been achieved (O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).  
However, according to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) and Ebrahim (2003b), overemphasis 
on formal external accountability has damaging effects on an organisations’ ability to act as 
an effective catalyst for social change, and may divert the attention of the accountable entity 
to be accountable to less powerful stakeholders (e.g. employees, beneficiaries, communities, 
environment and societies). Specifically, in the setting of the third sector organisations 
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(TSOs)3, overemphasis of formal external accountability could threaten and re-orient the 
underlying raison d’être of the social operations and missions of the TSOs (O'Dwyer and 
Boomsma, 2015, Ebrahim, 2005). 
This is as exemplified in the setting of microfinance in Zimbabwe. Dixon et al. (2007) 
observed that loan officers of a Zimbabwe microfinance organisation were faced with 
powerful formal external accountability pressures from donors of the microfinance. The 
threats of donors to withdraw funding from the microfinance entity had put immense stress 
on loan officers to pursue inappropriate methods to compel repayment from defaulters. 
Consequently, there were detrimental effects on the microfinance’s short and long-term 
survival as clients’ trust and loyalty towards the organisation diminished over time.  
The examples of formal external accountability include that of hierarchical, functional and 
imposed accountability as promulgated by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), Edwards and 
Hulme (1996) and O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015). Table 3-1 further summarises other 
instances of formal external accountability that are at times intertwined with formal internal 
accountability.  
3.3.2 Formal Internal Accountability 
Formal internal accountability focuses on an exchange of accounts that takes place within an 
organisation. There are various forms of formal internal accountabilities that are debated in 
the literature, such as managerial accountability, the ‘individualising form of accountability’ 
                                                 
3 Third sector organisation is regarded as value-based organisation which embraces social purposes in the 
organisations’ operations and objectives. Profit is utilised to finance the achievement of the social objectives of 
the organisations. The HM Treasury considered voluntary community organisations, social enterprises, and 
mutuals and co-operatives as types of TSOs in the UK. 
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or ‘hierarchical accountability’ (Roberts, 1991, Stewart, 1984, Sinclair, 1995). These 
accountabilities generally attempt to look into accountability practices between managers and 
subordinates, in terms of managers holding subordinates accountable for the performance of 
delegated duties (Sinclair, 1995), or subordinates holding managers accountable for their 
functional responsibilities (Stewart, 1984), or how each functional department in an 
organisation achieves its own predefined tasks and predetermined objectives which are in 
congruence with the overall vision of the organisation (Messner, 2009). 
Various mechanisms have been implemented to measure or control the achievement of 
formal internal accountability. These include the implementation of performance 
management and assessment tools such as a balanced scorecard, benchmarking, budgetary 
planning and control, staff improvement programmes and staff performance evaluations 
(Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003, Connolly and Kelly, 2011). An array of management 
accounting literature has specifically studied the implementation and implications of these 
accounting mechanisms (see e.g. Roberts, 1991, Messner, 2009, Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
However, it is beyond the scope and intention of the present research to review each of the 
management accounting mechanisms. 
Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003) and Roberts (1991) argue that overemphasis of formal 
internal accountability could cause negative consequences for the staff and organisation. This 
is primarily because formal internal accountability is often associated with achievement of 
targets, rewards and punishment of staff and the hierarchical system in an organisation. Over-
prioritization of these mechanisms and structures could cause employees to be strictly guided 
and controlled by rules and plans, and forget the interdependence between themselves and 
their colleagues. The long term effects of this could transform employees into mindless 
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‘automatons’ (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003), and to be in a constant mental state of 
nervous preoccupation with as to how they are seen by others (Roberts, 1991). Due to that, 
Roberts (1991) argues that a ‘socialising form of accountability’—a type of informal internal 
accountability—could serve to neutralise the experience of work and mitigate individuals 
from the impersonal harshness of hierarchy system in organisations. This informal internal 
accountability is further discussed in the next section and Table 3-1 summarises other sub-
types of formal internal and external accountabilities under accountability for compliance, 
resources, performances, procedures and leadership that are synthesised from the literature. 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
1) Compliance-  
Fulfilling 
legal 
obligations 
This 
accountability is 
to fulfil legal 
and contractual 
obligations 
Legal 
 
Ensuring that power given by law 
is not exceeded (Stewart, 1984). 
Filling annual financial and 
tax return, meeting legal 
and regulatory standards. 
Specific responsibilities are 
formally and legally conferred 
upon authorities and legal scrutiny 
is based on detailed legal 
standards, prescribed by laws and 
standards (Bovens, 2007). 
Professional Associate with professional and 
expertise integrity. The sense of 
duty that one has as a member of a 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
professional or expert group, in 
which the individual occupies a 
privileged and knowledgeable 
position in society (Sinclair, 1995). 
Accountabilities towards 
professional bodies. Professional 
bodies generally lay down the 
codes for acceptable practices that 
are binding for all members and 
the members’ practices are 
monitored and enforced by the 
professional supervisory bodies 
(Bovens, 2007). 
C h a p t e r  3     P a g e  | 52 
Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
Requires the practices of acquired 
techniques and values of the 
particular profession and the 
exercise of professional judgment 
during the practices, typically in an 
unsupervised context (Mulgan, 
2000). 
2) Resources- 
Proper 
management 
of resources 
To ensure that 
organisational 
resources and 
funds are 
properly 
Efficiency No waste of use in resources 
(Stewart, 1984). 
Annual reports, waste 
management programme, 
environmental 
management system. 
Administrative Monitoring the processes by which 
input is transformed (Sinclair, 
1995). 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
handled and 
used in 
accordance with 
the authorised 
manner. 
Exercising regular financial and 
administrative control (Bovens, 
2007). 
Fiduciary Concerned with the 
professionalism in which 
organisations are run and the 
safeguarding of organisations’ 
funds, assets and future (Dhanani 
and Connolly, 2012). 
Financial Concerned with financial 
performance of organisation. 
Management needs to account for 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
the financial position and to 
convey operational continuity, 
stability, viability and efficiency of 
the organisation (Dhanani and 
Connolly, 2012). 
Fiscal Ensuring that funds have properly 
been utilised in accordance to 
stipulated constitutions (Leat, 
1990). 
3) Performance- 
Meeting 
standards and 
To ensure that 
performance of 
organisations 
Performance Linked with the performance of 
organisation and whether it meets 
with required standards (Stewart, 
Performance assessment 
and evaluation (e.g. 
balanced scorecard, 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
objectives meet required 
standards. 
1984). benchmarking, social 
return on investment). 
Result Concerned with outcomes (e.g. 
whether good consequences are 
resulted). The nature of the 
account is by giving an adequate 
account showing what has been 
done to produce good effects and 
results (Goodin, 2003). 
4) Procedures-
Undertaking 
correct 
activities 
To ensure that 
correct activities 
have been 
undertaken to 
Programme Concerned with whether works 
carried out by an organisation had 
met its objectives (mission) 
(Stewart, 1984). 
Continuous improvement 
through training and 
organisational learning; 
monitoring and 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
meet 
organisational 
goals. 
 
 
 
 
Organisation continuously 
identifies and interprets its own 
standards of acceptable practice 
(Connolly and Kelly, 2011). 
reputational sanctioning by 
peers; stakeholder 
engagement. 
Process Relate to internal organisational 
operations and are designed to 
confirm that management 
processes and procedures embody 
societal norms and beliefs (i.e. 
look at how organisations achieve 
their objectives) (Dhanani and 
Connolly, 2012). 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
Ensure proper procedures have 
been followed in accordance with 
the organisation's constitutions 
(Leat, 1990). 
Action The nature of the account is to 
show whether what has been done 
is right or acceptable (Goodin, 
2003). 
5) Leadership- 
The role of 
management 
in setting up 
Management 
and directors 
ensure that 
organisations 
Managerial A person’s location within a 
hierarchy in which a superior calls 
to account a subordinate for the 
performance of delegated duties 
Staff’s performance 
appraisal, learning and 
training, promotion and 
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Nature of the 
Accountability 
Overall 
Definition 
Form of 
Accountability 
Definition of the Form of 
Accountability 
Examples of 
Accountability 
Mechanisms (e.g. 
Process, Tools or 
Practices) 
and meeting 
goals 
have carried out 
and met 
organisational 
objectives, 
mission and 
vision. 
(Sinclair, 1995). demotion, bonuses. 
Accountability of a subordinate to 
a superior in an organisation 
(Stewart, 1984). 
The process of calling to account 
takes place along the strict lines of 
the chain of command (Bovens, 
2005). 
Table 3-1: The typology of various formal internal and external accountabilities (Source: Synthesis based on the above 
mentioned authors) 
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3.3.3 Informal External Accountability 
Informal accountability focuses on account giving by an organisation or individual that is not 
subjected to formal control mechanisms. Instead, this form of accountability is driven by a 
sense of responsibility, possessing an ethical, moral or value based dimension which is 
largely absent in formal types of accountability (Roberts, 1991, Messner, 2009, Lindkvist and 
Llewellyn, 2003). Gray (2006, p.335) contends that informal forms of accountability take 
precedence over formal forms of accountability, particularly in the majority of TSOs as: 
…relationships between NGOs [or TSOs] and their stakeholders—and 
especially their funders—is not a purely economic one (unlike that between 
shareholder and company). It is a more complex relationship and reflects more 
complex attitudes and interactions between the organisation and its stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the relationship may not be—nor needs to be—as formal and as 
distant as that between shareholders and company (the yardstick against which 
all accountability relationships appear to be judged). Matters such as trust, 
emotion, conscience, social contracts, mutuality etc. all enter into the 
relationship and to reduce such complexity to monotonic performance measures 
is to demean the complexity of the relationship.  
 
There are two types of informal accountabilities that are deliberated in the literature: informal 
external and informal internal. Informal external accountability prioritises account-giving to 
less powerful external stakeholders in a more informal setting. Unlike formal external 
accountability in which external stakeholders have the power to influence an accountable 
entity to be accountable, external stakeholders of informal external accountability generally 
have less power to impose, enforce and monitor the accountor to undertake certain duties or 
require formal account from them (e.g. to verify that the formal account has been discharged) 
(Osman, 2012, Boomsma and O'Dwyer, 2014). This is mainly because informal 
accountability is based on normative reasons and moral responsibility. However, in certain 
conditions, some external stakeholders of informal external accountability have great 
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influence on firms’ activities. Specifically, in countries with strong human rights advocacy 
and democratic values, external stakeholders such as NGOs and media have a strong power 
to influence accountors to be accountable. This has been reflected in the social accounting 
research where Belal and Owen (2007) and Islam and Deegan (2008) found that the media 
plays a prominence role in influencing companies’ disclosure of social and environmental 
matters. 
Even so, informal external accountability typically prioritises closeness in which a closer 
relationship requires less formal accountability mechanisms, but more opportunities for 
accountee and accountor to communicate, collaborate, elaborate, clarify and question the 
accountability issues (Gray et al., 2006, Taylor et al., 2014, O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). 
This means that mechanisms of accountability tend to be less guarded and flow of 
communication is more personalised, such as face-to-face interaction, open dialogue or 
stakeholder engagement. According to Agyemang et al. (2009), tension often arises when 
there is a contradiction in the discharge of formal external and informal external 
accountabilities. The dominance of formal external accountability, which is enforced by 
powerful stakeholders, may at times lead informal external accountability to receive less 
attention. Therefore, operationalising informal external accountability in practice can 
sometimes be difficult. However, Vu and Deffains (2013, p.335) argues that this form of 
accountability could be enhanced and enforced through “norms of governance, ethics, trust, 
identity, professional advancement, or reputation”. The most commonly discussed informal 
external accountability in the NGO literature is the downward accountability. Downward 
accountability in NGOs is often associated as accountability towards beneficiaries.  
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3.3.4 Informal Internal Accountability  
The literature on informal internal accountability can be characterised under two main 
categories: ‘individual, personal or felt accountability’ (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003, 
Sinclair, 1995, Fry, 1995) and the ‘socialising form of accountability’ as defined by Roberts 
(1991, 2001). Felt accountability is conceived as an accountability through which 
organisational actors takes voluntary intrinsic responsibility to be accountable and 
answerable to themselves and others due to their personal values (Sinclair, 1995, Fry, 1995). 
The individual personal values are influenced by both the nature of the organisation and by 
wider contextual factors such as shifting societal values and beliefs (O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 
2015). For instance, Sinclair (1995) claims that an individual’s felt accountability may be 
driven by an individual’s role and responsibilities in the organisation, as well as his historical 
traditions, personal experience, religious and ethical sources. Sinclair (1995, p. 231-232) also 
asserts that individuals with strong felt accountability are more peculiar and they “won’t do 
what’s required by them, if they think it’s required for the wrong reasons”. These individuals 
would define the scope of their responsibility according to what they feel is right and their 
‘calculus of accountability’ is drawn from their moral values. Further, individuals who are 
largely driven by felt accountability have the tendency to be initiative and creative (Lindkvist 
and Llewellyn, 2003). Rather than being imprisoned by the hierarchical system of social 
orders, individuals with strong felt accountability conform less to other expectations and has 
the propensity to be creative to engage in imagination (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). 
However, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) caution that over-prioritization of felt 
accountability by the accountor may encourage priority towards morality and ethical values 
alone. This could ultimately lead the accountor to be uninterested in assessing organisational 
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impacts towards other external stakeholders as the individual is blindsided by his own 
perception of what is morally and ethically right (O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). 
Roberts (1991) claimed that the ‘socialising form of accountability’ is another form of 
informal internal accountability. It is an accountability which is based on reciprocal and 
mutual understanding between an accountor and accountee, particularly between managers 
and subordinates. The ‘socialising form of accountability’ is established through face-to-face 
interactions among individuals through informal spaces of organisation settings (e.g. lunches 
and after work drinks, toilets, corridors), or unsurveilled back regions of organisational life 
where there is no bureaucratic system of accountability structuring the relationship.  
The importance of informal interactions and talks is that they reflect and reinterpret the 
official version of organisational reality as well as providing the basis to shape loyalties ties, 
friendship, mutual understandings and dependence among individuals. In this sense, 
socialising forms of accountability serve to humanise the experience of work and “cushion 
the individual from impersonal harshness of hierarchy especially at lower levels of the 
organisation” (p. 364). It also helps to establish trust and mutual understanding among 
organisational members, and make expensive and time-consuming control systems 
unnecessary (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). Even so, Roberts (1991) contends that the 
relationship between accountor and accountee in socialising and individualising forms of 
accountability is reciprocal. If a socialising form of accountability is not properly governed, 
the effect would lead to abuse of power, nepotism, favouritism and abandonment of wider 
responsibilities beyond the group. In this sense, a bureaucratic system of individualising 
forms of accountability is in place to inhibit the personal abuse of power and the fraudulent 
potential of a local group (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).  
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The above sub-sections have synthesised different forms of accountability discussed in the 
literature. There is no single accepted definition of accountability, but all previous studies 
agree that accountability is basically derived from the accountability relationship between 
accountor and accountee. In order to understand the accountability relationship, it is 
important to determine who the accountor is and to whom the accountability is directed. The 
discharge of the types of accountability (i.e. accountability for what) by an accountable entity 
is also influenced by the nature of the accountability relationship and is liable to change in 
different contexts (Roberts, 1991, Ebrahim, 2005, Ebrahim, 2003b).  
An accountability relationship between an accountor and accountee in a profit-maximising 
firm would be different from an accountability relationship in a mutual organisation. The 
accountability relationship in similar types of organisations may also vary depending on the 
shifting societal values and beliefs affecting the organisation (O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). 
Due to these differences, previous research on accountability has developed various 
frameworks to study accountability processes and practices in different types of economic 
entities (see e.g. Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009, O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015, O'Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2007, Najam, 1996, O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The following section 
introduces the forms of accountability particularly relevant in the present study and the 
importance of governance systems in achieving the accountabilities. 
3.4 Conceptualising Governance and Accountability in Mutual Organisations 
Due to the increasing governance and accountability issues relating to mutual organisations 
and building societies, this research is therefore motivated to study and understand the state 
of mutual organisations vis-a-vis the UK building societies governance and accountability 
practices and issues. In order to understand the state of mutual organisation’s governance and 
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accountability practices, the research extends and modifies the governance framework 
initially proposed by the Confederation of Finnish Co-operatives (2000) and Ketilson and 
Brown (2011), to include applicable forms of accountability as delineated in the above 
sections and literature.  
Chapter 2 has highlighted that the framework proposed by the Confederation of Finnish Co-
operatives (2000) and Ketilson and Brown (2011), was drawn to understand the governance 
and management control in mutuals and co-operatives, includes looking into the 
organisations’ internal, external and intermediate governance structures. The framework is 
modified in the present research mainly because first, the governance framework was 
designed based on the context of co-operatives and mutuals in Finland and Canada. Since 
mutual organisations are different depending on the country of origin and historical 
movement, therefore, modifying the initial governance and management framework to be in 
line with the UK context is crucial. Second, many previous studies commonly adopt agency 
theory, stewardship theory and democratic theory to understand governance practices in 
mutual organisations where these theories examined one dimension of an accountability 
relationship (Cornforth, 2002, 2004). For instance, agency theory mainly emphasises the 
conformance role of the board of directors to ensure that mutual organisations are run in the 
best interests of customers. Equally, stewardship theory emphasises that the role of the board 
of directors is to drive forward organisational performance through adding value to the 
organisation’s strategies. When mutual organisations are performing well financially, 
stewardship theory argues that the organisation is then adding value to customers’ interests 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
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It can be argued that stakeholder theory as promulgated by Freeman (2010) focuses on the 
accountability relationship between an organisation and its multiple stakeholders rather than 
the owners, and it may probably be relevant to study governance in mutual organisations. 
Nevertheless, the scope of stakeholder theory (specifically the managerial branch), as argued 
by Deegan and Unerman (2011), Deegan (2002) and Gray (2010), has too narrow a focus on 
dominant stakeholders. The dominance of stakeholders is determined by the resources 
provided by them on which companies rely to survive. This suggests that the more powerful 
and important the stakeholders, the more efforts will be made by companies’ managers to 
respond and manage the demand of powerful stakeholders (Deegan and Unerman, 2011; 
Gray, 2010, Gray et al., 1997). In this regard, the research contends that stakeholder theory 
may not be adequate in satisfying the normative (moral) rights demands of accountability for 
all stakeholders (Gray et al., 1997). While stakeholder theory is not adopted to study 
governance practices and issues in the present study, it should be acknowledged that an 
understanding of stakeholder theory has been helpful in identifying and defining the potential 
stakeholders of mutual organisation and the types of accountability associated with the 
stakeholders.  
In this thesis, it is argued that all organisations, regardless of whether they are NGOs, private 
firms, social enterprises, mutual organisations or co-operatives, have accountabilities and 
responsibilities to all stakeholders whose stakes may be affected by the organisation’s actions 
and activities (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, Gray et al., 2006). As such, studying 
governance in mutual organisations based on divergent types of accountabilities reflects a 
multitude of accountability relationships between mutual organisations and wider 
constituents, rather than a single aspect of accountability relationship, as propagated in 
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agency theory, stewardship theory and democratic theory. The integrated governance model 
proposed by the Confederation of Finnish Co-operatives (2000) and subsequently modified 
by Ketilson and Brown (2011) outlines a full range of governance structures for mutuals and 
co-operatives to achieve accountability to customers and regulators. However, their models 
disregard mutual organisations’ accountabilities towards personnel, community, societies and 
environment.  
Since accountability is a dynamic and multifaceted concept and consists of various forms 
(Stewart, 1984, Sinclair, 1995), studying the multiple forms of accountabilities (i.e. for what 
and to whom), the practices and process of accountability (i.e. how), the reasons specific 
forms of accountabilities are important (i.e. why) and how governance structures foster the 
achievement of accountability, will therefore provide clarity and an overview of the whole 
governance and accountability practices, process and issues in mutual organisations. The 
study therefore developed a conceptual framework (namely a mutual accountability 
framework) in order to understand accountability and governance practices and issues in 
building societies. Within the mutual accountability framework, four types of 
accountabilities—personnel, financial-social dual, social accountabilities and compliance 
accountabilities—have been identified as the main and important forms of mutual 
accountability. 
Figure 3-1 depicts the four types of accountabilities or the mutual accountability framework 
expected to prevail in mutual organisations. Personnel accountability requires mutuals to be 
responsible and accountable to their staff by ensuring that proper systems and mechanisms 
are in place to foster employees’ benefits and welfares, as well as personal and professional 
development. Financial-social dual accountability requires elected representatives to be 
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financially and socially accountable to customer-members in terms of financial performances 
and social impacts that businesses create to customers. On the other hand, being socially 
accountable requires mutuals to be responsible and accountable to the environment, local 
community and general public by doing good deeds and serving the needs of individuals who 
are disadvantaged, marginalised and helpless. Compliance accountability entails mutuals 
complying with rules and regulations set out by policymakers and regulators. External 
governance structures (such as soft and hard laws) facilitate the achievement of compliance 
accountability. The achievement of mutual accountability encapsulates the four types of 
accountabilities. Internal, external and intermediate governance structures are designed to 
add value to business and foster the achievement of mutual accountability.  
The thesis suggests that the mutual accountability framework as presented in Figure 3-1 
provides clarity to researchers and practitioners in understanding the types of accountabilities 
expected to exist in mutual organisations (e.g. to whom, for what, how and why the entity is 
accountable). The mutual accountability framework is also considered the normative 
conceptual framework or ‘skeletal theory’ to understand and evaluate the governance and 
accountability practices in mutual organisations and UK building societies.  
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Figure 3-1: Possible Mutual Accountability Framework in Customer-Owned Mutual Organisations (Source: Author) 
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3.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reviewed the concept of accountability in academic literature. The review in this 
chapter suggested that accountability derives from the relationship between parties and this 
relationship is socially, morally and legally determined, which confers a responsibility from 
the accountors to the accountees. The chapter maintained that accountability is related to 
governance because governance affects the achievement of accountability, and accountability 
bolsters governance. Due to that, the chapter conceived the mutual accountability framework 
and the expected governance mechanisms in customer-owmed mutual organisations. The 
mutual accountability framework is regarded as the normative conceptual framework of this 
research in understanding the empirical practices. The following chapter introduces and 
discusses the development of UK building societies and emphasises the significance of 
selecting this industry as the case context. 
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CHAPTER 4: Introduction to Case Context: 
The UK Building Societies  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter justifies the rationales that the UK building societies serve as the background 
and context of study. The chapter first discusses the development of the UK building society 
sector since its emergence in the 18th century. Section 4.3 explains the socio-geographic 
history of the UK leading to the development of the building society sector. Section 4.4 
highlights the effects of the Building Societies Act 1986 (amended 1997) towards the building 
society sector. Section 4.5 discusses the implications of the 2008 financial crisis for the 
demutualised building societies and Section 4.6 argues that the building society sector did not 
escape the crash unscathed. Section 4.7 considers the implications of the failure of some 
building societies during the 2008 banking crisis and the consequences of the banking 
regulatory reforms. While Section 4.8 introduces the governance structures of building 
societies, Section 4.9 provides the rationales for investigating the governance and 
accountability practices and issues in the industry. Concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 4.10. 
4.2 A Brief Historical Movement of UK Building Societies  
The UK building society is a type of financial mutual that specialises in savings and 
mortgage lending. It is incorporated under its own legislation, the Building Societies Act 1986. 
As a type of financial mutual, the financial reserve of a building society is owned by its 
customers, who are also the savers and borrowers. The emergence of building societies can 
be traced back to the 18th century during the industrial revolution, when peasants came to 
C h a p t e r  4   P a g e  | 71 
town and cities searching for factory jobs. Due to poor living conditions in the overcrowded 
urban areas, workers grouped together to save for decent homes.  
Building societies at that time were considered as ‘terminating societies’ in which funds were 
pooled from savers to buy land and construct property. Once all members had been housed, 
the building society would be dissolved (Barnes, 1984, Ingham and Thompson, 1993). In this 
regard, building societies were not an economic entity and they did not make any profit. 
Instead, they were groups of people coming together, helping out another group of people, 
and the group terminated after it achieved ‘mutual aid’(James, 2000).  
It was the basis of the terminating societies from which permanent societies then evolved. 
The formation of permanent societies was based on the notion that money would be pooled 
from those interested in saving (e.g. savers), but did not want to own a house. The surplus of 
money would then be lent to those interested in owning a house (e.g. borrowers), but did not 
have enough capital. There was such a rapid expansion across Britain in the 19th century that 
all terminating societies ceased, and those in place today are exclusively the permanent 
societies. Through the establishment of permanent building societies, the latter have since 
become the financial intermediaries between borrower members and investing members 
(Barnes, 1984). The first permanent building society was founded in 1845, The Metropolitan 
Equitable, and the first legislation which gave building societies their official recognition was 
the Regulation of Benefit Building Societies Act 1836 (BSA, 2013c).  
Building societies grew rapidly in Britain in the 19th century due to their historical movement 
as a financial mutual that specialised in provision for house ownership. In 1890, there were 
2,286 building societies and the number of building societies reached its peak at 3,642 in 
1895. Due to intense competition among building societies in the 1900s, the number of 
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building societies decreased continually from 1,723 at 1910 to 726 by 1960 (Boleat, 1982). 
Deregulation in housing and financial markets in the 1980s intensified the competition 
between banks and building societies. Some building societies demutualised and converted 
into shareholder-owned banks. This led to the number of building societies decreasing from 
481 in 1970 to 67 in 2000 (Stephens, 2007, Gough, 1982). At the date of writing, there were 
only 44 building societies remaining and they accounted for an average of 20 per cent of the 
total outstanding mortgages and for 20 per cent of all retail deposits in the UK (BSA, 2015a). 
4.3 The Socio-Political and Economic Environment In United Kingdom 
The next sub-sections discuss the implications of the socio-political and economic conditions 
of the UK towards the UK building society sector. The sub-sections shed light on the 
development of the building society sector prior to the 1980s, and the implications of 
neoliberal reforms introduced by the conservative government towards the building society 
industry. 
4.3.1 The Development of the Building Society Sector Prior to the 1980s 
After the First and Second World Wars, Britain, together with many countries involved in the 
wars, were fearful of the return of such catastrophic events. Many of these countries focused 
on growing their countries’ economies, politics and societies. The macroeconomic policy of 
the pre-1980 UK government was that the state should fully control the economy, actively 
intervene in industrial policy and set standards for social wages by constructing a variety of 
welfare systems (e.g. housing, healthcare, education). Private firms and the banking sector 
were highly regulated and controlled by the state, whereby the focus of the financial services 
sector was on stability rather than competition and innovation (Harvey, 2005, Steger and Roy, 
2010).  
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The building society sector managed to monopolise the savings and mortgage markets due to 
their history as specialist mortgage and savings providers and the government’s 
macroeconomic policies which enhanced the sector’s competitive advantages (Boleat, 1982, 
Barnes, 1984). For instance, the Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme (also known as the 
‘Corset’), which was introduced in 1973, required banks and finance houses (with the 
exception of building societies) to place special deposits with the Bank of England. Many 
banks and finance houses were reluctant to expand their businesses into the mortgage market 
as they were constrained by the amount of funds they could lend and they were effectively 
penalised if their liabilities exceeded their assets (Stephens, 2007).  
Furthermore, building societies were allowed to deduct tax from savings accounts using a 
‘composite rate’ rather than the ‘standard rate’ of interest (Stephens, 2007). This arrangement 
has been in place between the sector and Inland Revenue since the 1890s to facilitate tax 
collection by the Inland Revenue (Boleat, 1982). The composite tax rate arrangement assists 
building societies to attract more savings from taxpayers as the composite rate was normally 
lower than the standard rate. The composite tax rates in 1955 and 1975 were at 24.17 per cent 
and 27.75 per cent respectively. On the other hand, the standard tax rates in 1955 and 1975 
were at 42.5 per cent and 35 per cent respectively (Boleat, 1982, McKillop and Ferguson, 
1993). 
The building society sector operated as an oligopoly in the mortgage and savings markets by 
the end of 1970s. The sector accounted for 50 per cent of the savings market in 1973 and 
between the years 1973 and 1979, the average annual mortgage lending of the sector was 82 
per cent and reached its peaked at 96 per cent in 1977 and 1978 (Boleat, 1982, Gough and 
Taylor, 1979, Stephens, 2007). However, the dominance of building societies was under 
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threat towards the end of 1970s. They were constantly criticised for being discriminatory in 
their lending, responsible for inadequate lending to meet demand and were insufficiently 
accountable to their members (Barnes, 1984, Beecher, 2011). The BSA cartel, which was 
established to recommend and advise on savings and mortgage interest rates for the whole 
sector, was also criticised as being a political instrument used by political parties such as the 
Conservatives and Labour to keep interest rates at a politically sensitive number4 during 
election times (Klimecki, 2012, Boleat, 1982, Barnes, 1984). Due to these criticisms and 
along with Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms, the mortgage and financial services 
markets, which were heavily politically protected by the government, were then transformed 
into one of the most deregulated markets in the 1980s (Klimecki, 2012).  
4.3.2 Deregulation of the Financial Market and Demutualisation of the Building 
Societies  
The 1980s opened up a new economic era in Britain whereby emphasis was placed on neo-
liberalist ideology (Jessop, 2003). In the early 1970s, Britain suffered from severe stagflation 
where unemployment and inflation were very high (Harvey, 2005). Inflation rose from 9 per 
cent in 1973 to 16 per cent in 1974 and peaked at 24 per cent in 1975, the second highest 
inflation rate since World War 1 (Pettinger, 2011). On the other hand, unemployment 
increased in the mid-1970s, to 4 per cent and reached a climax of 13 per cent in 1982 
(Denman and McDonald, 1996). Due to these factors, the country suffered huge deficits and 
required a bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1975 and 1976.  
                                                 
4 This approach was initially developed in 1939 when competition between the societies was so intense that the 
BSA fixed the share and mortgage rate for the whole industry, in a way that the inflow of funds matched the 
outflow, as well as providing the building societies with sufficient surplus to add to reserves. However, the 
cartel was considered to be a political instrument used by the government to gain votes at election times. It has 
been reported that on a number of occasions the BSA was given donations by both the Labour and Tory parties 
in order to keep the interest rate below a politically sensitive number. 
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The IMF provided two options to the UK government: to either cut back the state budget or 
declare bankruptcy. The then government (i.e. the Labour party) opted to cut the state budget 
which led to dissatisfaction among taxpayers. Consequently, the Labour Government lost 
public support and  the 1979 election to the Conservative party of Margaret Thatcher (Harvey, 
2005). As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was opposed to the Keynesian economy of 
increasing the taxes on private wealth to resurrect the country’s economy. Instead, Thatcher 
unleashed numerous neoliberal reforms by: 
a) liberalization: promoting free market forms of competition (as opposed to monopolistic 
or state monopolistic ones) as the most efficient basis for market forces; 
b) deregulation: giving economic agents greater freedom from state control and legal 
restrictions; 
c) privatization: reducing the public sector’s share in the direct or indirect provision of 
goods and services to businesses and community alike; 
d) (re)commodification: of the residual public sector, to promote the role of market forces, 
either directly or through market proxies; 
e) internationalization: encouraging the mobility of capital and labour, stimulating global 
market forces, and importing more advanced processes and products into Britain as a 
means of economic modernization; and 
f) reduced direct taxes: to expand the scope for the operation of market forces through 
enhanced investor and consumer choice (Jessop, 2003,p.5). 
The impact of neo-liberal reforms towards the housing and financial markets included the 
eradication and replacement of the traditionally favoured council housing with individual 
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property ownership (Boddy, 1989). The Conservative Government supported the idea that 
personal home ownership encouraged independence, and council housing was alleged to 
cause a waste of state resources5 (Klimecki, 2012). The Conservative Government therefore 
implemented the ‘Right to Buy’ 6  initiative which opened up an opportunity for council 
tenants to purchase their own properties with discounts depending on the length of their 
tenancy, through the Housing Act 1980. More than a million social housing units were sold 
by the end of 1990s (The Guardian, 17 April 2013 ) and around 2.3 million homes were 
added to the private market by the end of 2004 (Williams, 2007).  
In order to facilitate the sale of council housing, the Conservative Government had also 
liberalised the financial market to allow the entrance of banks and other mortgage lenders 
into the mortgage market. The Wilson Committee and Bow Group considered that restricting 
the interest rate competition between banks and building societies would be anti-competitive 
and discriminated against homebuyers (Boddy, 1989). Major regulatory and legislative 
changes were made by the government and these include: the removal of foreign exchange 
control and the ‘Corset’ in 1979 and 1980 (Buckle and Thompson, 2004), the abolishment of 
the BSA cartel and composite tax, the removal of the asset requirements which required 
banks to lodge 12.5 per cent of their assets in specified range of assets, the abolishment of 
building societies from the exemption of competition, credit control and legislation, and the 
                                                 
5  It has been argued that Labour traditionally favoured the development of council housing, while the 
Conservatives promoted individual property ownership. These contrary ideological positions on housing were 
often marginalised by the opposed administration after World War 2, depending on whether Labour or the 
Conservatives were in power. 
6 The Right to Buy scheme is a policy in the UK which gives the council tenants and some housing associations 
the legal right to buy, at a large discount, the home they are living in. 
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introduction of ‘Big Bang’ and the Financial Service Act 19867 (Gola, 2009, Marshall et al., 
2012). Figure 4-1 summarises the major changes in the legislation and regulations between 
1962 and 2000 which affected the building society sector. 
                                                 
7 The ‘Big Bang’ was considered to enable London to become one of the top global financial centres in the 
present day. It opened up the ‘clubby’ LSE to entities outside the LSE and “led to the creation of large and 
complex banking financial conglomerates engaged in the whole range of universal banking business” (Gola, 
2009, p. 16). 
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Figure 4-1: Major changes in regulation and legislation affecting building societies 
(Source: Marshall et al., 2012, p. 166) 
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These neoliberal reforms, coupled with the increase of owner occupation and sale of council 
houses, attracted banks and other lenders into the mortgage markets and into competition 
with building societies. Banks outcompeted building societies and monopolised the savings 
and mortgage markets by the mid-1990s (Boddy, 1989). This is as supported with the market 
shares in Table 4-1 whereby the personal and housing finance market shares of banks prior 
to 1979 was 32 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The mortgage market shares of banks 
increased significantly from 5 per cent in the year 1979 to 72 per cent in year 2000. 
Customers’ deposits with banks also increased from 32 per cent to 70 per cent in the year 
2000. On the other hand, the savings and mortgage market shares of building societies 
decreased tremendously from 47 per cent and 82 per cent in the year 1979 to 16 per cent and 
20 per cent in the year 2000 respectively (Boleat, 1982).  
Furthermore, the deregulation of the financial services sector and the abolition of the BSA 
cartel in 1983 impaired building societies’ ability to cope in a post-cartel8 world of highly 
competitive financial markets. The growing competition experienced by building societies 
led the BSA and government to recognise that new legislation was required to enable 
building societies to compete with other financial institutions on a more equal basis. The 
Governor of the Bank of England, chairmen and chief executives of building societies, as 
well as opposition Members of Parliament, shared a concern that building societies should 
not shift towards general banking activities which were inconsistent with building societies’ 
distinguished status and values. They were of the view that building societies should remain 
financial mutuals, specialising in individual savings and house finances (Boddy, 1989). The 
                                                 
8 Subsequent to the abolition of the cartel, the mortgage rates of the building societies had moved in line with 
the money market interest rate. 
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Building Societies Act 1986 received royal assent in 1986 and came into force on 1 January 
1987 (Buckle and Thompson, 2004).  
Year 
Market Share, Personal Sector 
(%) 
Market Share, Housing 
finance (%) 
 
BS Banks NS&I BS Banks 
1977 (i) 47 32 15 80 5 
1978 47 32 15 82 5 
1979 
The Administration of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government 
46 34 12 82 5 
1980 46 35 11 81 6 
1982 48 37 15 75 14 
1984 51 33 16 76 16 
1986 (ii) 52 33 15 76 18 
1988(iii) 51 32 12 70 23 
1990 44 43 10 60 34 
1992 45 40 10 62 32 
1994 46 38 11 62 35 
1996 (iv) 41 43 12 55 39 
1998 (v) 18 67 11 23 70 
2000 16 70 10 20 72 
2002 18 64 8 18 69 
2004 17 66 7 18 62 
2006 18 66 7 18 56 
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Year 
Market Share, Personal Sector 
(%) 
Market Share, Housing 
finance (%) 
 
BS Banks NS&I BS Banks 
2007 18 65 7 17 53 
2008 19 63 8 17 48 
2009 17 62 8 15 59 
2010 18 59 8 17 67 
2011 18 58 8 16 68 
2012 17 58 7 17 68 
 
Monetary Financial 
Institutions 
NS&I BS Banks 
2013 92 9 18 67 
2014 (vi) 92 9 20 66 
Table 4-1: Changes in retail and mortgage balance market shares (by percentage)  
Sources:  
Row (i)-(ii): Building Society Fact Book 1988 
Row (iii)-(iv): Building Society Yearbook 1998/1999 
Row (v)-(vi): Building Society Yearbook 2013/2014 and 2016/2017 
4.4 Legal Framework: The Building Societies Act 1986 (Amended 1997) 
The Building Societies Act 1986 transformed building societies’ power and introduced a new 
regulatory framework for the industry. It represents the first piece of coherent legislation for 
building societies since the Building Societies Act 1874 and implemented proposals in the 
Treasury Green Paper Building Societies: A New Framework, published in 1984 (Marshall et 
al., 2012, Boddy, 1989). Under the Building Societies Act 1986, power was given to the 
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Building Society Commission (BSC) and HM Treasury to make statutory instruments (e.g. 
regulations, orders), which provide Parliament approval to amend and supplement the 
Building Societies Act 1986 (BSA, 2013b). This role was previously operated by the Chief 
Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
The Building Societies Act 1986 states explicitly that building societies are predominantly 
concerned with lending for house purchase and are primarily funded by members, in which 
Section 5(1) stipulated that a building society “is that of making loans which are secured on 
residential property and are funded substantially by its members” (BSA, 1986, pp. 4). 
Nonetheless, building societies are allowed to venture into other financial activities such as 
unsecured lending, estate agencies, insurance broking, consumer credit, money transmission 
and foreign exchange services (Boddy, 1989, Ingham and Thompson, 1993, Tayler, 2005). 
The Building Societies Act 1986 further formalised building societies’ access to the 
wholesale money market9, in which: 
• at least 75 per cent10 of the ‘business assets’11 of a building society must be loans 
fully secured on residential property (Section 6 of the 1986 Act); and 
• at least 50 per cent of societies’ funds must be raised from individual members and 
another 50 per cent through the wholesale money markets12 (unlike banks which do 
                                                 
9 Wholesale funding is funding derived from federal funds, foreign deposits and brokered deposits, among 
others. Most financial institutions would opt for wholesale funding when it is expensive to source a retail 
deposit (e.g. when customers do not save in a financial institution due to the low interest rate offer). Retail 
funding is a deposit that is generally derived from customers (savers) or small businesses (Buckle and 
Thompson, 2004).  
10 No statutory restriction on what categories of assets might be included in the remaining 25% of business 
assets. 
11 Business Assets = Total assets + provision of doubtful debts – (fixed assets + liquid assets + long term 
insurance funds). 
C h a p t e r  4   P a g e  | 83 
not have any restriction to the amount of capital raised from wholesale markets) 
(Section 7 of the 1986 Act). 
The Building Societies Act 1986 also requires building societies to prepare annual accounts, 
an annual business statement, a directors’ report and a summary financial statement. A copy 
of the annual account should be submitted and filed to the BSC. Since coming into force, the 
Building Societies Act 1986 has been extended and amended, subsequently replacing the 
‘prescriptive regime’ of the 1986 Act—which means the activities of building societies were 
deemed to be illegitimate unless specifically permitted—with the ‘permissive regime’ of the 
1997 Act, in which the activities of building societies would be legitimate unless otherwise 
stated (Stephens, 2007). 
The establishment of the Building Societies Act 1986 provided the opportunity for building 
societies to demutualise and convert into a shareholder-owned bank. Conversion initially 
required 20 per cent of the member vote and was later raised to 50 per cent and 75 per cent. 
After conversion, the demutualised building societies are protected from takeover for a 
period of five years (unless the building society has taken over another company) (Buckle 
and Thompson, 2004). The first building society which converted was Abbey National (in 
1989). This was followed by Northern Rock (1997); Halifax (1997); Alliance & Leicester 
(1997) and Bradford & Bingley (2000) (BSA, 2013c). The list of building societies which 
have demutualised since 1989 and their current conditions are summarised in Table 4-2 
below: 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Through the Building Societies Act 1986, building societies were initially allowed to raise 20 per cent of their 
funds from the wholesale markets, a figure that rose to 40 per cent by the end 1986 and 50 per cent in the 1994 
review of the Act. 
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Demutualised 
Building 
Societies 
Year of 
Demutuali-
sation 
Successor Current Condition 
Abbey National  1989 Santander  
 
Floated as a public listed company in July 
1989. It was acquired by Banco Santander 
on November 2004 and rebranded as 
Santander in January 2010. 
Cheltenham & 
Gloucester 
1995 Lloyds TSB Taken over and became part of the Lloyds 
Banking Group in August 1995. 
National & 
Provincial 
Building 
Society 
1995 Abbey 
National plc  
Taken over by Abbey National in 1996. 
*Alliance & 
Leicester 
1997 Santander 
 
Floated as a public listed company in April 
1997. It was acquired by Banco Santander 
in October 2008 and rebranded as 
Santander in 2010. 
*Halifax 1997 HBOS/ 
Lloyds 
 
Floated as a public listed company in June 
1997 and merged with Bank of Scotland to 
form HBOS in 2001. In Sept 2008, Lloyds 
Bank agreed to take over HBOS and it 
became part of Lloyds Banking Group in 
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Demutualised 
Building 
Societies 
Year of 
Demutuali-
sation 
Successor Current Condition 
January 2009. 
Woolwich 1997 Barclays Floated as a public listed company in July 
1997 and it was later taken over by 
Barclays Bank in October 2000. 
Bristol & West 1997 Bank of 
Ireland 
Became part of Bank of Ireland in 1997, 
but its savings and branch networks were 
transferred to Britannia Building Society in 
2005. The latter than merged with Co-
operative Financial Services in 2009. 
*Northern Rock 1997 Virgin 
Money 
 
Floated as public listed company in Oct 
1997 and it was nationalised in Feb 2008 
due to the financial crisis. It was acquired 
by Virgin Money in January 2012. 
Birmingham 
Midshires 
1999 Halifax plc Taken over by Halifax in 1999 and it is 
now owned by Lloyds Banking Group.  
*Bradford & 
Bingley 
2000 Santander Floated as public listed company in 
December 2000. However, the mortgage 
book was nationalised in September 2008 
and the retail savings was transferred to 
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Demutualised 
Building 
Societies 
Year of 
Demutuali-
sation 
Successor Current Condition 
Santander in September 2008. It was 
rebranded as Santander in January 2010. 
Table 4-2: The current condition of building societies which demutualised between 1989 
till 2000 (Source: BSA Yearbook 2015/2016 and Casu and Gall, 2016, and analysis by 
author)  
(The symbol * indicates the demutualised building societies which existed as a 
shareholder-owned bank prior to the 2008 financial crisis) 
 
According to Casu and Gall (2016), there were a number of strategic reasons which 
motivated building societies to convert into shareholder-owned banks. Conversion into 
shareholder-owned banks enabled the demutualised building societies to be freed from the 
1986 Act and to obtain additional capital from wholesale funds and securitisation practices. 
Building societies are constrained under the 1986 Act to undertake corporate banking (such 
as 25 per cent of their lending being on corporate lending) building societies have to generate 
capital internally as they have no shares to sell and no access to the equity market. Their 
international operations are limited whereby they are only allowed to operate within the 
European Union via subsidiaries (Buckle and Thompson, 2004, Boddy, 1989).  
Many building societies converted into shareholder-owned banks in order to finance their 
lending activities through inter-bank borrowing on the global wholesale money market and 
securitisation (Michie and Llewellyn, 2010, Beecher, 2011). The wholesale money market 
provides banks access to global funds (at an interest rate that is often lower than the retail 
funds) and allows them to borrow the funds for a short term (depending on their credit rating) 
to finance their lending. Under good economic conditions, banks can easily renew their 
C h a p t e r  4   P a g e  | 87 
maturing borrowing from the wholesale funding and perhaps take advantage of the lower 
interest rate. However, these banks may face short term liquidity problems if the market 
confidence is affected (Branston et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, securitisation enables banks to bundle up their illiquid assets together with 
other high credit risk assets (e.g. credit card loans, personal loans, car loans) into another 
security, either an asset-backed security (ABS)13 or a Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO). 
The ABS and CDOs are then sold to investors globally based in different risk categories and 
returns. Investors, banks and credit rating agencies were very attracted to ABS and CDOs 
due to the higher returns and profits they receive and can make (BBC, 7 August 2009, 
Klimecki, 2012). Nonetheless, securitisation lessens the banking sector ability to monitor 
loans and evaluate their risk, as securitisation products often blended the very risky assets 
with very high quality assets (HM Treasury, 2008, Branston et al., 2009).  
There were other opportunistic and less strategic reasons that triggered building societies to 
opt for conversion. Financial advisers, accountants, investment bankers and lawyers received 
handsome fees and bonuses for successful conversions and mergers (Klimecki and Willmott, 
2009). The BSA has calculated that the total cost of legal, accounting and public relations 
fees for those building societies who have converted was £550 million. The Halifax 
conversion itself cost £171 million (Birchall, 2013a, ACCA, 2013).  
                                                 
13 ABS is a type of security that is backed by pools of illiquid assets. ABS could further be classified into 
mortgage-backed securities if it is backed by a mortgage, residential mortgage-backed securities if it is backed 
by a residential home loan, and commercial mortgage-backed securities if the mortgages are made to 
corporations. ABS is often sold in different ‘tranches’ (or sections) based on different risks and returns. The 
most senior tranches are less risky and the most junior tranches are the riskiest. The rationale in which the ABS 
are structured into different tranches is mainly because in the case of early redemption of the ABS (e.g. times of 
low interest) or credit event such as default, the junior tranches will absorb all the losses and the senior tranches 
receive repayment first. 
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The management of building societies also benefited through enhanced reward packages 
subsequent to the conversion (Shiwakoti, 2005, Birchall, 2013a). A short enquiry by the All-
Party Parliamentary Group for Building Societies & Financial Mutuals found that there had 
been substantial increases in the directors’ remuneration of those demutualised financial 
institutions. The salary and bonuses of directors of Halifax rose by 38 per cent from 1996 to 
1997 when it converted. In a similar vein, the directors of Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & 
Bingley and Northern Rock benefited from 26.8 per cent, 40.2 per cent and 32.4 per cent 
increments in their remunerations and benefits subsequent to their demutualisation (ACCA, 
2006).  
While demutualisation enabled directors to obtain better remuneration and reward packages, 
it had also attracted the ‘carpetbagger’ phenomenon, in which individuals joined building 
societies merely to put forward a motion to convert the building societies. A successful 
conversion rewarded ‘carpetbaggers’ with personal compensation or ‘windfalls’ or stakes in 
the organisation in the form of shares which could rise up to thousands of pounds after the 
initial public offering of the companies’ shares. Figure 4-2 shows that a member typically 
received free shares in the converted organisations which valued at the lowest at £130 and at 
the highest at £2,423.  
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Figure 4-2: Windfalls that were paid to members after demutualisation of the building 
societies (Source: ACCA, 2006, p. 19) 
 
The attractive windfalls attracted an increasing number of ‘carpetbaggers’ to save with 
building societies merely to vote for the conversion of the building societies (Dayson, 2002, 
Talbot, 2002). Nonetheless, these ‘carpetbaggers’ were outwardly despised by the building 
society sector. A number of building societies, such as Nationwide and Yorkshire Building 
Society, who intended to remain as mutuals, saw the dangers that customer-owner-members 
might force their building societies to convert into shareholder-owned banks against their 
will (Birchall, 2013a). Various means of defence against carpetbaggers were developed by 
the industry to fight off carpetbaggers, such as the requirement for members to sign away 
their windfall gains to assigned charitable organisations if their building societies converted 
(Cook et al., 2002). Nationwide was the first building society to introduce the ‘windfall 
assignment clause’ to its customers in November 1997, and the remaining 43 building 
societies introduced a sign-away clause by October 2001 (Dayson, 2002). Further, many 
building societies leveraged their mutuality by providing more benefits to their members 
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through higher interest rates in savings and lower interest rates in mortgages (Buckle and 
Thompson, 2004).  
The Building Societies Act 1986 (amended 1997), also altered the turnout and voting 
outcome level required for board to accept proposal and resolution. For instance: 
• for a conversion vote to be put by the board to be passed, it must have support from 
75  per cent of savers and a majority of borrowers on a 50  per cent turnout; 
• the number of members required to propose a member’s resolution increased from 50 
to a maximum 500; and the number of members required to call a special general 
meeting rose from 100 to 500; and the number to nominate a board candidate rose up 
to 250 members in a large society. 
While many existing building societies successfully fought off carpetbaggers, Bradford & 
Bingley was the last building society to demutualise against the board of directors’ advice. 
The board of directors of Bradford & Bingley was defeated by the carpetbaggers who 
succeed in forcing a vote on conversion in 2000 (News, 29 September 2008 , Cook et al., 
2002).  
The impact of demutualisation reduced the asset size of the building society sector from £318 
billion of total assets in 1996 to around £156 billion in 1998 (KPMG, 2013). Table 4-1 
shows the decreasing trend of building societies’ mortgage market shares from 1980 to 2014. 
The table exhibits that the mortgage market shares of building societies declined from 81 per 
cent in the 1980s to 20 per cent in 2000, and decreased to 17 per cent before the 2008 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, the failure and bailout of a number of banks during the crisis 
weakened consumers’ trust and confidence in banks. During this period, the building society 
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sector managed to attract new customers in both the mortgage and savings markets, whereby 
their market shares in both markets rose by 3 and 1 per cent respectively. 
Subsequent to the wave of demutualisation in the 1990s, the government, in December 2001, 
introduced the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to the financial services sector. 
Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the prudential function of the BSC was 
superseded by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the BSC’s power to make 
statutory instruments was transferred to HM Treasury (BSA, 2013c). The Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 also established the financial ombudsman scheme which helps to settle 
disputes between customers and all authorised financial institutions in the UK.  
Further, the act established the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) which 
provides a compensation scheme for customers of authorised financial institutions. In the 
event of failure of the financial institutions, customers are compensated initially at £35,000. 
Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2012 which was enforced after the 2008 
financial crisis, the amount compensated per individual, per firm was fixed at £75,000.  
4.5 The Demutualised Building Societies Through the 2008 Financial Crisis 
All demutualised building societies grew rapidly after their conversion into shareholder-
owned banks. They grew rapidly by offering mortgage products to customers whose 
employment, credit or business records had previously excluded them from entering the 
housing market (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). They also lent aggressively through 
securitisation and borrowing from wholesale money markets. When there were crises in the 
US subprime market and the wholesale money market collapsed, as well as a retail run in the 
banks, the lack of capital consequently caused the converted building societies (such as 
Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, HBOS and Alliance & Leicester) to seek government 
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support and mergers with other financial institutions (Beecher, 2011). None of these 
converted financial institutions exist as a standalone entity any more (Michie and Llewellyn, 
2010, Beecher, 2011, Branston et al., 2009). The following sub-sections highlight the 
responses of Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, HBOS, and Alliance & Leicester through 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
i. Northern Rock 
Northern Rock was demutualised and floated on the LSE in 1997. Northern Rock had grown 
rapidly and entered the FTSE 100 in September 2001 and became the fifth largest mortgage 
lender in the UK, subsequent to demutualisation. Northern Rock’s capital and liquidity 
problems started when its wholesale funding in US, Europe, Canada, Far East and Australia 
were closed down due to the collapse of US subprime mortgages. It funded most of its 
lending and expansion from the wholesale money market and securitisation, in which 75 per 
cent of its funding was derived from the wholesale money market when it was nationalised 
(House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008). It also had a lack of an insurance 
policy to insure against liquidity problems (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). The 
announcements and the leaking of a ‘backstop’ arrangement made between the organisation 
and the Bank of England caused a retail run and illiquidity in Northern Rock. Consequently, 
it was nationalised on 20 Sept 2007 (The Guardian, 26 March 2008, House of Commons 
Treasury Select Committee, 2008). 
ii. Bradford & Bingley 
Bradford & Bingley was the UK's second largest building society prior to its demutualisation 
in 2000. In March 2006, the shares of the organisation were valued at £3.2 billion and by 
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September 2008, it was worth £246 million. Similar to Northern Rock, it was nationalised 
whereby the government took control of £50 billion of its mortgages, and £20 billion of its 
savings units and branches were sold to Santander (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). The 
problem with Bradford & Bingley was similar to Northern Rock in which the organisation 
relied on 42 per cent of wholesale funding and securitisation to expand its business. It also 
lent heavily in subprime markets and it had mortgage arrears that were above the industry 
average during the 2008 financial crisis (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 
2009). 
iii. HBOS14 
HBOS was formed under the merger of Halifax Building Society and Bank of Scotland in 
2001. The merger of both organisations was intended to help HBOS to increase market and 
product penetration opportunities and to enable HBOS to become one of the challengers to 
the ‘Big 4’ banks (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS). HBOS benefited from the merger in 
which its pre-tax profitability grew strongly from £2,630 million in 2001 to £4,808 million in 
2005 (HBOS Annual Report 2001 and 2005). Similar to Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley, HBOS relied on the wholesale money market, securitisation practices and lent 
heavily on risky housing, property and corporate markets (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). 
HBOS’s liquidity problem surfaced when the UK economy weakened in 2007 and many 
‘subprime’ borrowers defaulted on their borrowings with the organisation. HBOS had to be 
                                                 
14 HBOS was previously a building society under the trading name Halifax Benefit Building and Investment 
Society. However, it converted into a plc in 1997 and merged with Royal Bank of Scotland to form HBOS in 
2001. 
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taken over by Lloyds Banking Group in Sept 2008 when it could not renew its borrowings in 
the wholesale money markets (HM Treasury, 2015a).  
iv. Alliance & Leicester 
Alliance & Leicester was floated in the LSE in 1997 and managed to be listed in the FTSE 
100 in 1997. Similar to Northern Rock, HBOS and Bradford & Bingley, it relied heavily on 
the wholesale money market and securitisation to lend aggressively. At the time it was taken 
over by Santander on October 2008, 57 per cent (or £45.2 billion) of its funding was derived 
from the wholesale money market and 39 per cent (or £30.8 billion) of its capital was 
received from retail deposits (Alliance & Leicester Annual Report, 2007, p. 12). Although 
Alliance & Leicester’s mortgage accounts were of a high quality (with only three months 
arrears, which was lower than half of the industry average), it bought structured credit assets 
that lost value in the credit crunch. It wrote off £209 million of those assets but still suffered 
losses of £70 million in its wholesale funding costs. Due to that, Alliance & Leicester agreed 
to be taken over by Santander for £1.26 billion after a reported pre-tax profit of £1.8 million 
from £290 million for a six-month period in June 2008 (Alliance & Leicester Annual Report, 
2008, p. 36).  
The above examples demonstrate that many converted building societies expanded their 
businesses through securitisation practices and funding from the wholesale money market 
after demutualisation. When the wholesale money market collapsed and depositors withdrew 
their money during the height of the 2008 financial crisis, the lack of capital caused the 
converted financial mutuals to seek support from the government and larger financial 
institutions. The National Audit Office (NAO), estimated in 2015 that £1,162 billion of 
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taxpayers’ money has been utilised to bail out those banks and the amount is still mounting 
(NAO, 2015). 
Building societies which are adverse to risk and adhere to a customer-owned model did not 
receive any capital injection from government and taxpayers (Michie and Llewellyn, 2010). 
The sector attracted new customers in the first half of 2008 with £6.3 billion of deposits in 
contrast to £3.8 billion during the first half of 200715 (The Independent, 03 August 2008). 
Adrian Coles, the ex-Director General of the BSA, argued that “against a backdrop of 
economic uncertainty and stock turbulence, people saw building societies as safe places for 
their cash, with brands names they can trust” (The Independent, 03 August 2008). The UK 
government also emphasised that the customer-owned model of building societies and co-
operative banks is one of the strongest ownership structures, which the government has a 
clear commitment to support. The government highlighted at the coalition agreement in 2010 
to “promote mutual and create a more competitive banking industry” (The Coalition: our 
plan for Government, 2010, p. 9).  
4.6 Building Societies Through the 2008 Financial Crisis 
Building societies arguably survived the financial crisis better than investor-owned banks as 
a whole (although they were not immune to the crisis) (The Independent, 23 October 2010, 
Michie and Llewellyn, 2010, Michie, 2011). This can largely be attributed to the following: 
first, both by regulation and strategic choice, building societies limited their dependence on 
wholesale funding markets and securitisation practices. Second, they focused on serving the 
                                                 
15 However, in line with the global economic problems, lending had slowed from £8.4 billion in the first half of 
2007 to £3.4 billion between January and June 2008. 
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interests of their members rather than the short-term pressure from their shareholders (HM 
Treasury, 2012). Third, the primary source of funding in building societies is derived from 
retail savings and not the wholesale money market. Therefore, building societies did not 
experience funding and cash flow problems like banks through the financial crisis (Michie 
and Llewellyn, 2010). 
However, a number of building societies were greatly impacted by the 2008 credit crunch 
which led to their mergers with other financial mutuals. The competitive pressure from banks 
had put increasing pressure on the mutual business model. Some of the boards of building 
societies had looked at ways to keep up with the competitors and increased their risk-taking 
in ways that were often not accompanied by appropriate risk management, governance 
structures and capital backing (Andrew Bailey, Ex-CEO of the PRA at BSA Conference, 
2013a). They made: losses on loans (specifically on the commercial loans), losses due from 
potentially fraudulent borrowers, losses from large deposits held with Icelandic banks and 
losses on mortgage books acquired from other lenders prior to the financial crisis (Casu and 
Gall, 2016). When the 2008 credit crunch unfolded, they ran out of capital and capabilities in 
handling the crisis and consequently sought mergers with larger financial institutions. Table 
4-3 summarises the list of building societies which were affected by the financial crisis and 
the years in which they were rescued by other larger building societies, the Co-operative 
Bank and other banks. 
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Building Society Year of Merger Merged into 
Catholic 2008 Chelsea Building Society 
Cheshire  2008 Nationwide 
Derbyshire 2008 Nationwide 
Barnsley 2008 Yorkshire Building Society 
Scarborough  2009 Skipton Building Society 
Dunfermline 2009 Nationwide 
Britannia 2009 Cooperative Bank 
Chelsea 2010 Yorkshire Building Society 
Stroud and Swindon 2010 Coventry Building Society 
Chesham 2010 Skipton Building Society 
Norwich and Peterborough 2011 Yorkshire Building Society 
Kent Reliance 2011 One Saving Bank plc 
Shepherd  2013 Nottingham Building Society 
Century  2013 Scottish Building Society 
City of Derry 2014 Progressive Building Society 
Table 4-3: Building societies which merged subsequent to the 2007/2008 credit crunch 
(Source: Casu and Gall, 2016 and analysis by author) 
 
Although the building society sector did not seek bailouts from the government (with the 
exception of Dunfermline Building Society), the failure of some building societies shed a 
different light on the sector. Womack (2010) argued that the failure of some building 
societies during the credit crunch had actually shown that many of the them “were just as 
greedy for growth and as prone to mismanagement as the worst of their banking rivals.”  
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Graham Beale, the ex-CEO of Nationwide, was also reported in disclosing to the Treasury 
Select Committee that building societies which suffered the most during the crunch were 
those which had expanded their operations without proper understanding of the risks and 
strategies that the organisation pursued: 
Typically where building societies have expanded their activities and gone into 
areas of risk that they either have not fully understood or where they did not 
have the right resource in place to be able to deal with them…[For example, 
with] the Derbyshire…the risks were beyond the capacity of the balance sheet 
(House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008, p.31). 
Due to the failure and mismanagement of building societies, a number of regulatory and 
governance reforms were made to the building society industry, which are discussed below. 
4.7 Regulatory Reform in Building Societies since the 2008 Financial Crisis  
Following from the 2008 financial crisis, a number of changes were made to the banking 
regulations. The reformation mainly stemmed from poor risk management, lack of 
governance and personal accountability in the banking sector (HM Treasury, 2013). Among 
those banking regulation reforms that affect the building society sector, include but are not 
limited, to the implementation of the Financial Service Act 2012, Building Societies 
Sourcebook (BSOCS), Senior Manager & Certification Regime (SM&CR), Butterfill Act and 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). 
i. Financial Service Act 2012 
Due to the failure and bailout of the banks during the financial crisis, the coalition 
government had in effect introduced and passed the Financial Service Act 2012 in December 
2012. The 2012 Act made substantial amendments to the Financial Service Act 2000. It gives 
the Bank of England responsibility for protecting and enhancing stability in the financial 
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system. The act also abolished the FSA and created a new regulatory system consisting of the 
Financial Policy Committee, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) (BSA, 2013c). 
ii. Building Societies Sourcebook (BSOCS) 
The Building Societies Sourcebook (BSOCS) was introduced by the FSA on 26 March 2010. 
A number of building societies diversified away from their core business operations by 
undertaking risks of which the board of directors did not have a proper understanding. Due to 
that, some building societies such as Dunfermline Building Society, Cheshire Building 
Society and Derbyshire Building Society failed. BSOCS was introduced to enhance 
supervisory guidance for building societies and to prevent a similar collapse of building 
societies as in the 2008 financial crisis. BSOCS sets out guidance for the approaches to 
lending as well as the treasury management approaches that building societies should 
undertake (BSA, 2011). 
iii. Senior Manager and Certification Regime (SM&CR) 
The Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards (PCOBS) was appointed by 
Parliament in June 2013 to look into ways to enhance directors’ accountability in the banking 
industry. The PCOBS claimed that there had been lack of personal accountability in the 
banking industry, in which directors and management  hide behind an accountability firewall 
and engaged in high profile misconducts (e.g. PPI mis-selling, the LIBOR rate-rigging) 
without being prosecuted (BSA, 2016). In order to improve professional standards and senior 
management responsibility and accountability in the UK banking industry, the PRA and FCA 
introduced the Senior Manager and Certification Regime (SM&CR) which came into effect 
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in March 2016. The regime applies to banks, building societies, credit unions and all PRA-
regulated investment firms (HM Treasury, 2015b).  
iv. Banking Reform Act 2013 
The Banking Reform Act 2013 which is introduced and based on the recommendations of the 
Independent Commission and Banking (and reported in a Vickers Report) outlines new 
suggestions such as: 1) the UK banks are required to ring-fence their deposits from retail and 
small and medium-sized businesses; 2) the PRA are required to review and ensure that banks 
separate their retail from the investment activities; 3) allow for the application of bail-in to 
building societies and the power for BOE to convert building societies to company; 4) 
introducing criminal sanctions for reckless misconducts that leads to bank failure; 5) 
providing protections to depositors under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.  The 
provisions of the Act are expected to come into force in 1 January 2019 and are expected to 
affect the building society sector 
v. Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) 
The quality and quantity of capital issued by financial institutions was considered not 
sufficient to absorb losses during the 2008 financial crisis (BSA, 2010a). The capital 
requirement for financial institutions has therefore been enhanced and increased under the 
Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) which was approved by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). CRD IV introduces more stringent requirements for financial 
instruments to be classified as Tier 1 capital. It requires building societies and banks to have 
a higher quality and quantity of capital due to changes in the definition of capital. It also has 
new liquidity and leverage requirements, new rules for counterparty risks and macro 
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prudential standards. CRD IV also makes changes to rules on corporate governance such as 
director’s remuneration, and standardised EU regulatory reporting (BSA, 2010a).  
vi. The Building Societies (Funding) and Mutual Societies (Transfers) Act 2007 
The Building Societies (Funding) and Mutual Societies (Transfers) Act 2007 or Butterfill Act 
was the result of a private member’s bill sponsored by a Conservative MP, Sir John Butterfill. 
The enactment of the Act enabled the government via secondary legislation to amend the 
building societies legislation and allow 75 per cent of building societies funds to be derived 
from wholesale market. The Act also allows merger between different types of mutual before 
the demutualisation of building societies. The act was enforced when Britannia Building 
Society merged with Co-operative Bank. Nonetheless, the 75 per cent rule in which building 
societies fund could be derived from the wholesale market has never been introduced (Casu 
and Gall, 2016, HM Treasury, 2014). 
vii. UK Corporate Governance Code  
Unlike the above mandatory regulations, building societies are required to ‘explain or 
comply’ with the UK Corporate Governance Code (The Code) (2014)16 which was first 
published by the FRC in 1992. The Code was fundamentally addressed to public listed 
companies. As a best practice, building societies are encouraged by the PRA and the BSA to 
comply or give their reasons for their non-compliance with The Code in their annual report 
(BSA, 27th November 2014). 
                                                 
16 This thesis refers to the UK Corporate Governance Code (hereafter referred to as The Code) published in 
2014. It is acknowledged that The Code was revised in 2016. However, interview data was collected and 
analysed in 2015, and the research therefore refers to The Code of  2014.  
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4.8 Governance of Building Societies 
While the legislation and regulations governing the building society sector have continuously 
been reformed and strengthened, the internal governance arrangements in the industry have 
also developed over time. The original governance structures in building societies were based 
on monitoring and supervision by customer-owner-members who live in the local community. 
If elected representatives were to abuse their power and position, they would be reprimanded 
by other members (Casu and Gall, 2016).  
Since building societies have grown in size, structure and scope, the current internal 
governance arrangements in the sector are similar to corporations and public listed 
companies. Building societies are run and managed by a board of directors and the directors 
are members of different committees, such as audit, remuneration, nomination and risk 
committees. The directors are also the customer-members of the organisations and are subject 
to election or re-election. Directors are required to continuously undergo training to 
strengthen their skills and knowledge (BSA, 2014b).  
Furthermore, as a type of financial institution, building societies are required by the PRA and 
FCA to implement the best practice three lines of defence model in the business. The three 
lines of defence model provides a simple and effective way for organisations to communicate 
risk management and control by clarifying the roles and duties of staff and management. The 
first line focuses on business management, maintaining effective internal control and 
executing risk and control procedures. The second line focuses on a set of specialist control 
functions covering risk, regulatory, compliance, legal, finance and human resources issues. 
The establishment of these functions is to ensure that the first line of defence is properly 
designed and operated as intended, to develop risk management and control for the whole 
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organisation, and to provide training on risk management processes. The third line focuses on 
the internal audit which provides independent assurance on organisation’s governance, 
internal control and risk management, including the manner in which the first and second 
lines achieve risk management and internal control objectives.  
Senior management and governing bodies such as the audit committee and board of directors 
are the main stakeholders served by all the lines. Senior management and governing bodies 
has the accountability to achieve organisation’s objectives, setting strategies to achieve these 
objectives and helping to ensure that the three lines of defence model reflects the 
organisation’s risk management and control processes. The roles of regulators and external 
auditors are to perform an independent and objective function such as to assess the first, 
second or third line of defence with regard to compliance with rules and regulations. 
The rights of members have also been enriched in legislation. Members have the right to 
receive notice and to take part in a building society’s AGM and put forward resolutions to be 
discussed at the AGM. Members can also request a special general meeting be held, subject 
to meeting certain conditions such as getting the support of a number of other members. All 
members have one vote in the governance matters of building societies despite the percentage 
of their shareholding. However, a criticism of member democracy and the “one member, one 
vote” principle is that widely dispersed ownership of members causes limited effective 
control over management (Spear, 2004, Leadbeater and Christie, 1999). 
4.9 Motives for Studying Governance and Accountability in UK Building Societies 
The above discussion has therefore reflected that prior to the 2007/2008 banking crisis, there 
were doubts and scepticism towards the mutual ownership model and the adverse risk 
approach adopted by building societies. It was claimed that the Building Societies Act 1986 
C h a p t e r  4   P a g e  | 104 
and the customer-owned business structure have prevented building societies from competing 
and growing rapidly like banks (Klimecki, 2012, Michie, 2011). As a result of that, a number 
of building societies converted into shareholder-owned banks in order to be freed from the 
legal restrictions placed on them. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis witnessed all demutualised building societies collapsing and 
none of them surviving as an independent entity. Demutualisation had led all converted 
building societies to rely heavily on wholesale money markets and securitisation practices in 
order to lend aggressively (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009, Beecher, 2011, BBC, 7 August 
2009). When the US sub-prime market collapsed and investors stopped to purchase the ABS 
and CDOs, and banks ceased to lend to each other, all demutualised building societies 
experienced difficulties in renewing their short-term funding from the wholesale money 
market. In consequence, the demutualised building societies suffered from lack of capital and 
liquidity which caused them to seek financial assistance from the government (BBC, 7 
August 2009). In comparison, building societies which did not demutualise survived the 
credit crunch better than all the converted building societies. In the midst and aftermath of 
the financial crisis, they were able to attract new customers and garnered the coalition 
government’s support to promote financial mutuals in the financial services sector (Klimecki, 
2012, Mutuo, 2015).  
Despite the growing prominence of building societies, in recent years, there have been highly 
publicised scandals in the industry. For instance, Yorkshire Building Society was fined by the 
FCA for £4.1 million and £1.4 million for failing to deal properly with its mortgage 
defaulters and disseminating misleading promotional materials to its customers respectively 
(Yorkshire Building Society Annual Report 2014, p. 4). Before Norwich and Peterborough 
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Building Society was merged with Yorkshire Building Society, the former building society 
was also fined £1.4 million by the FCA for mis-selling investment products to older people 
(The Telegraph, 18 April 2011).  
Manchester Building Society was also accused of engaging in hedging accounting which led 
to the restatement of the organisation’s pre-tax loss of £17.8 million for the year ending 2011 
(Manchester Building Society Annual Report 2011, p. 29). The finance director and auditor 
(e.g. Grant Thornton) of Manchester Building Society were reprimanded by the FRC for 
being negligent in their duties (FRC, 2015).  
Furthermore, Sir Christopher Kelly, an independent reviewer who was commissioned by the 
board of the Co-operative Bank to investigate the capital shortfall in the Co-operative Bank 
in 2013, concluded that one of sources for the capital shortfall in the Co-operative Bank was 
due to its merger with Britannia Building Society. The then regulator, the FSA, argued that 
Britannia Building Society would not survive as a standalone entity if it did not merge with 
the Co-operative Bank in August 2009. This is primarily because Britannia Building Society 
had ventured into risky loans and “sometimes complete transactions which no other lender 
would take on”. Following the merger, the newly merged Co-operative Bank failed to plan 
and manage capital adequately, and a weak governance system led to the lack of oversight by 
the board (HM Treasury, 2014, p.15). 
Directors of building societies were also often criticised for receiving high remuneration 
without regard to their customers’ best interests. For example, the board and management of 
Skipton Building Society was accused of disregarding its customers appeals for lower 
mortgage and higher savings rates during the 2008 financial crisis but paid a staggering 
£682,000 to its former finance director for the financial year end 2010 (Skipton Building 
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Society Annual Report 2010, p. 40). Customers of Henley Economic Building Society  also 
accused the directors of their building society for not prioritizing their rights and best 
interests by financing a property development project, which is outside the field of expertise 
of a small building society (The Daily Mail, 13 December 2009).  
In another noteworthy example, Nationwide was criticised for financing more than £30 
million of commercial loans on the Heron Tower project. The tower, which was built from 
2008 to 2011, was claimed to have had difficulties in attracting occupants in the aftermath of 
the recession, and conflict allegedly took place between key shareholders of the property (e.g. 
Heron International, State General Reserve Fund of Oman and members of the Saudi royal 
family) (Financial Times, 19 September 2013 ). Due to that, borrowers defaulted on their 
loans and the involvement of Nationwide Building Society alongside other foreign banks and 
Middle East royalty were heavily criticised for undertaking activities that were being 
inappropriate for a financial mutual. A representative from the campaign group Save Our 
Savers stated that “given that Nationwide prides itself on being a mutually-owned building 
society and not a bank, many of its members will be surprised that so much of their money 
has gone, not to support home-owners, but a rather riskier property company” (The Daily 
Mail, 20 September 2013). 
Due to these issues, a number of observers have questioned the extent ‘mutuality’ is still 
embedded in building societies and the real difference between banks and building societies 
(The Daily Mail, 2 November 2012). It has been claimed that building society is a financial 
mutual which is owned by its customers and hence should be run in the best interests of its 
customers. However, many of the building societies were accused of being fuelled by 
executive greed and prone to mismanagement (The Daily Mail, 23 May 2009). Harrison 
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(2009), a consumer advocate, pointed out that “sometimes the reality of meeting their 
members’ interests (rather than managers’), and the levels of actual member participation and 
quality of customer service [in building societies] have often been some way behind the 
rhetoric”.  
This thesis maintains that with the growing prominence of building societies as a result of the 
2008 financial turmoil, an analysis and understanding of their roles and accountability 
obligations towards their customers, communities, societies, the general public and other 
stakeholders is important. Previous studies on building societies mainly focused on the 
effects of demutualisation on the building society sector and the investor-owned banks 
(Tayler, 2005, Drake and Llewellyn, 2002, Shiwakoti et al., 2008), the implications of the 
financial crisis towards converted building societies such as Britannia Building Society, 
HBOS, Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 
2009, 2008, HM Treasury 2013, Kelly, 2014), and the resilience of building societies’ unique 
ownership structure in the event of economic crisis (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009, Michie, 
2011). There is a gap in the literature in term of lack of understanding of the nature of 
building societies’ governance and accountability practices. This study therefore aims to fill 
this gap in the literature by exploring and understanding the governance and accountability 
issues and practices in the building society sector. The next chapter explains the research 
methodology and methods used in the thesis for exploring and understanding the governance 
and accountability practices in the industry. 
4.10 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter justifies the reasons for studying governance and accountability practices in the 
building society sector. The chapter argues that the deregulation of the financial market in the 
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1980s led to the demutualisation of a number of building societies and a total of 30 and 61 
per cent of building societies’ savings and mortgage market shares were shifted to the 
shareholder-owned banks between 1980 and 2000 (Drake and Llewellyn, 2002). The 
implications of demutualisation came to the forefront during the 2008 banking crisis, when 
all demutualised building societies such as Northern Rock, Abbey National, Bradford & 
Bingley, Alliance & Leicester collapsed and were taken into state ownership.  
The chapter further argues that the building society sector did not escape the crisis unscathed. 
A number of building societies (e.g. Dunfermline Building Society, Chelsea Building Society 
and Derbyshire Building Society) failed during the 2008 financial crisis and were rescued by 
other larger building societies. The building society sector has also been experiencing an 
increasing number of governance and accountability scandals. It has, however, not been 
subjected to academic, practitioners and policy maker’s attentions. As a result of that, the 
final part of the chapter justifies the reasons the building society industry has been chosen as 
the context of study. The next chapter justifies the choice of research methodology and 
research methods of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5: Research Methodology and    
Research Methods 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter serves the purpose of linking the previous chapters on background literature and 
conceptual framework to ensuing empirical chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide the methodological underpinnings of the thesis, Section 5.2 compares the different 
research paradigms and highlights the reasons for the chosen methodological assumptions 
with respect to ontology, epistemology and their implications for the conceptual framework 
and chosen data collection methods. Section 5.3 discusses and justifies the data collection 
techniques used to answer the research question. While Section 5.4 explains the data analysis 
processes, Section 5.5 addresses the ethical concerns and research quality issues in the thesis. 
Section 5.6 provides concluding remarks on the chapter. 
5.2  Research Paradigms in Social Science Research 
In any research, there is an underlying philosophical assumption17 on which the entire study 
is based. The assumption behind the research philosophy undertaken by the researcher 
dictates the choice of theory and the research approach opted for, which in turn affects the 
choice of research method and form of analysis (Silverman, 2013). Each level of this 
philosophy of science, theoretical framework and research method is reciprocal and they are 
influenced by one another (Willis, 2007). The choice of a research paradigm depends on the 
                                                 
17 The philosophy of science is sometimes synonymous to other concepts such as worldview or paradigm. In 
this thesis, these terms are used interchangeably. 
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researcher’s belief about what reality is (ontological assumption) and how valid knowledge 
(epistemological assumption) should be accepted. Ontology is concerned with the 
researcher's assumption about the nature of the reality and epistemology refers to the manner 
in which knowledge is gained. Ontological assumption regarding reality can be positioned 
along a subjectivist continuum, in which reality is viewed as the projection of human 
construction or imagination, to an objectivist assumption, in which reality is perceived as a 
concrete structure (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
A researcher’s ontological assumption will influence the manner in which the knowledge is 
assumed and obtained (i.e. the researcher’s epistemological assumptions). For instance, the 
positivist perspective rests in the belief of physical realism, where objective reality exists 
independently of human beings (i.e. ontological assumption). Truth is known or knowledge is 
achieved when researchers correctly discover the objective reality, rather than being inferred 
subjectively through sensation, reflection and intuition (i.e. epistemological assumption) 
(Chua, 1986). The aim of positivist social science research is to identify the causal 
relationship and fundamental laws that explain commonalities in human social behaviours 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In terms of the methodological approach, most positivist 
research tend to be quantitative rather than qualitative,  and adopt the objective method of 
natural science, or the scientific method, to study social reality (Hallebone and Priest, 2009).  
However, critics of positivism suggest that understanding human actions is far too restricted 
for universal laws and would prevent from interpreting the rich data sources that help in 
understanding the reasons why some human activities occur (Swanson and Chermack, 2013). 
Proponents of the interpretive paradigm consider that reality has no meaning until human 
beings ascribe meaning to it. Reality is subjective and socially constructed (Saunders et al., 
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2009) and valid knowledge is generated by making sense of human actions, which contains 
individual aims and a social structure of meanings (Chua, 1986). Interpretive philosophy, 
therefore, focuses on understanding the world as it is and understanding the fundamental 
nature of the social world through subjective experience, where “explanation can be obtained 
within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 
28). 
Paradoxically, critical research, which is popularised through the Frankfurt School, German 
School, and the Marxist School,18 believe the nature of reality is objectively constructed and 
could be “transformed and reproduced through subjective interpretation” (Chua, 1986, p. 
622). According to Myers (2008, p. 42), both critical and interpretive research are similar “to 
large extent, [in which] the epistemological assumptions of interpretivism…apply equally 
well to critical research.” However, the difference between both paradigms is that critical 
research focuses on the issues of inequalities and power struggles (Hallebone and Priest, 
2009), and has the desire to make a change to the current status quo (Laughlin, 1995). For 
instance, critical research starts with identifying a specific group of people whose needs are 
not satisfied by the current system. The intention of the researcher is to enter into the 
participants’ world to gain understanding of their inter-subjective meanings and the culture 
that has been created by all other actors in their world. The researcher then figures out how 
the current social condition came to exist with historical and empirical analyses (Willis, 
                                                 
18 The term critical theory or critical social research is synonymous with criticalist research as defined by 
Hallebone and Priest (2009). For the purpose of this thesis, the term criticalist research is applied throughout the 
whole thesis. 
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2007). The use of critical theory19 or ideologies are very crucial to guide the research and to 
illuminate the social actions and practices (Creswell, 2007, Guba, 1990). Rather than simply 
describing and accepting the current knowledge as it is in interpretive research, critical 
research challenges those prevailing beliefs, values, and assumptions that might be taken for 
granted (i.e. challenges the status quo with the aim of causing change to happen) (Gray, 2013, 
Laughlin, 1995). According to Fisher (2007), critical researchers generally believe that the 
purpose of research should be to change society for the better (Guba, 1990). These 
researchers basically have strong critical, socio-political and economic ideologies in place to 
support their claims about social inequality and unjust social systems (see e.g. Sikka, 2015a, 
Sikka, 2015b, Sikka, 2009).  
Having outlined some aspects of the three main research paradigms, the next section 
examines the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the present study and the 
rationales in which Laughlin’s middle range thinking (1995, 2004) is chosen as the 
methodological approach of the thesis. 
5.2.1 Chosen Methodological Approach: Middle Range Thinking (MRT) 
This section justifies the rationale in which Richard Laughlin’s (1995, 2004) middle range 
thinking (MRT) is adopted as the methodological approach in this thesis. According to 
Laughlin (1995, p.65), “all empirical research is partial and incomplete and…theoretical and 
methodological choices are inevitably made whether appreciated or not.” MRT concentrates 
on continua of theory, methodology, and change for which the choice for a mid-point has to 
                                                 
19 Critical ideologies include the thoughts of Marxist, German Critical Theory and French Critical Theory 
among others. 
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be made. These choices are influenced by the research philosophical assumptions, such as 
ontology, epistemology, and the role of the researcher (i.e. the researcher’s influence in the 
research process) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). MRT maintains the mid-point or hybridised 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the interpretive and positivist school of 
thought. Ontologically, it recognises that reality is different from our interpretations and is 
influenced by our ‘perceptual biases’, which ultimately influence the epistemological 
standpoint. MRT provides a deliberate instrumental choice process that encourages the 
researcher to have some understanding of the underlying methodological assumptions of the 
positivist and interpretivist approaches and the combination of their features may be useful to 
extend our understanding. Laughlin’s (2004, p. 268) claim for such hybridisation is that: 
The way to engage with this empirical reality cannot either be left to some 
seemingly abstracted methodological approach, which is intended to be operated 
with minimal intrusion of subjectivity…or should it be left to an inevitably 
variable and sometimes very individualistic set of subjective processes…Middle 
range thinking sets up structures around the subjective processes, which 
recognise and accept the subject in the discovery process, yet also set some 
limits on how that subjectivity can be operationalised. 
 
Under MRT, theory should be used in a ‘skeletal’ manner to be later fleshed with empirical 
details from data. Theory in MRT does not follow positivist paradigm, nor the hypo-
deductive approach proposed by Chua (1986). However, theory guides the process of 
discovery and serves as a skeleton upon which the empirical flesh from the data may be fitted. 
In the case that empirical details do not suit the ‘skeletal theory’, the empirical data provide a 
basis for extending and/or reforming the ‘skeletal theory’. This is very crucial because 
theories and empirical investigation only help us gain a partial understanding of the 
phenomenon as it is difficult to make claims of absolute truth (Laughlin, 1995, 2004). For 
instance, Broadbent and Laughlin (2014) contend that: 
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MRT requires the need to be explicit about the theories that are used in all 
research projects. The “skeletal” theories provide a language that allows 
researchers to discuss the empirical situation and are used reflexively with the 
empirical data. Just as the theoretical “skeleton” needs empirical “flesh” to give 
it meaning, so the empirical flesh is given shape by the theoretical frame. This is 
middle-range in that it provides a framework with which to explore an empirical 
situation but not to define it…the use of the framework is not to test a theory, 
but to provide a language to enable discursive processes to develop 
understandings of the social world [p. 257-258]. 
 
The ‘skeletal theory’ according to Laughlin is not pre-given but needs to be discovered: 
Through extensive engagement with empirical situations [e.g. documentary 
analysis], initially to formulate their nature and then subsequently to provide a 
framework for understanding further empirical situations which, in turn, 
provides the base for developing their ongoing nature (2004, p. 268). 
 
Pertaining to methodology, MRT permits the design of a methodology which sets up 
“structures around the subjective processes which recognise and accept the subject in the 
discovery process yet also set some limits on how that subjectivity can be operationalised” 
(Laughlin, 2004, p. 268). According to Laughlin, being structured “specifies in more precise 
and abstracted terms what is involved in this engagement process whilst, at the same time, 
not trying to squeeze out the intuitive, imaginative properties of individual observers” (2004, 
p. 274).  
This thesis maintains that studying accounting practices and processes should be structured 
and framed. MRT takes the middle position that the “social world is not rule governed but is, 
instead, interpretively constructed”. MRT considers the significance of not being heavily 
theoretically driven in describing empirical practices and also not to enter the field work 
theory-less (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2014, Laughlin, 2004, Laughlin, 1995). Theory guides 
and justifies the scope of the research and should have the attributes of conceptual 
pragmatism “to assist empirically oriented researchers to move from micro through meso to 
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macro levels of analysis using conceptual tools that are flexible and open-ended” (Llewelyn, 
2003, p.666).  
The mutual accountability framework discussed and justified in Chapter 3 guides in 
exploring and understanding the nature of the governance and accountability practices in the 
building societies and the key issues experienced by the sector. This conceptual framework is 
regarded as a ‘skeletal theory’ (according to Laughlin’s MRT, 1995, 2004) of this thesis and 
it is also considered as a normative20 governance and accountability model of customer-
owned mutual organisations. The framework justifies for what, why and how mutuals should 
be accountable to its vision and missions, employees, customers, regulators, community and 
environment. 
Furthermore, qualitative rather than quantitative approach is chosen as the research approach 
of the present study. Quantitative research mainly focuses on investigating numbers and 
based on the ontological assumption that ‘empirical reality is objective and external to the 
subject and the researcher’ (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 41). Humans are considered passive actors 
that pursue their assumed roles in a rational manner. Knowledge is assumed to be gathered 
through positivist approach which is based on verification and sought to identify 
relationships between variables in order to construct explanations by combining these 
relationships into general theories. On the other hand, qualitative research mainly focused on 
examining the meaning of words and is based on the ontological assumption that reality is 
‘emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human interaction’ (Chua, 1986, p. 
                                                 
20 Normative means a statement of values like ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’. 
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615). Knowledge in qualitative research is assumed to be gathered by ‘study[ing] things in 
their natural settings, [and] attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). 
A qualitative research approach was chosen in this research mainly because first, the focus of 
the study is on ‘how’ research question within a ‘real life’ accounting practices, a focus that 
makes a qualitative research approach most appropriate methodology to adopt (Silverman, 
2013, Patton, 2002, Bryman, 2012). Second, this research aims to explore and understand to 
what extent the governance system in building societies are appropriate in achieving 
accountabilities. Given that governance issues are key topics in financial services sector 
following the 2008 financial crisis, setting parameters (through quantitative approach such as 
questionnaires and statistical regression) will restrict in exploring and learning the 
governance issues in building societies. This will also rule out many interesting phenomena 
relating to what people actually do in their day-to-day lives in their companies with respect to 
governance and accountability issues.  
In terms of changing option as promulgated by Laughlin, MRT is open to maintaining or 
changing the status quo. This means that it is optional for the researcher to call for change or 
to understand a phenomenon before change is promulgated. Laughlin (2004, p. 269) 
maintains that: 
We cannot say that our understanding must inevitably lead to change in the 
phenomena being investigated—adopting this position means that everything is 
‘wrong’ and in need of development. The argument for a ‘middle position’ is 
that there needs to be mechanisms to judge when change should be pursued. 
 
While it is possible that the understanding stemming from this research may promote change, 
it is not the immediate concern of the research. This is primarily because the purpose of the 
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research is to uncover and explore the state of governance and accountability matters in 
mutual organisations vis-à-vis the building society (i.e. an exploratory study). Hence, to 
propagate change in the first place may not be appropriate. Rather, in-depth understanding 
and discovery of the phenomenon and issues should be carried out first before change can be 
propagated21. The next section explains in detail the choice of the data collection techniques. 
5.3 Research Method 
According to Silverman (2013), research methods are the specific techniques or tools used by 
researchers to answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives. In order to 
answer the research question of the present study, the research mobilises three research 
methods: semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and non-participant observation. 
The reasons why these research methods are adopted are justified next. 
5.3.1 Semi-Structured Interview 
Interviews with informants formed a major part of this research. An interview is basically 
defined as a type of research method which facilitates “conversation between two or more 
people” (Matthews and Ross, 2010, p. 219). According to Gray (2013), in-depth interview is 
an appropriate method when the objective of the research is largely exploratory involving, for 
                                                 
21 However, it is highlighted here that there are a number of criticisms with respect to the MRT model (see 
Lowe, 2004). Lowe (2004) argues that it is difficult to determine the ‘exact’ mid-point that is promulgated by 
Laughlin (1995). Laughlin recognised this limitation and states that the ‘descriptors “high”, “medium” and 
“low” are not precise, definable, or measurable’ (1995, p. 68). However, what is more important is the MRT 
recognition of schools of thought (e.g. French and German critical thinking) and locating one’s work away from 
such extreme to a middle point if the two extreme points are reducible to a numeric value. Likewise, Laughlin 
(2004) addresses that there is the possibility for other theories and schools of thought fitting into the middle 
point and it does not exclusively have to be the German Critical Theory that he initially promulgated. For 
example, Laughlin states that: “Whilst ‘middle range thinking’ has been inextricably linked to German Critical 
Thinking, and Habermas…two things need to made clear on this association. First, it doesn’t have to be so. I am 
trying to argue for characteristics of an approach (‘middle range thinking’) but this does not mean that it is only 
this set of ideas that possess these characteristics. Second, whilst our work has been informed by Habermas, we 
have taken the liberty of adding new elements to his thinking over many years” (2004, p. 269). 
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instance, understanding of experiences, opinion, attitudes, values and processes about a 
particular matter or phenomenon. There are three main types of interview that are commonly 
discussed in social science research: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews 
(Saunders et al., 2009, Rubin and Rubin, 2011).  
The semi-structured interview is chosen as the core method in this study. The semi-structured 
interview is a non-standardised interview approach in which the interviewer has a list of 
issues and questions to be covered, but may not deal with them in each interview. Additional 
questions will be asked, including some that are not anticipated at the start of the interview. 
The advantage of using semi-structured interviews as compared to structured and 
unstructured interviews is that semi-structured interviews allow for probing of views and 
opinions, where it is desirable for interviewees to expand on their answers. In contrast, 
structured interviews have a set of similar questions in predetermined order like 
questionnaires (Gray, 2013). Semi-structured interviews also impose some structure on the 
interview conditions, as opposed to unstructured interviews, and assist in framing subsequent 
analysis (Liew, 2005). 
Given that this research is exploratory in nature and aims to understand how the interviewees 
construct and attribute meanings to the governance and accountability practices in building 
societies, the semi-structured approach is deemed a more appropriate approach. This is 
primarily because: first, some of the governance and accountability issues identified through 
documentary analysis require participants’ views and opinions. Semi-structured interviews 
through identification of predefined questions provide an avenue to seek in-depth views of 
interviewees in an open-ended manner. Second, the semi-structured interview provides the 
flexibility to ask predetermined questions to fellow ‘elite’ interviewees (such as chief 
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executives, non-executive directors, regulator and audit partner). According to Rubin and 
Rubin (2011), some interviews are one-shot, in which the researcher has no possibility to 
follow up. The time allotted for the interview may also be short and the researchers are 
allowed to ask critical questions. In this respect, predetermined interview questions allow the 
researcher to prioritise and be selective on the questions interviewees are asked.  
In total, thirty-eight interviews were conducted over a six-month period, between July and 
October 2015, and between January and February 2016. The interview normally lasted 
between forty-five minutes and one hour and thirty minutes. Throughout the data negotiation 
process, issues of confidentiality, anonymity, privacy, and security of information were 
stressed to interviewees. Interviewees were notified upfront through email that their names, 
personal information, and organisation would not be revealed. Instead, pseudonyms are used 
to substitute for their actual names. The invitation letter also stated that if an interview was 
granted, the interview would be audio recorded with the consent of the interviewees. 
Interviewees were permitted to validate the interview transcripts, if they wished. The 
following sub-sections highlight the selection of the research interviewees. 
5.3.1.1 Interviews of Directors 
Three main key stakeholders are identified in the study. First, organisation directors are 
regarded as the key stakeholders in this research. Following O’Dwyer (2003), who 
interviewed senior executives to explore managerial conceptions of corporate social 
responsibilities, this study also interviewed the executive directors (ED) and non-executive 
directors (NED) of building societies. The individuals are considered to have wide 
experience and understanding on the governance and accountability matters in their 
organisations based on their strategic positions.  
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Interviews were also conducted with ex-directors of the building societies. In some cases, the 
executives and non-executives were hesitant to go in-depth into the governance and 
accountability matters of building society sector. Inputs from ex-directors are vital in 
complementing and contradicting views provided by existing directors, as well as to 
triangulate on the narratives provided by other interviewees (Bryman, 2012, Silverman, 
2013).  
The executive directors were identified through a review of the BSA website. A list of 
spokespersons and the contact details of forty-four building societies were available on the 
BSA website. On the other hand, non-executive directors and ex-executive directors were 
identified through the review of the annual reports of building societies. Because there might 
be different issues faced by building societies depending on the size, forty-four building 
societies with different sizes were invited to participate in the research. Sixteen building 
societies took part in the research. Table 5-1 presents the number of interviews conducted 
with building societies from different sizes based on their total asset values.
Size of Building 
Societies 22 
Asset Size Number of building 
societies 
Number of 
interviewees 
Peer Group 1 (PG1) 
Asset size over 
£ 1billion 
9 14 
Peer Group 2 (PG2) 
Asset size of between 
£300 million and 
£ 1billion 
5 6 
Peer Group 3 (PG3) 
Asset size of less than 
£300 million 
2 4 
                                                 
22 The classification of building societies (based on asset size) is in consistent with the categorisation by 
KPMG‘s Annual Building Societies Database 2015. 
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Total 16 24 
Table 5-1: Number of interviews conducted with building societies based on the asset 
size of the organisations (Source: KPMG 2015, analysis by author) 
 
Once potential interviewees had been identified, emails and invitation letters were sent to 
invite these individuals to participate in the research. Both letter and email included a broad 
outline of the research being undertaken and the topics to be addressed. According to 
O’Dwyer (1999), this may enable interviewees to consider the issues and matters being 
addressed prior to the interviews and to seek clarification, if required. Appendix 1, Appendix 
2, Appendix 3, and Appendix 4 provide examples of the invitation letter, email, consent letter, 
and interview guide. 
5.3.1.2 Interview of Customer-Members 
The study also sought the participation of member-owner-customers of building societies. 
Customers are the raison d’être for building societies to be incorporated in the first place. 
Building societies play a pivotal role in serving their members. Nonetheless, it has been 
reported that some of the board of directors and management of building societies were 
running and managing the organisations as their personal business rather than for the benefits 
of members (see e.g. Financial Times, 7 August 2013 , The Daily Mail, 13 December 2009). 
With respect to this, members were invited to take part in the research in order to obtain their 
views pertaining to their accountability relationship with their building societies. A total of 
nine members were interviewed. They were the researcher’s circle of friends and individuals 
that the researcher met during her attendance at AGMs and member forum events organised 
by building societies. Although the number of participants interviewed was not predefined, it 
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was deemed sufficient as all the participants were saying the same thing (see e.g. Baker et al., 
2012). 
5.3.1.3 Interview of Regulator, Auditor and a BSA Representative 
Following Hyndman et al. (2004) who interviewed regulators to understand the discharge of 
financial accountability by Irish credit unions, this study also interviewed the UK banking 
regulator (e.g. the PRA) to seek their opinions pertaining to the state of governance and 
accountability practices of UK building societies. The FCA23 and PRA24 are considered to 
have major influence over the governance and accountability practices in the building society 
sector because of their role in supervising and monitoring the conduct and prudential states of 
individual building societies (HM Tresury, 2013). As one of the key stakeholders in the 
industry, their perspectives were therefore sought.  
Emails and phone calls were made to the FCA and PRA in June 2015 and a follow-up phone 
call was made in August 2015 to invite the regulators to participate in the research. However, 
the researcher was informed by the call centre at the FCA and PRA that it was against both 
regulatory bodies’ policies to take part in academic research because of massive numbers of 
                                                 
23 The main function of the FCA is to ensure that the regulated firms make the interests of the customers and 
market the central focus of how the businesses are run. These include securing “an appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers, to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system, and to promote 
effective competition in the interests of consumers” (FCA, 2015, p. 6). The FCA is accountable to HM Treasury, 
who are accountable to Parliament. 
24 The functions of the PRA include supervision and regulating on the prudential matters of the building 
societies. In particular, it has two statutory functions, which are to promote the safety and soundness of the 
banks, building societies, credit unions, investment firms and insurance companies, and to secure protection for 
policyholders. The PRA is the subsidiary of the Bank of England and it works alongside the FCA. It is 
accountable to the Bank of England and HM Treasury, who are accountable to Parliament. 
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requests for and invitations to research participation. Nonetheless, through invitation from 
LinkedIn, one representative from the PRA agreed to take part in the study.  
Attempts were also made to invite the auditors to take part in the research. The input of 
auditors was crucial to the research as the financial statements of the building societies are 
audited by the external auditors and many of the audit firms provide professional training, e-
governance and internal auditing services to the building societies. On top of that, Sikka 
(2009, 2015) argues that auditors play a prominent role in the construction of regulatory 
arrangements for financial institutions through governance arrangements such as those 
relating to accounting and auditing. They are expected to monitor company directors to 
ensure that company conduct is appropriate and the accounts they produce are meaningful. 
Arguably, auditors indirectly have an impact in the success and failure of firms.  
With respect to that, requests were made to some directors to refer the researcher to their 
auditors and regulators. Nonetheless, the researcher’s requests were rejected a number of 
times. The researcher personally contacted the auditors based on emails obtained from the 
published works of audit firms on building society sector. An audit partner who has more 
than twenty years of experience in the financial services and building society industry 
consented to take part in the research. Furthermore, the views of a representative from the 
Building Societies Association (BSA) were obtained. The BSA is an association that 
represents forty-four building societies to audiences such as regulators, the government and 
Members of Parliament, the Bank of England, the media and the general public (Morris, 
2015). In this sense, the input from the BSA representative was paramount for the research. 
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5.3.1.4 Interview Process 
In total, thirty-eight interviews were carried out. Participants interviewed were from sixteen 
building societies of varying sizes. Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 present an overview of the 
interviews undertaken and the pseudonyms associated with the research participants (Rubin 
and Rubin, 2011, Spencer et al., 2014). All interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis 
at venues convenient for both interviewer and interviewees. For instance, interviews with 
directors, the auditor and regulator were conducted at the interviewees’ offices. On the other 
hand, interviews with members were carried out at the AGM venues or a cafeteria. 
No Organisation 
Code 
Participant 
Code 
Size of 
the 
Building 
Societies 
Date Duration Position 
1 BSL01 CEO-1 PG2 9-July-2015 42 
minutes 
CEO 
2 BSR02 CEO-2 PG1 14-July-2015 48 
minutes 
CEO 
3 BSL03 FinDir-1 PG2 17-July-2015 30 
minutes 
Finance 
Director 
4 BSL04 CHAIR-1 PG2 27-July-2015 1hour and 
45 
minutes 
Chairman 
5 BSR05 CEO-3 PG1 04-Aug-2015 1hour and 
45 
minutes 
CEO 
6 BSL06 CEO-4 PG3 05-Aug-2015 1hour 08 
minutes 
CEO 
7 BSN07 CEO-5 PG1 11-Aug-2015 1hour 15 
minutes 
CEO 
8 BSR08 RiskDir-1 PG1 13-Aug-2015 58 
minutes 
Risk 
Director 
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No Organisation 
Code 
Participant 
Code 
Size of 
the 
Building 
Societies 
Date Duration Position 
9 BSR08 CHAIR-2 PG1 13-Aug-2015 55 
minutes 
Chairman 
10 BSR08 CEO-6 PG1 13-Aug-2015 1hour  09 
minutes 
CEO 
11 BSR09 NED-1 PG1 18-Aug-2015 59 
minutes 
NED 
12 BSL10 CEO-7 PG2 20-Aug-2015 40 
minutes 
CEO 
13 BSL11 CEO-8 PG3 25-Aug-2015 2 hour and 
15 
minutes 
CEO 
14 BSL11 HC PG3 25-Aug-2015 45 
minutes 
Head of 
Compliance 
15 BSL11 FinDir-2 PG3 25-Aug-2015 1 hour 30 
minutes 
Deputy 
CEO 
16 BSL12 CEO-9 PG1 03-Sept-2015 1 hour CEO 
17 BSR13 CEO-10 PG1 25-Sept-2015 1hour 15 
minutes 
CEO 
18 BSR14 CEO-11 PG1 30-Sept-2015 1 hour and 
30 
minutes 
CEO 
19 BSR15 CEO-12 PG1 27-Oct-2015 1 hour 15 
minutes 
CEO 
20 BSR16 CEO-13 PG1 29-Oct-2015 1hour 25 
minutes 
CEO 
21 BSL17 CEO-14 PG1 12-Nov-2015 1hour 20 
minutes 
CEO 
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No Organisation 
Code 
Participant 
Code 
Size of 
the 
Building 
Societies 
Date Duration Position 
22 BSL01 NED-2 PG2 07-Jan-2016 1 hour 01 
minutes 
NED 
23 BSL01 NED-3 PG2 11-Jan-2016 50 
minutes 
NED 
24 BSR14 NED-4 PG1 23-Feb-2016 50 
minutes 
NED 
Table 5-2: Interviews undertaken with directors of UK building societies (Source: 
Author) 
No Name of 
Stakeholders 
Participants 
Code 
Meeting Date Approximate 
Duration 
1 Member MEM-1 29-June-2015 40 minutes 
2 Member MEM-2 30-June-2015 55 minutes 
3 Member MEM-3 7-July- 2015 42 minutes 
4 Member MEM-4 8-Aug-2015 15 minutes 
5 Member MEM-5 10-Sept-2015 15 minutes 
6 Member MEM-6 3-Oct-2015 35 minutes 
7 Member MEM-7 14-Oct-2015 30 minutes 
8 Member MEM-8 14-Oct-2015 30 minutes 
9 Member MEM-9 14-Oct-2015 25 minutes 
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No Name of 
Stakeholders 
Participants 
Code 
Meeting Date Approximate 
Duration 
10 BSA 
Representative 
BSA 31-July-2015 58 minutes 
11 Ex-Director ED-19 23-Sept-2015 1 hour 10 minutes 
12 Ex-Director ED-20 21-Jan-2016 1 hour 40 minutes 
13 Regulator REG 05-Feb-2016 50 minutes 
14 Audit Partner AUD 10-Feb-2016 40 minutes 
Table 5-3: Interviews undertaken with key stakeholders of the building society industry 
(Source: Author) 
 
Different sets of interview guides were used to structure the interviews between directors, 
members, auditor and regulator. However, the list of questions asked varied, depending on 
the flow of discussion and the organisational setting. All interviewees were informed prior to 
the commencement of the interview that their participation in the research was voluntary. 
They were free to express themselves or withdraw from the interview sessions if they felt 
uncomfortable with the interview questions (see e.g. Saunders et al., 2009). Interviewees 
were also assured that all information disclosed during the interview was regarded as 
confidential and would be safeguarded properly. Their names and organisations would not 
appear in the thesis or future publications, but would be substituted with generic names. All 
interviewees consented to have the interview audio recorded. Detailed notes were taken 
throughout each interview such as key phrases made, and non-verbal communication and 
body language. Analysis of the field notes assisted the researcher to build up new and follow-
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up questions for subsequent interviews as well as pace the flow of the interviews (Patton, 
2002). Field notes from the interviews also aided in analysing and interpreting initial 
empirical findings prior to formal data processing and interpretation of the information 
gathered (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  
Despite the importance of interviews in qualitative research, Easterby-Smith et al. (2012, 
p.130) state that qualitative researchers have often encountered ‘interviewer biasness’ in 
which the interviewer imposes “their own reference frame on the interviewees, both when the 
questions are asked and when the answers are interpreted”. In order to reduce interviewer 
bias, the interviews were carried out with a variety of stakeholders who have direct or 
indirect experience and encounters with building societies. This is in-line with the 
recommendations of Saunders et al. (2009) that seeking, corroborating and properly 
analysing insights provided by different stakeholders provides the likelihood of gaining a big 
picture of the studied phenomenon. The interview evidence was corroborated with data from 
documentary analysis and non-participant observation, and all interviewees were invited to 
validate the interview transcripts. Having discussed the interview process in this research, the 
next sub-sections explain the secondary data collection techniques such as documentary 
analysis and non-participant observation. 
5.3.2 Documentary Analysis  
Documentary analysis is a technique used in qualitative research to review, analyse, and 
interpret various forms of documents like interview notes and transcripts, journal articles, 
newspaper articles, acts and websites (Rubin and Rubin, 2011). Potential biases often occur 
in qualitative research and to reduce this threat, documentary analysis is often used in 
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combination with other qualitative methods as a means of triangulation, to seek corroboration 
with different sources of data and methods of collection (Bowen, 2009, Patton, 2002). 
The importance of documentary analysis in this research is that it helps to provide initial 
understanding into the building societies movement. The method also helps to identify and 
problematise the governance and accountability issues in the sector. According to Goldstein 
and Reiboldt (2004, p. 246), while “interview data helped focus specific participant 
observation activities, document analysis helped generate new interview questions.” The 
reading and analysis of many sources of documents proved valuable in generating and 
refining the interview guide of the present research. Documents that have been used and 
analysed include building societies audited financial statements, BSA press releases, HM 
Treasury reports, Bank of England reports, newspaper articles, industry reports, information 
leaflets, and web-based information. These documents have provided important sources of 
information and to some extent they have been used to support and corroborate the 
interviews and non-participant data collected. 
5.3.3 Non-Participant Observation 
Slack and Rowley (2001) argued that some interviewees in qualitative research may not 
provide in-depth explanations on the issues that the researcher are interested in. This may be 
due to the sensitive issues discussed and time constraints in covering all matters. In this 
regard, observation provides an avenue for the researcher to obtain information that may 
escape the researcher’s knowledge as well as enable the researcher to seek further 
clarification from interviewees on the subject under observation (Slack and Rowley, 2001, 
Alvesson, 2010). Rather than participate in the research as a customer or employee in 
participant observation, the researcher ‘stands to one side’ and observes the environment and 
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phenomenon under study (this is regarded as non-participant observation) (Slack and Rowley, 
2001). 
Non-participant observation data helps the researcher to compile and supplement the oral and 
documentary evidence. It also assists the researcher to obtain initial understandings and to 
seek clarification on issues that the researcher is uncertain about. For instance, it has been 
reported in newspapers that some building societies were not accountable to their customers 
(see e.g. The  Daily Mail, 9 April 2011, The Daily Mail 13 December 2009). However, the 
researcher's attendance at two AGMs and one member forum event between August and 
October 2015, in the south and north of the UK, confirm that the meetings were properly 
convened and carried out in accordance with the Building Societies Act 1986. Directors of 
building societies were in attendance to answer customers’ questions and to seek customers’ 
opinions on the present and future products offerings. Hence, the researcher observation as 
non-participant in the meetings clarified the ambiguities that the researcher had after the 
reading of the newspaper articles.  
Moreover, during attendance at the meetings, the researcher listened and took notes 
throughout the meetings. Any discrepancy between what the researcher witnessed in the 
meetings and issues reported in newspaper articles, led the researcher to seek in-depth 
clarification from the directors during the interviews. The following section explains the 
process by which the data collected are analysed. 
5.4 Data Analysis  
Data analysis is an on-going process in qualitative research that can be performed along with 
the data collection. It does not only begin when the researchers complete the data collection 
(Spencer et al., 2014). In this study, preliminary data analysis started after every interview. A 
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brief summary was written about the main findings after each interview. Once all interviews 
had been transcribed, the researcher comprehensively reviewed again all interview transcripts 
and journal articles, listening to digital recordings, and read the notes taken during and after 
each interview. The main purpose of this process was to ensure that researcher obtained an 
overview and understanding of the state of governance and accountability practices in the 
building societies. This was also to identify any potential issues and tensions experienced by 
the sector. 
After the initial stage of comprehensive reading and reviewing the documents, the interview 
data was then translated into relevant data. The process of reducing the messy and massive 
interview data to relevant data includes identifying which data should be included and 
excluded (Miles et al., 2014). At this stage, the researcher classified the interview and 
documentary data based on main themes, subthemes and open codes (or illustrative 
quotations which do not relate to both key themes and sub-themes). For example, participants 
frequently spoke about the significance of the ‘shared service model’ in building societies. 
Although issues about the shared service model probably relate more to business challenges, 
categorising those illustrative quotations under ‘open codes’ enabled the researcher to 
examine the reasons the interviewees shed light upon the subject at a later phase. NVivo, a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) package was used to record 
all key themes, subthemes and open codes identified from the interview transcripts and 
document sources (Wiredu, 2014).  
After the identification and classification of the interviews and document sources, all key 
themes, sub-themes and open codes were displayed by creating detailed matrices. NVivo, in 
this regard, helped to generate overviews of quotes automatically and to generate matrices 
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that illustrated the number of quotations per theme. The matrices and overview produced by 
NVivo assisted in recognising the regularity and patterns of explanations in the evidence 
collected (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). At the data display step, the reading of the matrices 
and initial illustrative quotation helped the researcher in preparing mind maps, condensing 
open codes into main themes, and reformulating the open codes and main theme matrices for 
both documentary and interview data using NVivo.  
The final step in the data analysis process is data interpretation, which involved interpreting 
and explaining the reduced data for both documented, non-participatory observation data, and 
for interviews. In this step, all the matrices, summaries of initial findings and mind maps 
were examined and revisited in order to obtain a ‘big picture’ of the narrative outline created 
by the interviewees. Subsequently, a full description of the findings using the big picture and 
documentary analysis were developed. The analysis of documentary data and academic 
literature on governance and accountability in mutual organisations continued throughout the 
entire research process in an iterative process in order to conceptualise the findings. As initial 
interpretation of evidence emerged, the researcher went back and forth between the emerging 
narrative, field notes, interview transcripts, summaries of initial findings and the analytical 
framework that emerged, drawing on concepts of internal, external and intermediate 
governance structures, and financial-social dual, compliance, personnel and social 
responsibilities and accountabilities. During the analysis phase, additional interviews were 
carried out with interviewees between January and February 2016 in order to clarify certain 
issues that had emerged and to gain elaboration and confirmation on initial findings. 
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5.5 Research Quality Criteria  
Research validity and reliability are the two most important criteria in judging the quality of 
research. A piece of research is considered reliable if the findings of the research are 
replicable, and valid if the extent of the research findings accurately represent the whole 
phenomenon under study and can be generalised across social settings (Lewis et al., 2013, 
Saunders et al., 2009). Lewis et al. (2013) and Bryman (2012) argue that it is a barrier for 
qualitative research to be concerned with reliability or validity issues. This is primarily 
because the extent to which the qualitative research findings can be repeated and provide 
similar results has been questioned on numerous occasions. However, Seale (1999, p. 158) 
still cautions qualitative researchers of the importance to show “the audience of the research 
studies as much as is possible of the procedures that have led to a particular set of 
conclusions.” Rather than considering reliability and validity as the criteria in evaluating a 
piece of qualitative research, this research adopts the research quality criteria proposed by 
Guba and Lincoln (1994), such as trustworthiness. According to Bryman (2012, p. 390), 
trustworthiness is similar to reliability and validity in quantitative research and it consists of 
four criteria: 
• credibility, which parallels internal validity; 
• transferability, which parallels external validity; 
• dependability, which parallels reliability; and 
• confirmability, which parallels objectivity. 
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Table 5-4 below summarises the research quality criteria proposed by Guba and Lincoln 
(1994, as adapted from Bryman, 2012) which were adopted in the present study, and the 
approach undertaken by the researcher in meeting those criteria.  
Quality Criteria and the Process of Achieving Them 
Credibility 
Guba and Lincoln (1994, as adapted from Bryman, 2012) state that credibility in qualitative 
research is to ensure that the study is conducted according to good practices and to submit the 
research findings for participants’ validation and review. In order to ensure that this research 
is credible, the researcher has used multiple techniques in collecting the data such as semi-
structured interviews, documentary analysis and non-participant observation. Findings from 
these multiple sources were also corroborated and correlated with established literature in 
order to enhance the credibility of the findings. At the same time, interviewees were invited to 
validate the interview transcripts, in order to ensure that interviews have been carried out and 
data were not fabricated and created by the researcher. Out of thirty-eight interviews 
conducted, only two interviewees requested copies of the interview transcripts. 
Transferability 
The purpose of transferability is to establish whether a study’s findings can be generalised 
beyond specific research settings (Bryman, 2012). However, it is a challenge to generalise the 
findings of qualitative research to different milieus. This is primarily because each different 
setting has different contextual factors, such as different culture and values (Saunders et al., 
2009). Hence, this research does not claim that the findings may be transferable to other 
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Quality Criteria and the Process of Achieving Them 
contexts. Instead, it is maintained that the concept of transferability and generalisation in this 
study is ‘analytical’ and not ‘empirical’ (Polit and Beck, 2010). Yin (2010) contends that 
analytic generalization is making projections about the likely transferability of the findings to 
the theory. This means that the purpose of the mutual accountability framework developed in 
Chapter 3 can be adopted as a conceptual framework to study and explore on the governance 
and accountability practices of building society industry as well as other mutual organisations 
in the UK, such as credit unions and friendly societies.  
Dependability and Confirmability 
Dependability and confirmation in qualitative research entail peers to act as ‘auditors’ during 
and at the end of the research. It also includes proper documentation and filing of all the 
records for the purpose of verification (Bryman, 2012). All the works in this thesis have been 
reviewed by supervisors and all data are available for verification and examination, if 
requested. The details of how the findings of this thesis are dependable and confirmable are 
already presented in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 for data collection and analysis. 
Table 5-4: Research quality criteria (Source: Author) 
5.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has discussed the methodological assumptions made in this thesis and how they 
have influenced the choice of different research methods. The chapter has also discussed the 
research question and how it is associated with the conceptual framework and research 
methods. Semi-structured interviews were the main data collection method in this thesis and 
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the evidence from interviews was triangulated with evidence from documentary analysis and 
non-participant observation. The chapter also describes how the research quality criteria 
(such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability), as promulgated by 
Guba and Lincoln (1994), were addressed in the study. The following chapters discuss and 
report the findings of the research. 
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CHAPTER 6: Internal Aspects of Governance 
and Accountability: An Analysis 
of the Views of Key 
Stakeholders 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the methodological choice and methods of this thesis in Chapter 5, this 
chapter, chapter 7 and chapter 8 discuss and report the empirical findings of the research. 
These empirical chapters refer to the mutual accountability framework as presented in 
Chapter 3 to examine and explain the governance and accountability practices. The data 
analysis is divided into three main parts. This chapter reports the first part, which includes the 
views of interviewees (directors, ex-directors, an auditor, members and a regulator) with 
respect to the internal aspects of governance and accountability in the building society sector. 
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, the second and third parts are respectively discussed, examining 
the intermediate and external governance structures of building societies. 
This chapter is divided into six main sections. The next section, Section 6.2 presents 
directors’ understanding of governance and accountability. Section 6.3 reports interviewees’ 
views on the importance of governance and accountability and Section 6.4 highlights the 
state of internal governance arrangements in building societies. Section 6.5 sheds light on the 
employment and internal mechanisms employed by the sector to achieve personnel 
accountability. Section 6.6 summarises and highlights key internal governance issues in the 
building society sector.  
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6.2 Understanding the Meaning of Governance and Accountability  
The interviewees were asked about their understanding of governance and accountabilities in 
building societies. All of the directors recognised that they were the “stewards” or 
“custodians” of the business and they had the responsibility to safeguard the organisation in 
the best interests of past, present and future members: 
I got the responsibility to past membership, to current members and to future 
members. We need to make sure we are here for a longer period of time [CEO- 
11]. 
A similar perspective was voiced by another director: 
I am highly conscious that this is an organisation that was formed 165 years 
ago and my job is to take it forward and hand it over to the next generation in a 
better condition than I took it over. As chief executives, we cannot pretend that 
we are the owners of the business. Full stop! We’ve got all the people [who] 
have [for] all of those years built up the organisation and it’s my job to make 
sure the organisation moves forward [CEO-2]. 
Governance in building societies is to ensure that proper control structures are in place to 
enable customers to voice their opinions and to participate in business operations, and to 
ensure that organisations are run and managed by qualified individuals. For instance, a 
director stated: 
Governance is the structure that we have in place that ensure we have got 
proper check and balance in everything that we do, to make sure that the right 
decisions has been made, the right risk appetite is being adhere, appropriate 
due diligence that we have been making the major decisions [CEO-5]. 
In emphasizing the importance of effective governance, a non-executive director expressed 
the view that: 
The whole corporate governance arrangement is important. For instance, there 
should always be clear lines of responsibilities between executive and non-
executive directors, the number of NEDs should be more than executive 
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directors and proper structures should be in place to facilitate the discussion of 
directors’ remuneration and managing the accountability relationship between 
directors and members. It is also important for building societies to have 
governance on product innovation, product review, lending policies and making 
sure that [borrowers] are able to repay their mortgages. All of these aspects are 
important. It’s difficult to say one particular aspect is more important [NED-1].  
When the interviewees were asked about the differences between banks and building 
societies’ governance structures, the majority of interviewees highlighted that the differences 
centred on customers’ rights. Customers have the right to vote on governance matters of 
building societies, such as the pay policy of directors. Conversely, the customers of banks did 
not have the opportunity to vote on directors’ remuneration. Some interviewees also 
explained that building societies contrasted with banks in terms of their commitment and 
responsibility to the community, society, environment and staff: 
With certainty the ownership structure is different. The regulation is the same 
here. But, what I like to think are the people we have here. There are special 
elements that we have got. Whether the staff is customer-facing or not, most of 
our staff really do care about customers and felt good to have conversations 
with customers [CEO-10]. 
Another director elaborated: 
I think banks do the charity works and things like that. How wholeheartedly they 
go into that, I don’t know. But, our engagement with the community is the 
essence of our business [FinDir-1]. 
Even so, most interviewees contended that members were neither interested in voting for the 
pay policy of directors, nor the election or re-election of directors, nor in approving the 
audited financial statements. Members were mainly interested in building a business 
relationship with building societies by opening savings accounts and/or obtaining mortgages. 
Chairmen are commonly appointed by members as their proxies. As one member stated:  
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I have a savings account with [SSS] building society because it offers good ISAs 
rate. But, I don’t generally vote for the directors or read the AGM pack that I 
received each year [MEM-9]. 
The analysis of the responses suggests that the directors had a reasonable understanding of 
their roles and responsibilities in accordance with the UK Code of Corporate Governance 
(The Code). Repeatedly, directors commented that they were the stewards of the building 
societies and their main responsibilities and accountabilities were directed towards customer-
owners. Directors also recognised that they had a responsibility and accountability to wider 
constituents such as the community, environment, regulators and employees. 
6.3 Importance of Governance and Accountability in the Building Society Sector 
In the literature on the importance of governance for organisations, it was often found that 
good governance enhanced firms’ financial performance and access to external financing, 
lowered firms’ cost of capital and increased firms’ efficiency (Claessens, 2006). There was a 
consensus among interviewees about the significance of good governance in all types of 
financial institutions. Interviewees said that good governance assists their organisations to 
make long-term decisions in the interests of current and future members and to provide safe 
and secure financial institutions for customers. For instance, a finance director mentioned 
that: 
The fundamental part is to make sure that the governance of this organisation is 
such that we do not make a mess and lose the depositors’ capital. On the other 
side, our business is lending money. We have to make sure we have proper 
governance in our lending policies, product review and innovation. If we don’t 
get that right, we don’t make any money either. We are out of business [FinDir-
2]. 
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A risk director emphasized the critical nature of effective governance in improving 
organisations’ decision-making processes, individual accountability of the director and also 
the financial performance of the business: 
I think the important element of having a governance framework is it helps in 
our decision-making process and also made us accountable for our decisions. 
We wouldn’t want a board where they said management did that and we didn’t 
know what was going on. So, I think the important element is having a 
governance framework that enables us to work out who is accountable and 
responsible for what. I also think that effective governance enables us to 
demonstrate to our members and other stakeholders about the performances of 
our business [RiskDir-1]. 
Another CEO accentuated that good governance heightens the confidence of regulators: 
I feel that governance has become more important since the financial crisis, 
because of the facts that the regulators have become very nervous and therefore 
want to make sure that everything has been done to avoid future failures. On 
that basis, we have to demonstrate that we are doing a good job to the 
regulators [CEO-4]. 
One of the NEDs expressed that governance should never be overlooked and added that the 
failure of some building societies during the 2008 financial crisis had made governance more 
essential in the industry: 
If you look at the reasons for the failure of 15 of the building societies during 
the financial crisis, they often came down to governance, a weak board, a weak 
chief executive or the opposite, the dominant chief executive. So governance is 
extremely important… There are corporate governance failures in the building 
societies that exposed during the crisis, that makes corporate governance really 
important [NED-1]. 
A similar view was expressed by another CEO: 
If you look across all [the building societies] that failed, the reason that they 
failed is that the governance was inadequate. In many cases, it had a very 
strong chief executive, who the board didn’t control. I think governance is 
important regardless if we are mutual or bank [CEO-7]. 
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In addition, external stakeholders such as the regulator and auditor seconded the views of the 
directors that effective governance could enhance accountability to the members of building 
societies: 
The building societies are trusted with their members’ reserves. These are 
millions of pounds. In my view, effective governance could help them to 
demonstrate greater accountability to their members [REG]. 
However, there were a number of interviewees who were in doubt as to whether excessive 
attention to governance by the regulators since the 2008 financial crisis was beneficial to the 
business. The collapse of all demutualised building societies such as Northern Rock, HBOS, 
and Bradford & Bingley had led the FCA and PRA to strengthen their supervisory roles on 
financial services firms. Nonetheless, the interviewees suggested that overemphasis of 
governance by the FCA and PRA had led some of the small and medium-sized building 
societies (particularly those building societies categorised under Peer Group 2 (PG2) and 
Peer Group 3 (PG3)) to increase their focus on managing risks, internal control and 
governance structures, rather than on administration of business. This is as explained by the 
following director: 
It seems that governance and risks is what we have talked about more often. We 
don’t seem to talk about the business these days. We just need to get the pattern 
right around the place… It is good to talk and think about good governance. It 
is good to have strong governance, and well-run society. There has been time 
where we have been in a position where, we just focus on it too much [CEO-8]. 
The comment implicitly highlights that building societies have overly emphasized the ‘form’ 
of governance and could have neglected the actual essence of the business.  
In summary, interviewees’ responses reveal that the aims of governance in building societies 
were to enhance the confidence and trust of various stakeholders such as customers and 
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regulators, to increase the accountability of directors and to achieve growth in the business. 
Nonetheless, there were scepticisms among a minority group of interviewees on the benefits 
of excessive focus on governance by the PRA and FCA since the 2008 financial crisis. 
6.4 State of Internal Governance Structures and Practices  
The thesis maintains that internal, intermediate and external governance structures foster the 
achievement of effective accountabilities (see e.g. Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Fonteyne, 
2007, Group, 2007). Interviewees highlighted the importance of internal governance 
structures such as the functions of the board of directors, board committees, risk management 
and internal control frameworks, disclosures and reporting, in achieving the overall 
organisation vision and mutual accountability. The following sub-sections consider the 
internal governance structures and practices in the building society sector. 
6.4.1 Board of Directors 
The board of directors has been recognised as an important governance mechanism (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008, Claessens, 2006, Solomon, 2013). In the building society sector, the 
organisations are run by a board of directors that comprises executive directors (EDs) and 
non-executive directors (NEDs). The board is regarded as the steward of the organisation and 
is accountable to the members for the overall affairs of the business (BSA, 2010b).  
Under Section 58 of the Building Societies Act 1986, every building society shall have at 
least two directors and one of the directors shall be appointed to be chairman of the board of 
directors. An analysis of the composition of the board of directors in building societies for 
the year ending 2014/2015 revealed that there were at least two executive directors and four 
C h a p t e r  6   P a g e  | 144 
non-executive directors. This is in line with the requirements under The Code that at least 
half of the board should consist of independent NEDs. 
Table 6-1 presents the number of directors serving on the boards of building societies. Based 
on the table, PG1 building societies were inclined to have more directors on their boards. 
There were at least two executive directors and five NEDs in PG1 building societies. On the 
other hand, there was at least one executive director and four NEDs in PG 2 and PG3 
building societies. The minimum number of NEDs in the building society sector was in line 
with the requirement of The Code, in which there should at least be two NEDs in the 
companies (Para B.1.2). 
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Number of directors
Building Society (in 
size order)
Executive 
Directors
Non-
Executive 
Directors Total
Nationwide 4 7 11
Yorkshire 5 8 13
Coventry 4 7 11
Skipton 2 8 10
Leeds 4 8 12
Principality 3 7 10
West Bromwich 3 7 10
Newcastle 4 9 13
Nottingham 3 6 9
Cumberland 4 6 10
Progressive 3 5 8
National Counties 3 4 7
Saffron 2 6 8
Cambridge 3 8 11
Monmouthshire 3 7 10
Leek United 3 5 8
Furness 3 6 9
Newbury 3 6 9
Ipswich 2 6 8
Hinckley & Rugby 2 4 6
Darlington 3 5 8
Manchester 2 6 8
Market Harborough 2 5 7
Melton Mowbray 2 6 8
Marsden 2 7 9
Scottish 1 6 7
Tipton & Coseley 3 5 8
Hanley Economic 2 5 7
Dudley 2 5 7
Harpenden 2 5 7
Vernon 2 6 8
Loughborough 3 7 10
Mansfield 2 6 8
Bath Investment 2 7 9
Stafford Railway 2 6 8
Teachers' 2 4 6
Swansea 2 5 7
Chorley & District 3 6 9
Buckinghamshire 1 6 7
Beverley 3 6 9
Holmesdale 2 4 6
Ecology 2 7 9
Earl Shilton 3 6 9
Penrith 2 5 7
TOTAL 115 266 381
Categories
PG1
PG2
PG3
Table 6-1: Number of board of directors (Source: Annual reports for the year ending 
2014/2015, analysis by author) 
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Directors were elected by the customers at the AGM. Under Sections 60 and 61 of the 
Building Societies Act 1986, members could nominate themselves or other people as the 
candidate for the board of directors. Nevertheless, candidates without the right credentials, 
skills and knowledge would experience greater difficulty in getting appointed. This is 
because Section 59 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) requires all 
appointed directors of a building society to be an ‘approved person’ who is approved by the 
regulator:  
…authorised firms are required to ensure that individuals seeking to perform 
one or more of the PRA-designated Controlled Functions seek PRA 
approval prior to taking up their position. Non-approval prior to taking up the 
role may lead to enforcement action against the firm and/or the individual.25  
This is in contrast with the argument made by Cornforth (2004, 2002) who asserted that 
under democracy theory, any ‘lay person’ member could nominate him/herself as a board 
member. Although expertise may be desirable, Cornforth (2004) argued that expertise should 
not be the central focus of the board of directors in democratically owned membership 
organisations like mutuals. In order to ensure that members with the right credentials and 
skills could be appointed as directors, all members were invited to write an application to be 
nominated as directors of the building society (BSA, 2014b). The interview data reflected 
that members rarely nominate themselves to serve on the board of building societies. 
Members mainly regarded building societies as service and mortgage providers. The power 
                                                 
25 (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/authorisations/approvedpersons/default.aspx) 
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to run a building society is delegated to the board of directors. Due to members’ passive roles, 
a director depicted the role of members as merely to: 
…rubber stamp the appointment of directors and changes in the constitutions of 
the organisations. This is because of the requirements of regulators to have 
people with the requisite skills and experience to be able to run an organisation 
like the building societies [FinDir-2].  
Members’ lack of interest in the business had led some directors to raise their concerns as to 
whether the board of directors is ‘truly and genuinely’ serving the best interests of members. 
Investor-owned organisations in recent years have come under scrutiny by investment 
analysts and professional or institutional investors who own a large block of shares and have 
been exercising their rights in corporate governance (such as the appointment and removal of 
directors). Directors and management in these organisations can be steered towards the 
maximisation of shareholders’ interests, either through stock market pressures or through 
direct intervention by a large shareholder. Paradoxically, the aim of a mutual is to maximise 
the ‘mutual dividend’ of the customer-owners. The ‘one-member, one-vote’ principle and 
absence of stock market pressures means that the directors and management of mutuals could 
arguably be less accountable to members than the directors and management of investor-
owned organisations (Buckle and Thompson, 2004, Adam and Armitage, 2004, Spear, 2004). 
For example, directors voiced a danger in mutual organisations that individuals who were 
working in it could be running the organisations for themselves: 
Because you don’t have the obligation to explain to institutional investors, some 
of whom are quite smart in what you are doing. If they are unhappy with what 
you are doing, they are either going to replace you or doing something different. 
Nonetheless, in mutual you don’t really feel that your members are monitoring 
you [CEO-9]. 
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The responses suggest that building societies were unlike other traditional mutual 
organisations such as credit unions which were run and managed by lay persons or volunteers 
(Hyndman et al., 2002). Building societies are managed by directors who are highly qualified 
individuals approved by the PRA and FCA and also by investing customers of the business.  
6.4.2 Board Committees 
The majority of interviewees emphasized that board committees play an increasingly 
important role in supporting and ensuring accountabilities of board of directors. A chief 
executive explained that: 
…we have a committee structure that focuses on specific topics and holds 
individuals accountable. For instance, our governance structures are built on 
having individual accountability, three-line defence model and independent 
oversight and challenge [CEO-13]. 
Another director expressed the importance and contributions of board committees to their 
building societies, specifically highlighting the knowledge and expertise brought in by an 
individual director: 
…board committees are absolutely vital in this organisation. We want directors 
with right skills and competence…applying the right level of challenges in the 
committees [CEO-14].  
The auditor acknowledged that:  
…the board committee structures in building societies are critical and have 
been strengthened and made more extensive and more robust since the last five 
years [AUD].  
Board committees in the building society sector consist of the audit and compliance 
committee, risk committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee and executive 
committee. Executive committees in the building society industry include the conduct 
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operation committee, asset and liability committee, lending or credit committee, product and 
marketing committee and IT. These committees are also regarded as ‘management 
committees’ and are chaired by the chief executive who reports monthly to the board. A 
number of building societies invite NEDs to attend the meetings of the executive committee. 
NEDs act as an observer and the representatives of the board of directors. NEDs are not 
allowed to enforce decisions in the executive committee meetings.  
Table 6-2 presents the composition of board committees in the UK building society sector. It 
is noteworthy from the data in the table that the majority of the board committee members in 
the audit and compliance committee, risk committee, nomination committee and 
remuneration committee consist primarily of NEDs. These correspond to the BSA and PRA 
recommendations to comply with The Code. For example, while The Code (Para B.2.1) 
requires a majority of members of the nomination committee to be independent non-
executive directors, Para C.3.1 requires the board to establish an “audit committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies, two, independent non-executive directors”. 
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1 Bath
NED 3 4 6 3 - - 2 - - 1 - -
ED 0 2 2 0 - - 2 - - 2 - -
2 Beverley
NED 3 4 5 1 - - 3 3 - - - -
ED 0 0 3 1 - - 3 2 - - - -
3 Buckimhamshire
NED 3 3 4 6 - - 2 - - 4 - -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - 2 - - 1 - -
4 Cambridge
NED 4 3 5 2 - - - - - - - 3
ED 0 0 3 1 - - - - - - - 1
5 Chorley
NED 2 3 3 2 - - 2 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 3 - - - - -
6 Coventry
NED 4 4 4 4 - - - - - - - -
ED 1 0 0 0 - - - - - - - -
7 Cumberland
NED 6 3 3 6 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 4 - - - - - - - -
8 Darlington
NED 4 3 3 2 - - - - - 2 - -
ED 0 0 0 1 - - - - - 2 - -
9 Dudley
NED 3 3 5 5 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 2 2 - - - -
10 Earl Shilton
NED 3 3 3 3 - - 5 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 2 - - - - -
11 Ecology
NED 2 3 3 3 - - 1 2 - - 6 -
ED 0 2 2 1 - - 0 1 - - 1 -
12 Furness
NED 4 4 2 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 1 1 - - - - - - - -
13 Hanley Economic
NED 3 4 5 5 - - 2 - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 2 - - 2 - - - - -
14 Harpenden
NED 4 3 3 4 - - 3 5 - 3 - -
ED 2 2 2 2 - - 2 2 - 2 - -
15 Hinkley and Rugby 
NED 3 3 4 4 - - - - - - 2 -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - - - - - 0 -
16 Homesdale
NED 4 3 3 3 - - 2 - - - - -
ED 2 2 2 2 - - 2 - - - - -
17 Ipswich 
NED 4 3 6 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 1 - - - - - - - -
18 Leeds
NED 4 4 6 3 - - 3 3 - 3 - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 3 4 - 2 - -
19 Leek United
NED 4 2 2 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 1 - - - - - - - -
20 The Lougorough
NED 4 3 5 3 - - 3 - - - 2 -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 3 - - - 3 -
21 Manchester
NED 4 3 4 4 - - 0 0 - 1 - -
ED 0 2 2 0 - - 2 2 - 0 - -
22 Mansfield 
NED 4 4 5 4 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - - - - - - -
NominationNo Building Society Remuneration 
Audit and 
Compliance Risk
Prudential 
Risk
Conduct 
Risk
Executive Committees
AlCO
Lending/ 
Credit Other
Conduct 
Operation
Marketing & 
Development IT
 
 
Table 6-2: Board committee structures in the UK building society sector (Source: 
Annual reports for the year ending 2014/2015, analysis by author) 
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23 Market Harbourough
NED 3 4 3 3 - - 3 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 2 - - - - -
24 Marsden 
NED 3 3 3 3 - - 2 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 1 - - - - -
25 Melton Mowbray
NED 4 3 5 4 - - 0 - ***0 - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 2 - 2 - - -
26 Monmoutshire
NED 7 5 6 6 - - - - - - - -
ED 1 0 3 1 - - - - - - - -
27 National Counties
NED 4 3 3 2 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 1 - - - - - - - -
28 Nationwide
NED 3 5 5 5 - - - - *2 - - 5
ED 0 0 0 0 - - - - 2 - - 0
29 Newbury
NED 4 6 6 4 - - 5 5 - - 3 -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 2 2 - - 2 -
30 Newcastle
NED 4 5 4 4 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - -
31 Nottingham
NED 4 5 6 2 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 3 1 - - - - - - - -
32 Penrith
NED 5 3 2 2 - - - - - - - -
ED 2 0 2 1 - - - - - - - -
33 Principality
NED 4 3 5 7 - - - - - 7 - -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - - - - 2 - -
34 Progressive
NED 3 5 - 2 5 5 5 - - - 4 -
ED 2 3 - 2 3 3 3 - - - 3 -
35 Saffron
NED 6 6 6 3 - - 6 6 **6 - - -
ED 0 2 2 0 - - 2 2 2 - - -
36 Scottish
NED 5 3 - 5 2 2 3 3 - - - -
ED 0 0 - 0 1 1 1 1 - - - -
37 Skipton
NED 3 4 3 8 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - - - - - - -
38 Stafford Railway
NED 5 4 3 3 - - 4 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - 0 - - - - -
39 Swansea
NED 3 5 3 3 - - 5 - - 2 - -
ED 1 2 0 1 - - 2 - - 2 - -
40 Teacher
NED 3 5 5 2 - - - - - - - -
ED 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - -
41 Tipton and Cosley
NED 3 3 3 3 - - 2 - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 1 - - 2 - - - - -
42 Vernon
NED 4 4 3 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 1 - - - - - - - -
43 West Brom
NED 3 4 4 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 2 0 - - - - - - - -
44 Yorkshire
NED 4 4 4 3 - - - - - - - -
ED 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - -
* denotes result approval committee
** denotes change committee
*** denotes executive committee
NominationNo Building Society Remuneration 
Audit and 
Compliance Risk
Prudential 
Risk
Conduct 
Risk
Executive Committees
AlCO
Lending/ 
Credit Other
Conduct 
Operation
Marketing & 
Development IT
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Table 6-2: continued 
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The selection method of the compliance committee, risk committee, nomination committee 
and remuneration committee members was based on expertise, skills and knowledge of 
individual NED. For instance, the audit committee would generally comprise individuals 
with an accounting background, while the risk committee would consist of individuals with 
financial sector experience. This was commented on by a finance director: 
We are currently looking to recruiting new chair of audit committee, which is 
NED chair. Generally, we want someone who has the experience in accounting, 
auditing and if it is possible in the financial services as well [FinDir-2]. 
Even so, a CEO was exasperated that the purpose of some board committees is merely to 
meet the superficial requirements of the regulator rather than truly adding value to the 
business: 
We had a visit by the PRA, who said that what we like you to do is to create a 
risk committee. The problem is all the risks in this organisation are basically 
covered in these previous committees that we had. So, what the heck does the 
risk committee do apart from ticking the regulator box? The regulators didn’t 
explain really why they want the risk committee. They just want to have the risk 
committee. So we had the risk committee [CEO-8]. 
It has also been acknowledged by PG2 and PG3’s directors that some building societies faced 
challenges in recruiting and appointing suitable directors on the board committees due to 
tremendous regulation changes and lower NED fees: 
A lot of the comments that come back to us are for what you are paying, you are 
paying someone £20,000 to do this job. It is not going to be someone. The 
rumours are coming back that some of the recruitment agency are advising 
potential NEDs to stay clear from the financial services because it is too risky. I 
actually think the biggest issue that we have is too much and too fast regulatory 
change, which drives away individuals [FinDir-2].  
The above demonstrates that there are numerous board committees in the building society 
industry. These include the audit and compliance committee, risk committee, nomination 
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committee, remuneration committee and executive committee. Some directors valued the 
significance of board committees to their business, while a few regarded the structure as set 
up only to meet the regulators’ requirements. 
6.4.3 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Independent NEDs have been recognised as one of the most important internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. NEDs have the responsibilities of monitoring the management and 
provide an independent voice in the boardroom in order to avoid ‘groupthink’ and herd 
behaviour (Hopt, 2013). NEDs are also expected to bring in independent judgement to the 
board and be able to draw upon extensive experience to challenge and be supportive to 
executive directors (BSA, 2010b). Furthermore, independent NEDs of building societies are 
expected to communicate and engage with members in order to better understand members’ 
needs and demands. This is to ensure that NEDs can better represent members’ interests on 
the board (BSA, 2010b). 
The executive directors agreed that NEDs are more accountable since the 2008 financial 
crisis. It was perceived that prior to 2008, extensive power resided in executive directors and 
management rather than the board of directors. Executive directors and management had full 
control of the board of directors because NEDs displayed “absence from board meetings” 
[CEO-8] or merely attended board meetings for “2 hours, cup of tea, just a while, and go 
home” [CEO-13]. Another interviewee illustrated the governance conditions in the building 
society sector before the banking crisis as:  
Some small building societies really just had a mutual ethos and that’s the way 
the whole organisation works. Some of the medium size ones, the CEOs would 
have been quite ambitious and the reason was because they were quite well- 
paid individuals. They had very strong views and they would control, if they 
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could, the board and the NEDs. There were instances where CEOs were too 
autocratic and controlling and some CEOs didn’t approve the NEDs meeting 
separately from the rest of the board [NED-2].  
The regulator interviewed also raised concerns about the independence and effectiveness of 
NEDs: “pre-2008 banking crisis the NEDs were just the people that building societies knew 
such as directors’ friends and colleagues” [REG]. Nevertheless, the time after 2008 
witnessed all building societies utilising formal means to recruit directors such as through 
advertisements, consulting firms, accounting firms and headhunters. All interviewees 
unanimously agreed that NEDs are more independent, accountable, and knowledgeable and 
provide more constructive criticisms to the board. This is also acknowledged by the regulator 
interviewed:  
I think building societies improve greatly on diversity over the last five years. 
But, there is still more work to be done. By diversity, I mean the skills and 
thinking style of NEDs [REG]. 
The auditor expressed that coercive pressures by regulators and desire to strengthen 
accountability to wider constituents have in effect led building societies to enhance the 
diversity, skills and capabilities of their NEDs: 
I think corporate governance in the building societies has been improving 
steadily for many years. I think that the financial crisis probably prompted from 
the regulators to regulate corporate governance more tightly. Building societies 
have also done that directly themselves. The structure and the membership of 
the board, the quality of NEDs, the experience of NEDs, the quality of 
information and briefings and materials provided to board has also improved 
[AUD]. 
Chief executives also elaborated that there was more contact between NEDs and regulators 
following the financial crisis. NEDs spent greater time communicating with regulators in 
terms of recruitment and businesses. A number of CEOs commented that the extent of 
pressures exerted by NEDs on executive directors and management is at times “too much” 
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[CEO-7]. NEDs are perceived to have “greater day-to-day sway on organisation’s operation 
these days than any individual members” [CEO-12]. A huge amount of time is also spent by 
management on providing information to NEDs: 
I have to spend a huge amount of time making sure that NEDs are fully briefed 
and fully understand what we’re doing. And in turn, they have to make sure that 
they’ve got processes so they can double-check that what I’m telling them is true. 
So, that’s been the biggest change I would say in terms of the accountability. In 
the level of involvement, non-executive directors now have been monitoring and 
overseeing the business in more detailed level whereas previously, they had an 
overview position. They’ve come down more into the business [CEO-2]. 
Another chief executive had a similar view: 
I would say the role of NEDs is much more accountable in its own right. I spend 
quarter of my time thinking about how do I interface with the board, 
particularly the NEDs and the information that provide, apparent information 
that we send to them and nature of decisions we want them to take [CEO-12]. 
While NEDs’ accountabilities have been enhanced since 2008, a number of chief executives 
stated that NEDs should be critical and supportive individuals to executive directors, rather 
than merely challenging management team: 
To be effective, the board has to work in such a way that it’s not the NEDs and 
us as the management. There is almost a bit of them and us. If the NEDs are 
merely criticizing the executive directors, that doesn’t work. The NEDs should 
also be there to encourage, to suggest new better ways and to be constructive 
friend to management [CEO-12].  
Another CEO cautioned that NEDs should not interfere with the duties and responsibility of 
management:  
Sometimes the NEDs were too much involved with the management in the 
running of the company. And really, we need to keep them out. ‘We actually said, 
right, management is going to run the company and you are going to make sure 
that we are doing it well and we have got a good approach to risk’ [CEO-8]. 
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The above commentaries indicate that the devastation caused by the failure of banks and 
building societies during the 2008 financial meltdown have in effect led regulators to 
strengthen their supervisory approach to financial services firms. The coercive pressures 
from regulators and the intention to be more accountable have led the board of building 
society to strengthen the skills, composition, knowledge and accountability of NEDs. It was 
reported that NEDs are more accountable and knowledgeable since 2008. Some NEDs were 
nonetheless inquisitive and meddling with the responsibilities of executives. 
Term and Tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
The importance of NEDs in contributing fresh and new perspectives to organisation (UK 
Cooperative Group, 2007, Claessens, 2006) is widely recognised by academics and 
practitioners. This is primarily because NEDs and chairman may be passive and unlikely to 
oppose to executives’ decisions and policies if they serve long-term on the board (Pass, 2004). 
Organisations therefore, benefit greatly from a regular influx of new ideas and perspectives. 
Although there is no hard legislation to state the term of office of a director in a mutual 
organisation, Para B.1.1 of The Code states that “the board should state its reasons if it 
determines that a director is independent…including if the director has served on the board 
for more than nine years from the date of their first election.” An analysis of the forty-four 
building societies’ annual reports for the year ending 2014/ 2015 revealed that nine out of the 
forty-four building societies had NEDs who had served more than nine years. Out of the nine 
building societies, two building societies were categorized under PG1, four building societies 
were under PG2 and three building societies were under PG3. Furthermore, ten out of forty-
four building societies had a chairman who had served more than nine years. Table 6-3 
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illustrates the size of building societies in which the term and tenure of NEDs and chairman 
were more than the nine years. 
Chairman> 9 years NED > 9 years
PG1 Assets over £1bn 2 2
PG2 Assets £300m to £1bn 4 4
PG3 Assets under £300m 4 3
10 9
Size of Building Societies
Total  
Table 6-3: Number of building societies which the tenure of the NEDs and chairmen 
were more than 9 years (Source: Annual reports for the year ending 2014/2015, analysis 
by author) 
 
In relation to this, some interviewees had a mixed stance on the suitability of NEDs serving 
more than nine years. Executive directors perceived that continuity for more than nine years 
is important to the business if the NEDs contribute relevant skills and knowledge. This was 
as expressed by a CEO as:  
I do not lie away every night thinking, ‘oh my goodness me, somebody has been 
on my board for nine years and it is about times we kick them off’. I think 
actually we can be a bit over consumed by good governance. I think actually, 
good business management is as important as good governance. I think you got 
to get the balance right. As I said, you can have very well governed companies 
that fail [CEO-8]. 
The auditor and an NED nonetheless claimed that to ensure ‘independent’ and ‘fresh’ 
perspectives are brought to the board, NEDs and chairmen should not serve more than nine 
years: 
I think 9 years is probably plenty to know about what is going on in the business 
and NEDs may also have cosy relationships with executives and therefore 
difficult to remain independent [AUD]. 
An NED likewise expressed: 
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That applies to the chairman as well. But I think, if you apply the nine-year rule, 
it is forcing you always to refresh yourself to think in you. You got the new 
perspective because the human nature becomes too complacent after nine years 
[NED-3]. 
Although some NEDs and chairmen have served more than nine years, the regulator 
contended that building societies should disclose in their annual reports the reasons their 
organisations were not adhering to the provision of The Code: 
I think it is not a black and white rule. The Code might say nine years and you 
are out. But there should be clear statements why they have chosen not to follow 
The Code [REG]. 
The majority of building societies with NEDs and chairmen who served more than nine years 
did not provide information in their corporate governance statement on the process in which 
NEDs and chairmen are evaluated to be independent. For instance, Cumberland Building 
Society reported in its corporate governance statement that after a review of directors’ 
independence, it was concluded that directors were independent. There was less information 
on how directors were determined to be independent after their long service on board:  
Michael Pratt [the chairman] completed 18 years of service on the Board on 29 
September 2014 and David Clarke [an NED] completed 10 years on 14 
February 2015. In the view of the Board, all the non-executive directors are 
independent in character and judgement, are free of any relationship or 
circumstance that could interfere with the exercise of their judgement, and bring 
wide and varied commercial experience to Board deliberations [Cumberland 
Building Society’s annual report, 2014, p. 11].  
Hinckley and Rugby Building Society reported similarly: 
The Board comprises two executives, five non-executives and the Chairman. All 
non-executives (to include the Chairman on appointment) are considered by the 
Board to be independent in character and judgement and free of any 
relationship or circumstance that could interfere with the exercise of their 
judgement [Hinckley and Rugby Building Society’s annual report, 2014, p. 12]. 
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The above indicates that some building societies were adhering to The Code without a 
requirement to comply. Although they do seem to be conforming to the ‘form’ of 
recommended governance practices, the substance and spirit of good governance practices 
are questionable. This is particularly evident in terms of the independence of the non-
executive directors.  
6.4.4 Incentive System 
In the 1990s, directors’ remuneration was a huge issue due to the less attractive remuneration 
paid out to senior management and directors. Many directors opted to demutualise their 
building societies in order to get into the share and bonus schemes to boost their 
remunerations (ACCA, 2006, Birchall, 2013a, Shiwakoti, 2005). Today, none of those 
demutualised building societies exist independently. They were all bailed out and merged 
with other financial institutions (Michie, 2011, Birchall and Ketilson, 2009). 
With respect to the current state of directors’ remuneration, all interviewees agreed that there 
are proper governance procedures in place to determine directors’ remuneration. For instance, 
all building societies have a remuneration committee in place to review and determine 
executive directors’ remuneration packages as well as to monitor the comparative 
remuneration packages within the financial services sector. In order to discourage 
irresponsible risk-taking and short-termism among the directors of financial services firms, 
the regulators have also amended the remuneration structure of all UK financial institutions 
including building societies (Bank of England, 23rd June 2015). With effect from January 
2016, the PRA and FCA extend the deferral of directors and management variable pays (e.g. 
bonuses) to five and seven years for senior management depending on their senior positions, 
and three years for staff who are material risk takers in the financial service firms. The FCA 
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have also introduced clawback rules in which senior management and affected staff are 
required to return part or all of the variable incentives that they have received to their 
employers under certain conditions, such as if there is reasonable evidence of firms suffering 
material downturn due to staff and management misbehaviour or material errors (Bank of 
England, 23rd June 2015). In light of this, a director claimed that the directors’ remunerations 
are in a more controlled condition: 
We had our remuneration committees meeting a couple of weeks ago—just to 
discuss three directors’ bonuses, salary and board performance to ensure that 
they achieve the target that has been set. And the next meeting that we have is 
next month, to ensure that the target for next year is realistic. They are just not 
easy. They will have to perform well to get a decent bonus [NED-4]. 
The auditor likewise expressed: 
I think the directors’ remuneration of building societies is generally set in line 
with the market rate. They are set within strong governance structure, with 
remuneration committee. You are not going to make your fortune working in 
building societies. There are no share options anything like that [AUD]. 
The annual reports of building societies such as Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society, 
Coventry Building Society and West Bromwich Building Society reflected that the incentive 
structures of building societies mainly consist of a basic salary and benefits and the incentive 
component. The incentive component has an annual bonus scheme which is determined on 
the basis of performance-related criteria, such as customer satisfaction, financial efficiency of 
the organisation (e.g. cost-to-income ratio), personal performance of the directors, a growing 
customer relationship, and employee satisfaction towards the organisations. In contrast, 
typical shareholder-owned banks incentivise their management based on profit and net assets, 
and rarely make reference in their directors’ remuneration reports to the non-financial 
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performance criteria involving employees or customer satisfaction which exists in the 
building society sector (Cook et al., 2002). 
The NEDs of building societies are remunerated by fees which were determined and 
approved by the board of directors on recommendation from the CEO. NEDs are prohibited 
from receiving any variable remuneration from the organisation (Bank of England, 23rd June 
2015). Some building societies have policies which restrict NEDs’ fees exceeding a certain 
limit based on the annual salary of the lowest-paid individuals in the organisation. This is to 
ensure proper balance and proportion between the NEDs’ fees and staff salary. However, two 
key issues pertaining to directors’ remuneration were the ‘regional focus’ of some building 
societies, and these building societies paying comparatively lower NED fees than investor-
owned banks. An NED commented that: 
I suspect there are some building societies who haven’t quite got the full range 
on board. It is difficult because some of them are very small and regional, and 
you ask about how they recruit people? It is sometimes very difficult. It is a 
mixture of remuneration, but the main thing is how regional they are. Our 
building society is in A [the location of the building society]. It is nowhere near 
London. We searched high and low to get the people that we want on our board 
[NED-2].  
This is further supported by the PwC (2016) research that reported that chairmen and NEDs 
of financial services firms in the FTSE 100 received an average of £370,000 and £65,000 
respectively in the year 2015. Table 6-4 shows the fee levels for chairmen and NEDs of 
financial services firms in the FTSE 100. The lowest and highest fees paid to NEDs of 
financial services companies were £59,000 and £ 71,000 respectively. On the other hand, the 
lowest and highest fees received by a chairman of financial services firms in FTSE 100 
companies were £330,000 and £515,000 respectively.  
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FTSE100
Chairman NED
Lower quartile £330,000 £59, 000
Median £370,000 £65,000
Upper quartile £515,000 £71,000
Total Board Remuneration
 
Table 6-4: Fees of chairmen and NEDs of financial services firms in FTSE 100 in 2015 
(Source: PwC report on FTSE 100 Non-Executive Director Fees in 2015, analysis by 
author) 
 
Comparatively, Table 6-5 presents an in-depth analysis of the building societies board of 
directors’ remuneration and incentives for the year 2014/2015. NEDs in PG1, PG2 and PG3 
received an average of £56,000, £28,000 and £18,000 respectively, and £35,000 per year. On 
the other hand, a chairman in PG1, PG2 and PG3 received an average of £94,000, £42,000 
and £24,000 respectively. 
Categories Asset size
Executive 
Directors  
(A)
Non-
Executive 
Directors 
(B)
Total 
number 
(A)+(B)
Exec 
(C)
Non 
Exec (D)
Chairperson 
(E)
Total 
(C+D)
Average 
Exec (C/A)
Average 
Non 
Exec 
(D/B)
Average of 
Chairperson 
(E/44)
PG1 Assets over £1bn 47 96 143 23,599 5,371 1,408 28,970 502 56 94
PG2 Assets £300m to £1bn 37 89 126 5,855 2,521 627 8,376 158 28 42
PG3 Assets under £300m 31 81 112 3,790 1,447 340 5,237 122 18 24
115 266 381 33,243 9,340 2,375 42,583 289 35 54
Size of Building Societies
Total
Total Board remuneration, £000Number of directors
 
Table 6-5: An analysis of building societies board of directors’ remuneration and 
incentives for the year ended 2014/2015 (Source: Annual reports for the year ending 
2014/2015, analysis by author) 
 
It can be seen from Table 6-4 and Table 6-5  that the fees received by chairmen and NEDs in 
PG2 and PG3 were generally lower than the lowest fee paid to chairmen and NEDs in 
financial services firms in FTSE 100 companies. Nonetheless, to encourage diversity and 
ensure that NEDs with the necessary skills and expertise could serve on the board, some 
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building societies commented that they had taken initiatives to ease the hurdles for NEDs to 
travel to their regional building societies, while others still struggled in this regard. For 
example, some building societies provide travelling and subsistence allowances to the NEDs. 
Board members are also supplied with information in a timely manner. This was as explained 
by the following NED:  
People tend to travel now, which previously they didn’t. So, now, building 
societies, they got to look far beyond their local boundaries for the right people. 
I think they are available, but they have to make it easy. So for example, we 
received information about issues that would be discussed usually 2 days before 
the meetings. The building societies I am with then arrange for us to stay in a 
hotel, we had a meal, and it is easy for people to travel. You don’t have to travel 
so much in one day. So, building societies must make it easy for the NEDs 
[NED-2]. 
As a result of the steps taken to attract better quality NEDs, some interviewees remarked that 
NEDs were considered more willing to travel and were more widely dispersed around the 
country. This implies that ‘common bonds’ which are shared between board members and 
local community are gradually being eroded.  
6.4.5  Risk Management and Internal Control Structures 
The onset of the 2008 financial crisis has led the regulators to strengthen the risk 
management framework and internal control structures in the financial services sector. As a 
type of financial institution, the building society is expected to have a clear statement of risk, 
a translation of risk appetite into a clear guidance and clearly execute the business’ risks by 
having the right credible individuals for monitoring and managing the risks. Independent 
auditors are expected to provide assurances to the governing body, such as the risk and audit 
committees, with comprehensive assurance on the effectiveness of the organisation’s risk 
management, governance and internal control structures (HM Treasury, 2014). Many 
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interviewees agreed that since 2008, “the nature of board discussion has focused on risks 
and becomes more defensive” [CEO-9]. A director further expressed that: 
There have been huge focuses on risk and risk management since the 2008 
financial crisis. So risk appetite has been restated. It’s more expansive now in 
terms of the things that it covers. There is more reporting in the risk committee 
[CEO-5]. 
The majority of building societies agreed that their organisations have implemented the best 
practice risk management framework, i.e. the three lines of defence model. A few chief 
executives voiced the importance of three lines of defence model in achieving sound 
governance in building societies: 
I am a huge fan of the three-line defence model. It is the best one we have. It has 
got failings on it, but fundamentally, it makes sense to me. I am fundamental 
believer in having excellent governance [CEO-10]. 
When the auditor was asked about the state of the risk management and internal control 
structures of building societies, the auditor stated that those structures in building societies 
have improved steadily over the years: 
I think the risk management framework is generally pretty strong in what I 
essentially think is a fairly undiversified and conservatively run organisation. 
The same applies generally to the internal control environment and the quality 
internal audit. Therefore, both the risk management framework and internal 
control structures have improved significantly in the recent five years [AUD]. 
Nonetheless, the regulator contended that the focus of risk management in most building 
societies tended be overly complex and comprehensive. Some building societies also had the 
propensity to concentrate on firm rather than macroeconomic levels of risk management:  
The risk management framework in building societies is too comprehensive and 
too complex. Others don’t have a framework yet. Building societies, they are 
thinking too much about the framework and not about the risks. It’s all process 
and not contents. For me, it is important that the building societies look at the 
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wider risks in the system and not just what are happening in front of their faces. 
Because at macro level, the socio-political and economic imperatives impact 
every building society as well. This is an area that has an awful lot of work 
ongoing, at the present time [REG].  
A CEO commented that regulators exert pressures and demand that building societies 
implement the so-called best practices model of governance and risk management structure:  
When the regulator said well, we would like you to have a risk committee, my 
first concern is I am happy to do that. Just because they want me to change it, I 
have no choice but to change it. We need to please them. It takes us an 
enormous effort to make it work pretty well [CEO-8].  
The CEO further raised concerns that the governance structures promoted by regulators do 
not guarantee sound decision-making: 
It is not just about the structure and processes of governance. Actually at the 
end of the of the day, bad decision making, actually causes as much trouble for 
building societies to fail in the financial crisis as poor governance. I am not 
sure necessarily myself, and the PRA would have agreed on that point, but it is 
what I have seen [CEO-8]. 
These suggest that while building societies have attempted to improvise their risk 
management and internal control structures by following the ‘best practice’ guidance, 
additional improvements are still needed in terms of the way risks are being perceived, 
communicated and managed. Building societies should also focus on the substance over the 
form of good governance practices. 
6.4.6 Financial Statements and Disclosure of Non-Financial Information in Annual 
Reports 
Disclosures of financial and non-financial information are important for the building society 
sector to discharge financial-social dual accountability to customer-members, who rely on 
that information for their decision-making and judgements on their involvement with the 
business (Hyndman et al., 2002). Building societies are also required to file annual returns 
C h a p t e r  6   P a g e  | 167 
with the FCA and PRA to discharge their compliance accountability. Transparent disclosure 
of information is important for the sector to gain the trust and confidence of customers, 
regulators, credit rating agencies, financial analysts and members of the general public. 
When interviewees were asked about the state of disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information in the annual reports, the majority of interviewees agreed that they did not 
encounter problems in the preparation of the annual reports. The purpose of reporting of 
financial and non-financial information in the annual reports is for “regulatory returns and 
for the references and reviews of credit rating agencies” [NED-4]. Members generally do not 
read and understand the information in the annual reports. A member mentioned that: 
I got the voting forms come in every year. They asked the members to vote for 
them. I tend to scan through. I don’t normally bother. Occasionally, I have done 
it. Normally, I don’t be bother. I suppose 99.9 % of members don’t even think 
about that. We just want our money safe and secure. As long as we get decent 
returns, we are fine with that [MEM-5]. 
Another member likewise mentioned: 
I receive the AGM pack of [SSS] building society. I normally cast them aside. I 
don’t really vote mainly because I am not interested. I am fine as long as I am 
convinced that my saving is safe [MEM-7].  
The members’ comments were echoed by directors, for example: 
…most members are not interested. Most people are interested in how safe and 
secure their money is and they want to know that the building society is run by 
decent people [CEO-8]. 
Nonetheless, there are minority members who displayed interests in the annual reports. It is 
suggested that these interested members are also likely to attend the AGMs and to hold the 
board accountable for their actions and decisions. For example, a director expressed: 
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We have 2 or 3 of what I would call governance-matter individuals who come to 
the AGM every year. They read the annual reports and they asked good and 
sharp questions. We answered all the questions and we are good about that 
[CEO-8]. 
When an NED was asked about enhanced transparency in their annual reports, the NEDs 
conceded that excessive disclosure of information in the annual reports increases the 
operational costs and provides limited value to the business: 
I think disclosure from regulatory returns is fine. But there is a lot of work and 
costs in disclosing all these things. I am not sure how much those values are in 
that [NED-4]. 
In light of these, the annual reports of the building society sector were analysed to assess the 
overall state of information disclosed. Section 72 (1) of the Building Societies Act 1986 
requires directors of every building society to prepare:  
(a) an income and expenditure account showing the income and expenditure for that year,  
(b) a balance sheet showing the state of its affairs as at the end of that year, 
(c) a statement of the source and application of the funds during that year [i.e. Statement of 
Changes in Equity]. 
An analysis of the 2014/2015 annual reports of the building society sector indicates that the 
financial statements of building societies are prepared in compliance with the Building 
Societies Act 1986 and the UK GAAP. Table 6-6 shows that all building societies prepare 
four major categories of financial statements such as an income statement, a balance sheet, a 
cash flow statement and a statement of total recognised gains and losses and additional 
financial information, such as financial performance indicators.  
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Furthermore, Table 6-7 illustrates other information included in the annual reports. Twelve 
categories of information were identified and reported. Under Sections 74 and 75 of the 
Building Societies Act 1986, building societies shall prepare the annual business statement 
and directors’ report. The auditors shall present their opinions to members regarding the 
financial statements, the annual business statement and the directors’ report. Since it is 
mandatory for building societies to prepare such statements, both tables illustrate that all 
building societies complied with the Building Societies Act 1986 and UK GAAP. 
The building society sector also prepared information and reports on a voluntary basis. For 
instance, building societies are not required to adopt and ‘comply or explain’ with The Code 
and to prepare directors’ remuneration reports which is required under Section 420 of the 
Companies Act 2006. As a best practice and encouragement by the BSA, PRA and FCA, a 
CEO argued that building societies “always prepare and disclose information which is 
required by public listed companies but not mutual organisations” [CEO-5]. These include 
information such as reports by the chairperson, CEO and CFO, statements of corporate 
governance, CSR and risk management, and employee-related and AGM information. 
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Nationwide P P P P P
Yorkshire P P P P P
Coventry P P P P P
Skipton P P P P P
Leeds P P P P P
Principality P P P P P
West Bromwich P P P P P
Newcastle P P P P P
Nottingham P P P P P
Cumberland P P P P P
Progressive P P P P P
National Counties P P P P P
Saffron P P P P P
Cambridge P P P P P
Monmouthshire P P P P P
Leek United P P P P P
Furness P P P P P
Newbury P P P P P
Ipswich P P P P P
Hinckley & Rugby P P P P P
Darlington P P P P P
Manchester P P P P P
Market Harborough P P P P P
Melton Mowbray P P P P P
Marsden P P P P P
Scottish P P P P P
Tipton & Coseley P P P P P
Hanley Economic P P P P P
Dudley P P P P P
Harpenden P P P P P
Vernon P P P P P
Loughborough P P P P P
Mansfield P P P P P
Bath Investment P P P P P
Stafford Railway P P P P P
Teachers' P P P P P
Swansea P P P P P
Chorley & District P P P P P
Buckinghamshire P P P P P
Beverley P P P P P
Holmesdale P P P P P
Ecology P P P P P
Earl Shilton P P P P P
Penrith P P P P P
PG3
Financial 
performance 
indicators
Statement of 
total recognised 
gains and 
losses
Building Society (in 
size order)
Categories
PG1
PG2
Statement of 
comprehensive 
income/Income 
statement
Statement of financial 
position/Balance sheet
Cash flow 
statement
 
Table 6-6: Main types of financial information in building society’s annual report 
(Source: Annual reports for the year ending 2014/2015, analysis by author) 
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Nationwide P P P P P P P P P P P P
Yorkshire P P P P P P P P P P P P
Coventry P P X P P P P P P P P P
Skipton P P X P P P P P P P P P
Leeds P P X P P P P P P P P P
Principality P P X P P P P P P P P P
West Bromwich P P X P P P P P P P P P
Newcastle P P X P P P P P P P P P
Nottingham P P X P P P P P P P P P
Cumberland P X X P P P X P P P P P
Progressive X X X P P P P P P P P P
National Counties P P X P P P P P P P P P
Saffron P P X P P P P P P P P P
Cambridge P P X P P P P P P P P P
Monmouthshire X X X P P P P P P P P X
Leek United P P X P P P P P P P P P
Furness P X X P P P P P P P P P
Newbury X X X P P P P P P P P P
Ipswich P P X P P P P P P P P P
Hinckley & Rugby P P P P P P P P P P P P
Darlington P P P P P P P P P P P P
Manchester P X X P P P P P P P P P
Market Harborough P P X P P P P P P P P X
Melton Mowbray X X X P P P P P P P P P
Marsden P P X P P P P P P P P P
Scottish P P X P P P P P P P P P
Tipton & Coseley X X X P P P P P P P P P
Hanley Economic P P X P P P P P P P P P
Dudley P P X P P P P P P P P P
Harpenden P X X P P P P P P P P P
Vernon X X X P P P P P P P P X
Loughborough X X X P P P X P P P P P
Mansfield X X X P P P P P P P P P
Bath Investment P P X P P P P P P P P P
Stafford Railway X X X P P P P P P P P X
Teachers' P P X P P P P P P P P X
Swansea P P X P P P P P P P P P
Chorley & District P X X P P P P P P P P P
Buckinghamshire P X X P P P P P P P P P
Beverley P P X P P P P P P P P P
Holmesdale P P X P P P P P P P P P
Ecology P P X P P P P P P P P P
Earl Shilton X X X P P P P P P P P X
Penrith X X X P P P P P P P P X
Total 33 27 4 44 44 44 42 44 44 44 44 37
Categories Building Society (in size 
order)
PG1
PG2
PG3
Directors' 
remuneration 
report
Employee 
related 
information
The 
Code
Audit 
report
Chaiman's 
statement
CEO's 
review
AGM 
information
Directors' 
Report
CSR 
statement
CFO 
statement
Risk 
management 
statement
Annual 
business 
statement
 
Table 6-7: Other information (excluding financial statements) in building society’s 
annual report (Source: Annual reports for the year ending 2014/2015, analysis by 
author) 
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It can be seen from Table 6-7 that the disclosure of other information was inconsistent across 
the sector. For example, seven out of forty-four building societies did not report AGMs and 
CSR information to members. Similarly, thirty-three, twenty-seven and four building 
societies prepared reports by chairperson, CEO and CFO respectively. Large building 
societies, specifically those in the PG1 category, disclosed more information than the PG2 
and PG3 building societies.  
The annual reports also show that the extent of voluntary disclosures in some PG2 and PG3 
building societies are limited to short reports and statements. For instance, the length of the 
statements of corporate governance and CSR in some building societies ranges from 2 to 17 
pages, and from 1 paragraph to 11 pages respectively. It can be deduced that the big variation 
in terms of the disclosures provided by building societies is due to the size of those building 
societies. The regulator contended the state of disclosures in building societies’ annual 
reports could still be strengthened: 
If you looked in practice what building societies said in the annual reports, 
specifically the corporate governance statement, ‘we had regard to The Code of 
Corporate Governance’. They didn’t actually say we follow it. Building 
societies’ board of directors are appointed by their members. You don’t get the 
same influence if you have a group of shareholders who can put their own 
members on board. Building societies have to show greater and clearer 
accountability to the best code of corporate governance. Before the crisis they 
won’t and they are improving. Unfortunately, today, not all of them follow all 
the rules within The Code of Corporate Governance. I think every building 
society should say we follow the corporate governance code to the letters [REG]. 
The above indicates that building societies are discharging financial-social dual 
accountability to members and compliance accountability to regulators. However, 
improvements are still needed in voluntary disclosures to achieve financial-social dual 
accountability. 
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6.5 Employment and Staff Development 
The 2008 financial crisis has caused the number of employees in the financial services sector 
to shrink. The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) reported the main UK banks such as 
Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC, Barclays and RBS have shed around 18,500 staff. This put 
the total number of employment down from 435,000 in 2007 to 416,500 in 2008 and 292,600 
by 2012 (BBA, 2014). Equally in the building society sector, the number of employees 
decreased from 51,578 in 2007 to 39,285 in 2010 and 40,220 in 2014. This is notably due to 
the merger of a number of banks and building societies during and after the 2008 credit 
crunch.  
A CEO explained that building societies generally attract individuals who desire to develop 
their professional careers as well as being willing to commit their time for community-based 
activities: 
We have very high employee engagement and we want people to come here 
because of the way we interact with our customers. If you come here, you have 
to be the sort of person who enjoys thinking like we do. If you want to come here 
and sell our stuff and get a kick from selling our stuff, don’t bother. We are not 
the right organisation for you. If you want to come here, we will provide you 
with flexible employment, we will give you a career opportunity to try different 
things and have a good record of that. Summarize by diversifying and valuing 
our people. And lastly, we will be a force for good in our local communities and 
to the societies as whole [CEO-12]. 
Another director saw individuals who worked in local and regional building societies as 
individuals who are not ‘greedy’, ‘materialist’, ‘capitalist’ or mainly seeking a secure job that 
facilitated learning: 
I haven’t met people who worked here who I would determine to be greedy. I 
haven’t encountered any side of greedy culture to the organisation which can be 
destructive when greed drives the wrong behaviour [CEO-13] 
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Likewise, a different CEO asserted that: 
This building society attempts to attract certain kind of person who wants 
something more than turning up and taking the money. You will find people who 
are principled and they want to work with something than just take the money. 
They don’t want to work in a political environment. They want to feel that they 
work in somewhere that is safe to raise concerns [CEO-10]. 
However, a director commented that building societies are at times similar to a “worker co-
operative, where people working in it are just running and managing the organisation for 
themselves” [CEO-9]. Another CEO acknowledged that his building society had situations 
where management got complacent and did not want to do anything. “The board then gets to 
kick them at the ass and say-come on, let’s get some stuff done” [CEO-8]. 
In order to ensure that competent individuals are employed and to achieve personnel 
accountability, many initiatives have been undertaken by the sector to enhance staff well-
being, personal and professional development. The annual reports reported that building 
societies provide training and professional development courses to employees, engage with 
employees to obtain employees’ feedback and provide workplace pension schemes, holidays, 
bonuses and health care benefits. All building societies also recognise diversity, ethnicity and 
different sexual orientation. Consideration is given to applications for employment from a 
range of backgrounds and diversities. In return, employees are expected to follow the 
organisation’s strategic plans and to provide a high service to customers.  
A number of interviewees mentioned that there are different career options and personal 
development offered by different geographic areas and sizes of building societies. Large 
building societies such as Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society and Coventry Building 
Society are widely spread across the UK. These organisations arguably provide greater career 
options to individuals and have a greater likelihood of attracting ‘specific skilled individuals’. 
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Due to the regional focus and the less attractive reward schemes of small and medium-sized 
building societies, many directors claimed that those building societies experience the 
challenge of attracting individuals with IT, risk management and treasury credentials. An 
NED expressed that:  
If you look at the shape of the building society sector, I would say if you are an 
employee or the senior manager of Nationwide, Skipton Building Society or 
Yorkshire Building Society, there is very distinct career path. They are very 
diversified and they have positions all over the country. Where you have the 
small and locally-based building societies like ours, which is in a small town, 
there aren’t a lot of skills people in the catchment area that you are necessary 
looking at. At the moment, it is difficult to attract people at risk management 
and IT [NED-3].  
The above-mentioned interviewee suggested that to achieve personnel accountability, 
building societies provide personal and professional development to staff. Employees are 
also encouraged to engage and share any concerns with their superiors. Small and regional 
building societies, however, have to assess the idea of attracting high-calibre individuals for 
specific jobs against the costs of employing the individuals. 
6.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter analysed and discussed the state of internal aspects of governance and 
accountability in UK building societies. The discussion in the chapter indicates that since the 
2008 credit crunch, corporate governance and accountability have become a vital agenda in 
the building society sector. UK building societies have taken many initiatives to strengthen 
their governance arrangements by improving their board diversity, composition and skills. 
The interview data reflects that the customary appointment of close friends as NEDs which 
existed prior to 2008 has been reduced. Many building societies have been using professional 
search companies to search for NEDs. NEDs are considered more accountable, 
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knowledgeable and provide constructive feedback to the board. All building societies also 
have remuneration committees in place to review and determine executives’ remuneration. 
NEDs’ fees were more thoroughly reviewed, determined and approved by the board of 
directors.  
However, the study found that there were a number of critical issues experienced by UK 
building societies. Regional and local building societies had to search quite hard for 
individuals with expertise in treasury, financial services, risk management and information 
technology due to their regional locations and fees and salaries below the market rate. Some 
building societies are also found to hugely emphasise the form rather than the actual essence 
of sound governance. Governance practices are box ticking exercise without due regard to 
the actual substance of compliance. For instance, the study found that some building societies 
created board committee structures simply to meet the superficial requirements of the 
regulator. The best practice risk management framework—the three lines of defence model—
was not implemented with the spirit of good accountability and governance. The analysis of 
the state of disclosure of information in the annual reports also revealed that all forty-four 
building societies complied with mandatory disclosures (such as reporting of financial 
statements and the directors’ report). Disclosure of voluntary information such as the 
chairperson and CEO’s reviews, the CSR statement and corporate governance statement were, 
however, inconsistent across the sector. Some building societies did not provide in-depth 
information in those reports and merely reported shallow information with short statements.  
Governance practices for compliance purposes have value only if the underlying activities 
and procedures are relevant to the businesses. The risks of over-focusing on the form rather 
than the true substance of good governance practices are that building societies may invest 
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huge resources in corporate governance systems such as the three lines of defence model, a 
risk committee or reporting of information which do not translate into improving business 
operations or enhancing accountability. These may consequently expose building societies to 
failures in governance, abuses of power and ultimately the collapse of the businesses. These 
areas still require more effort by building societies. The next chapter discusses the findings 
pertaining to the extent that intermediate governance structures assist in discharging 
accountabilities. 
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CHAPTER 7: Intermediate Governance 
Structures and Democratic 
Practices: An Analysis of the 
Views of Customer-Members, 
Directors and Regulator 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the discussion of the preceding chapter and discusses the extent to 
which the intermediate governance structures achieve financial-social dual accountability and 
facilitate democratic practices in UK building societies. The chapter presents key themes 
which emerged from interviews with customer-members, directors and a regulator. The 
interview data are substantiated with evidence from documents and non-participant 
observation. The chapter is structured into three main parts. Section 7.2 discusses customers’ 
conceptualisation of mutuality. Section 7.3 reports on the current intermediate governance 
structures and the state of democratic practices in the building society sector. The concluding 
section is discussed in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Conceptualisation of Mutuality Drawn from Customers 
A mutual organisation has been defined by building societies as a business which is owned 
by and run for the benefit of customer-owner-members. When members were asked about 
what they understand about mutuality, the majority of members answered “I don’t know” 
[MEM-3, MEM-4, MEM-8]. A building society’s profit is distributed to its members as 
mutual dividends or is used to help people who require financial assistance to purchase 
a house. A member highlighted that: 
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Building societies look after their members better than the banks do. Because 
most building societies in this country are for their members…I tend to use the 
services of the smaller building societies, which are for members only. All the 
profits are going to the building societies at the end of the day. Not the 
shareholders [MEM-3]. 
Members have the right to vote on the election or re-election of directors and auditors, on 
approval of the audited financial statement and to attend and speak at meetings. Each 
member has one vote regardless of the amount of money invested or the number of accounts 
they have (BSA, 2013c). The interview data indicated that almost all members are not 
interested in voting and understanding the day-to-day operations of building societies. For 
instance, a member expressed that: 
I have the voting pack sent to me every year by different building societies. 
Sometimes, I read through them and casted my vote. But generally, I care less 
about them. I think as long as my money is protected by FSCS and I get decent 
return, I am fine [MEM-3]. 
There were also a number of members interviewed who did not understand about their rights 
as customer-owner-members. A member explained that: 
I become a customer of [zz] building society because I need different banking 
account. Coincidently, [zz] building society offers good deal for their savings 
and current account and they have a branch near to my house. So, I am not 
really bother about how building societies are run [MEM-4]. 
Another member also explained: 
I have been the customer of [tt] building society for two years. I think [tt] 
building society offers good rates in their savings compared to banks…I 
received their AGM packs, but I don’t bother with it. I did not vote because I 
don’t have time for that [MEM- 9]. 
Apart from better interest rates, customers also enunciated that building societies provide 
good customer services. Employees are more attentive and engaging in building societies 
than banks: 
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One thing which is good about building societies is you can go into their 
branches and the staff and manager remember your name. They answer all your 
questions and they are good in doing that. I also have accounts with [UU] and 
[CC] banks. But I found that it is very difficult to get staff in branches to help. I 
think banks have so many ATMs in their branches that sometimes they forget the 
needs of customers who need to be talk to rather than machines [MEM-8]. 
Some members mentioned that they expected building societies to be accountable to future 
customers and the local community rather than just the present members. Building societies 
were initially set up to provide assistance to individuals to own houses (Woodin et al., 2010, 
Dayson, 2002). Hence, building societies have a responsibility and accountability beyond 
current members: 
I think building societies’ accountability is to their current members. They have 
to show that they are offering good practices, and that they are not losing 
money. They should also have more money to be able to offer out as mortgages 
and to build local community. This is the initial idea of what a building society 
is [MEM-3]. 
Another member corroborated this: 
I like the fact the building societies seem to have a better ethos in terms of 
looking after their customers. I think apart from better deals, I like to know that 
my money is in a company based in UK. It can keep the money within the UK 
economy and hopefully is helping someone else in the country to own houses 
[MEM-1].  
The responses of members suggest that the majority of members associated the idea of 
mutuality with good and decent returns, good customer services, and the board of directors 
and management’s accountability to present members, future members and the local 
community. The majority of customers do not exercise their ownership and control rights and 
do not attempt to understand the day-to-day operations of the business. The next section 
reports findings pertaining to types of intermediate governance structures applied by the 
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building society sector in achieving financial and social dual accountability and in fostering 
democratic practices. 
7.3 Intermediate Governance Structures and Democratic Practices 
Intermediate or democratic governance structures are the mechanisms and structures to 
facilitate democratic practices and the achievement of financial-social dual accountability in 
mutual organisations (Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Pearce, 2003, Pellervo, 2000). As owners 
and customers of building societies, members have ownership and control rights to changes 
in building societies such as changes to the constitution, mergers with other societies or the 
decision to demutualise. Furthermore, the board of directors and the managers are elected by 
members to manage and run the business. Members therefore have the authority to remove 
and replace management if they are not delivering the required services and products 
(Cooperative Group, 2007, Birchall, 2013). The intermediate governance structures were 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and interviewees were asked to discuss them. 
7.3.1 Member Panel and Member Forum  
In order to obtain a greater level of participation and involvement from members, a number 
of building societies established member panels and member councils as part of their 
governance structure. A member panel is regarded as a type of participatory democratic 
structure, to call upon a group of members to make decisions or at the very least, express 
their feedback and opinions on the products or services rendered (Ketilson and Brown, 2011). 
A member panel is argued to represent all members. It is made up of individuals who are 
concerned about the governance of their building societies. Hence, the member panel is often 
informed about business conditions and strategic matters, ideas and feedback on new 
products and viewpoints and feedback of other members (BSA, 2010a). 
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There are two types of member panel structures in building societies. Large building societies 
(specifically PG1) have member panels consisting of a huge number of members who 
volunteered to review their building society’s financial performance, provide feedback on 
operational details and suggest ways for better services and products. For instance, Coventry 
Building Society states on its website that the member council (or member panel) is made up 
of: 
…a dozen members who volunteer to work with us to review our performance, 
provide feedback on our plans and help us develop our approach…at the latest 
meeting the Council was given an overview and update on the Society’s 
performances…before moving onto the business of discussing the Society’s 
Members First values and principles…In the afternoon, the Council talked 
about executive remuneration…this was followed by an item brought to the 
Council meeting by one of the members - a discussion around our community 
work and charitable partnerships (Coventry Building Society, 2016) . 
A member panel of small building societies (specifically PG2 and PG3) such as Hinckley & 
Rugby Building Society is made up of a small group of savers and mortgage borrowers who 
have volunteered their time to discuss products and services and business objectives as well 
as to provide insights and suggestions on the development of their building society. The 
panel meets a few times in a year at various locations and also attended by a chairman, NEDs, 
the CEO and senior managers (Hinckley & Rugby Building Society, 2016).  
Besides a member panel, a number of building societies hold regular open forum events to 
members at different venues around the country. The board of directors and senior managers 
attend these events and local customers are invited to attend and provide suggestions to 
management. The researcher observed one of the member forums at [FF] building society. 
Executives and non-executives at that event gave a talk about [FF] building society's history 
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and presented its financial performance. Following their talks, members were invited to 
provide feedback and share their concerns with other members and the board of directors.  
When directors were asked the underlying reasons for organising a member panel and 
member forum, one of the directors commented that such approaches distinguish building 
societies from banks and preserve members’ democracy: 
Some of the banks will be able to get their principal shareholders into a single 
room and can be talking to a sufficiently large proportion of shareholders that 
carry the power to vote. We can never do that. That’s why our engagement 
programme is so important for us to understand our members and to enable 
members to participate [CEO-5]. 
Directors of regional and local building societies asserted that despite their increasing efforts 
to organise a member forum, there was a lack of member attendance and participation. This 
is supported with the researcher attendance at the member forum conducted by [FF] building 
society. There were less than 100 members attended the member forum out of a few hundred 
thousand of members. According to a chief executive, members’ lack of participation 
increased the resources utilised by business:  
So I have asked the branch staff and also local business meeting to say we do 
have the member forum where you can come along and you can talk about ways 
our building society could do a better job. They are very poorly attended. I used 
to run two a year and it’s now ended to one a year and it tends to be the same 
three or four people that turned up. So we ended up spending more money and 
perhaps we are winding up more people [CEO-4]. 
To overcome these problems, building societies employ retail branches to foster face-to-face 
interaction between members and branch employees. Building societies also communicated 
with members through members’ magazines, newsletters, questionnaires and surveys and the 
use of virtual tools and technology. These provide building societies the ability to 
communicate with members in a timely, personal and efficient way (BSA, 2010a). 
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7.3.2 Retail Branch  
The retail branch is a popular distribution network for building societies to communicate and 
interact with members. It is a medium that directors and management mobilise in order to 
obtain feedback and understand members’ needs through employees. A CEO emphasised that: 
We have to listen to our branch people because actually they are the nearer 
voice to the members, they hear and they report back on what they hear. There 
is good feedback with those being a formal structure, but they really know what 
our members are thinking and what our members are asking [CEO-3]. 
Chief executives asserted that even though most members rarely approach them, they would 
visit retail branches to meet staff and to converse with customers: 
I am more accessible than the chief executive of [GG] bank, who I am sure their 
customers could not phone up and talk to…Our position whereby, myself and 
my finance director always visit all our branches, greet our staff on what they 
should say to customers and also to talk to customers [CEO-1]. 
The BSA representative commented likewise: 
Directors go to the branches partly to meet the staff and partly to meet 
members. I heard one chief executive was very annoyed with his own staff, 
because he was in a branch and a member came over and asked ‘who is that 
over there?’ And he wasn’t introduced as chief executive. When directors are 
out there with staff and members, they immediately interested in members 
[BSA]. 
Members interviewed enunciated the significance of branches to acquire information and to 
express concerns about banking products and services. Employees in branches are 
approachable, accessible and friendly. They are also well trained to address customer 
concerns about online transactions, interest rates or financial advices on savings and 
mortgages products. A member expressed that employees in branches are “much friendlier. 
They sometimes answer your questions better than banks would” [MEM-3]. Another member 
commented similarly: 
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My wife and I have savings accounts with [KK] building society and [WW] 
bank. The impression I get, is that building societies are more local. I don’t 
mean geographically local. But they are more on the ground. I don’t know if you 
go to the [WW] bank on the high street, there’s hardly a person, it is a very 
machine-based. The building society that I use, I felt like they are smaller, 
friendly and more approachable [MEM-1]. 
Despite the benefits of retail branches to members and directors, an ex-director explained that 
branches are typically used by old customers who are “in their 60s and 70s. These customers 
remember the local building societies’ managers, the branch in the corner in the high street 
and they still make use in the branch” [EXDIR-1]. However, young customers who are 
arguably more technology savvy, seem more interested in doing online banking rather than 
visiting branches: 
If you think about the structural changes that occur in the UK society, young 
people are not interested in any of that stuff. It is going to be apps on the 
iPhone, and it’s all about moving money from A to B. They would not become 
interested in local business [EXDIR-1]. 
Another chief executive commented that the costs of maintaining branch networks are huge 
and the majority of member-customers scarcely use retail branches: 
If you took a hard economic approach to it, we would probably close some of 
our branches because they are not being used enough. It increases our cost of 
maintaining them. There will come a point where mutuals will find it a 
challenge just having branches because it feels like the right thing to do [CEO-
6]. 
The CEO’s remark raises a question of the future of branch networks to maintain the 
accountability relationship and to enhance proximity between building societies and 
customers. This is further supported by Casu (2015), who said that the number of branches in 
the financial services sector declined from 10,051 in 2006 to 8,837 in 2012. The branch 
network in the UK banking sector is expected to decrease to 7,000 branches by 2018 (The 
Telegraph, 3 March 2014). The decline of branch networks is due to changes in customer 
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demographics. Customers, specifically young adults, are perceived to be more 
technologically savvy and are increasingly turning to online and mobile banking applications, 
rather than visiting branches and having face-to-face interactions. Many banks have thus 
migrated to online banking applications to suit the requirements of technology-savvy 
customers (The Telegraph, 3 March 2014).  
Overall, members are satisfied with building societies’ branch networks as the platform to 
address their concerns and to obtain financial services advice. Branch networks play a key 
part in understanding customers’ needs and preserving proximity with customers (Bernard 
and Tetrault, 2012). They are also a channel to strengthen building societies’ intermediate 
governance structures in promoting democracy and accountability. Nonetheless, retail 
branches are infrequently utilised by technology savvy customers and the costs of 
maintaining a branch network are rising. It is therefore questionable whether the future of 
branch networks will help to revive customers’ overall banking experience and improve the 
accountability relationship between building societies’ senior management and customers.  
7.3.3 Social Media and New Technology 
Building societies utilise technology to modernise their democratic process and to enhance 
the financial-social dual accountability to members. The BSA (2015b) reported that two-
thirds of building societies use social media to communicate with members via Facebook and 
Twitter. For example, Darlington Building Society and Ipswich Building Society and their 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) use Twitter to announce new products, newsletters that 
might be of interest and to answer questions from customers. 
Building societies also have information on their websites which describe customers’ rights, 
types of product and interest rates, links to AGM materials and results and information on 
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community activities. Some large building societies mobilise their websites as a medium to 
interact with members including online question-and-answer sessions. For instance, Leeds 
Building Society (2017) has a section on its website named ‘TalkingPoint’ for members to 
express opinions on matters that are vital to them and to communicate with other members to 
discuss improvement ideas for products and services. Nationwide also has an online member 
forum which enables members to suggest ways to improve services and to see other 
members’ recommendations.  
In addition, a few building societies have implemented ‘in-branch technology’ to enable 
customers to contact the administrative office via an in-branch video link. A director 
elaborated that: 
Our use of in-branch technology is really important to offer advice. I can deploy 
technology and have an advisor available through the screen at every one of my 
branches. We invested in a network that if you are in a branch, this is the 
interview room. Somebody would pop on the screen and they might be 
downstairs and you might be in a branch in Colchester. You would see them and 
they would see you. On the other half of the screen, we would pop information 
there on how things work and shows you quotes, all sort of things. And we got a 
network technology to print that off in a printer wherever you are [CEO-11]. 
Unlike banks such as HSBC, NatWest and RBS, which are closing their high street branches, 
some building societies are committed to keeping their branch networks intact and even 
expanding their branches. They believe in the significant role of the high street branch, in 
offering people the option of managing their money using technology in-branch, together 
with personal services. A BSA representative explained that the approach undertaken by 
building societies is to deliver a mutual dividend to customers and the local community:  
Building societies are investing in their branches and expanding their branches 
at the time when the banks are universally withdrawn their branches. So when 
you think about what are the values, the values are about the members and 
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about how you deliver the values to the members. It does sometimes call the 
mutual dividend [BSA]. 
However, a majority of directors expressed their concerns on the ability of small and 
medium-sized building societies to invest in new technology and to cater to the needs of 
technological savvy customers who commonly opt for e-banking or mobile finance on their 
banking transactions. A CEO questioned whether small organisations (which most building 
societies are), “can continue to invest at the level that is required as UK society becomes 
more digital and technology becomes more important” [CEO-5]. The CEO further 
enunciated that: 
There is a question about what will their position be not tomorrow, but in 5 or 
10 years’ time as we become a wholly digital society. I just think they might be 
at a tipping point where these small businesses have to decide whether they 
have got the ability to continue to operate and compete in that sort of 
environment [CEO-5]. 
The regulator also commented that: 
I think small businesses are facing challenges through new technology. The 
network capabilities such as Internet finance and mobile finance are becoming 
more prominent…I think there might be people who want traditional building 
society, just that now. But as network capability goes up, it will drive huge 
changes in individuals banking needs. Building societies need to be prepared to 
that and they need to think what would make a customer-owned business offers 
services that are relevant to people [REG]. 
The increasing use of technology therefore posits challenges for the future od small and 
medium-sized building societies, which typically rely on branch networks and face-to-face 
interactions. These building societies may face an increasing cost mark-up and may need to 
continuously manage different distribution channels to meet the needs of their customers.  
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7.3.4 Annual General Meeting 
Building Societies Act 1986 requires all building societies to carry out their AGM in the first 
four months of their financial year end (BSA, 1986). Schedule 2, paragraph 20 states that:  
every building society shall hold a meeting in the first four months of each 
financial year as its annual general meeting (in addition to any other meetings in 
that year) and shall specify the meeting as such in the notices calling it.  
 
With respect to that, all building societies send their AGM packs to members prior to the 
meeting. The AGM pack enables members to vote on directors’ remuneration and to elect 
and re-elect directors and auditors. However, the BSA (2010) reported that there was only an 
18%, 19.4% and 18.4% voter turnout at AGMs in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
In 2014, the turnout averaged 11.8% (BSA, 2015b). Figure 7-1 also shows the decreasing 
trends in the AGM turnout at building society AGM between 2004 and 2014. 
 
Figure 7-1: AGM turnout at building society AGMs between 2004 and 2014 (Source: 
The BSA (2016) AGM statistics, analysis by author) 
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Likewise, members’ attendance was very small at the two AGMs attended and observed by 
the researcher. The first AGM was attended by 250 members out of about a few hundred 
thousand members. The second AGM was attended by fewer than 100 members out of about 
500,000 members. The majority of directors contended that turnouts at AGMs were “very 
low” and “disappointing” [CEO- 4, CEO-11]. A CEO stated that: 
We do put a lot of effort to try and engage members to come along. But you can 
see from last week’s AGM, we sent out all those invitations and 100 were there. 
Our desire is that would be 500 plus people there [CEO-3].  
An interviewee claimed that members attend the AGM when “there are proposals to merge 
with another organisation and during the 2008 financial crisis when members needed 
assurance about the soundness of their deposits” [BSA]. Another director commented that 
most members are satisfied with the way building societies are managed and they do not feel 
the need to turn out at an AGM: 
When we looked at what happened at our AGM, we had 50 customers come 
along. They are not technically interested in governance. But, what they are 
interested in is what we are. A nice organisation, decent to its customers, well 
run, properly managed. That’s what they like to see at the AGM. They are not 
interested in who is on what committee or how long any individual director has 
been there. They are not sitting there thinking, ‘well, I got an issue here, and 
how long the auditor has been?’ They don’t care about all those things that 
governance people are obsessed about. It’s a very rare person that does [CEO-
8]. 
Members attributed the reasons for their lack of participation as: “I merely regard building 
societies as service and mortgage providers [MEM-3, MEM-4], “I do not have time” [MEM-
1, MEM-9], “I am not interested” [MEM-3, MEM-5, MEM-8] and “I do not believe my 
single vote would change anything” [MEM-1, MEM-2, MEM-9]. On the other hand, a 
member who the researcher met at the AGM of [VV] building society argued that members 
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should exercise their ownership and control rights. The directors and managers of building 
societies take into consideration feedback provided by their members: 
We owned part of the company. If they said they want to expand and take over 
another building society, we will get a vote if we agree. We do have a 
say…Here, we are interested because this can be part of our company. The 
people are one of our people, our members. So they are quite happy to help you 
out. This building society really takes on board what their members asked. It’s 
not possible to do everything all the time. They do listen to their members. 
People feel that they are worthwhile and they are being listened to. You all put a 
little into the company so you have a say on how it is run [MEM-6].  
In order to encourage greater turnout at AGMs, numerous measures have been undertaken by 
building societies such as using technology to reach out to members who are using email and 
other web services as their primary means of communication. Nationwide states in its 
website that: 
You don't have to actually attend the meeting to vote. We communicate with 
around 8 million eligible members through email and by post as it’s really 
important that you have your say in ways that suit you (Nationwide, 2017).  
Some building societies also offer to make donations to charities for every vote they receive. 
Leeds Building Society reported on its website that: 
We’ll donate 10p for each paper voting form received or 20p if you vote online 
to national and local charities such as Depaul, Sense and Leeds Building 
Society Charitable Foundation. To vote online, you’ll need your unique security 
code and password from your voting email (Leeds Building Society, 2017). 
A number of building societies even hired independent agencies such as audit firms to 
scrutinize the voting process and provide free lunches, live bands, bus stands and door gifts 
to increase members’ attendance at the AGM. Even so, members rarely turn up at the AGM: 
Customers are advised when the AGM is and we announce to people they are 
free to come and there is a buffet and wine. We also provide a shuttle bus from 
the train station. Last year, zero customers who were not already linked to the 
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society by employment or past history turned up. So we changed the venue and 
nobody turned up other than people who were scheduled to turn up like 
auditors, directors and staff [NED-2].  
The analysis suggests that building societies undertake different measures to encourage 
members to vote and to attend the AGM. However, most members do not believe their votes 
result in changes in building society operations. Members mainly regarded building societies 
as products and service providers. Due to that, building societies experience the challenges of 
getting a high member turnout at the AGM. 
7.3.5 Board of Directors 
In the building society sector, the board of directors is expected to communicate and engage 
with members in order to better understand members’ needs and represent them on the board 
(BSA, 2010b). All interviewees agreed that the board of directors visited branches to talk to 
staff and customer-members. Directors of building societies would attend roadshows and 
member forums to interact and communicate with customers. This is further seconded from 
the researcher's attendance at building society AGMs and member forum. NEDs were in 
attendance to engage with members and to answer customers’ questions and probes with 
regards to a building society’s operations. A chairperson commented that:  
I go to branches, I sit in member forums and my non-executive colleagues do 
too. They go out into branches chatting to people, customers as well as staff 
[Chair-2]. 
Furthermore, Saffron Building Society has an online form on its website that gives members 
the opportunity to contact board members other than through the traditional channel of 
writing to the Chief Executive or Chairman (Saffron Building Society, 2017). However, there 
were some directors who were sceptical as to the relevance of member engagement between 
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NEDs and members. The majority of members are not interested in interacting with NEDs 
and the engagement activities arguably increased the costs of the organisations: 
What we asked the NEDs to do is to attend the AGM and invited them to 
member forums. So for example, in the 4 years I have been here, I have 
probably held about 6 or 7 member forums. So each time I get one, I said to the 
board I have got one coming up, who have not been on one before, would you 
like to come along and engage with the members? But unfortunately, it is let 
down by poor attendance not by the NEDs, but by members. So we ended up 
spending more money [CEO-4]. 
Other directors emphasized likewise that it is “difficult for NEDs to engage with members. 
We had the AGM, roadshows, member forums and there were very few members who turned 
up” [NED-2] or the “same body of people turn up each time there are member engagement 
events” [CEO-2]. Even so, directors expressed that comments and suggestions received from 
members would be acted upon appropriately. Diverse measures were undertaken by those 
building societies to collate feedback from members, to be brought to the attention of board 
and senior management. Those measures include “engagement by staff and executives with 
members” [NED-2], “listening to staff in branches [CEO-3] and “sending out reports, giving 
members the chance to have opinion through our branches asking for feedback when 
somebody has visited and transacted” [CEO-13]. These demonstrate that building societies 
are undertaking different means to enhance their engagement with customers, despite the lack 
of interaction between NEDs and members. 
7.3.6 Other Means of Engagement and Communication with Customer-Members 
Member questionnaires and surveys are also widely used by building societies to seek 
feedback from members and assessment of customers’ satisfaction with respect to products 
and services. Surveys are run annually or semi-annually in which they are posted together 
with an AGM pack or are available at retail branches (BSA, 2010a). According to directors, 
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surveys by mail or telephone are useful to obtain feedback from customers and to understand 
what drives customer satisfaction: 
We measure feedback from our members in terms of quality of our service how 
satisfied they are. Independently each month, we look at the satisfaction of our 
members and we used independent firms to measure that for us. And we talked 
to our members each year through that process. We have an online forum of 
members which covers the full age spectrum and profile of our membership, 
where we can test ideas and new ways of doing something, improving our 
communication and all of those sorts of things. When things go wrong, there are 
a lot of analyses of complaints and feedback so that we can understand what has 
happened [CEO-5].  
Another chief executive commented similarly: 
If we do get complaints, they are captured and every single of them is put in 
front of me and the management team. So every month, we look through 
complaints then we understand where the problems lie, look for solutions, look 
for every cost analysis, any escalated complaints letter come to me, we get very 
few of those. And also we do surveys. Whenever a new member opens up a new 
account or closes an account, we will send them a survey form to fill in. I think 
we have about 15-20% of responses and invariably the results from those are 
very positive. Again what we asked for is the feedback about what would you do 
differently or what you think we could do better. And we read those as well 
[CEO-4].  
Nationwide reported on its website that the organisation commissioned an independent 
research company to contact 12,000 customers by telephone to ask about the quality of 
services they receive from retail branches and telephone staff. Nationwide also conducted an 
online survey with 5,000 of the users of its Internet banking service and website (Nationwide, 
2016). Similarly, National Counties Building Society conducted an online survey with its 
customers to obtain feedback and suggestions about products and services. Its website 
reported that for every ten online surveys completed, a tree would be planted and members 
would stand a chance to win cash draw (National Counties Building Society, 2016). 
C h a p t e r  7   P a g e  | 195 
Furthermore, to reduce the barriers to member participation, a number of directors allowed 
members to personally contact them. A director disclosed that: 
Particularly during the credit crunch period when customers were worried 
about the safety and soundness of their deposits, members could phone me up 
and talk to me about the organisation financial position, our attitude to risks, 
and exposure to other banks in term of counter party deposit [CEO-1]. 
Members are also kept abreast with building societies’ activities, community activities and 
financial performance through newsletters, magazines, regular electronic publications and 
member roadshows. All building societies communicate with members through letters with 
respect to interest rate changes by explaining the context of the decision to amend the rate 
and reassure savers that their deposits are secured (BSA, 2010a). These approaches to 
member communication and engagement are to foster democracy in a customer-owned 
business. A CEO emphasised that:  
We do a member roadshow, where we go to different parts of the community 
where we are represented and we present on certain topics and get their views 
back from those members. Very importantly, we do customer research about the 
service we provide. We have ten key categories about what we describe as 
service and we get customer feedback on that permanently those going well and 
the overall score and what we can do to improve. The feedback that we get is 
that they are pretty much happy with the way that we are trying to do things and 
with our strategies and they want us to carry on doing that. Now does that mean 
democracy exists for members’ benefits? I think it probably is [CEO-12]. 
Members found that they had no problems in accessing information when they required it. 
Building societies provide regular information updates and members are satisfied with the 
contacts they had with building societies. A member stated that:  
Contact has always been good when you deal with building societies. They write 
real letters to me and not just emails and they have got telephone helpline if I 
need to do so. And then, they send general communication about what the 
company is doing [MEM-1].  
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Another member mentioned that: 
Everyone has different experience. I found that contacts with building societies 
have always been good. I don’t have any complaint [MEM-3]. 
Despite the increasing efforts made by building societies to enhance member democracy and 
improve engagement with members, the regulator questioned the board of directors’ 
accountabilities in building societies:  
One of the big challenges of their board is their lack of accountability. If you 
read their annual reports, they are trusted with their members’ reserves. These 
are millions of pounds…Most of the building societies don’t say to their 
members whether their reserves are earning above and in the right way of risks. 
Or how is the business moving forward…building societies, they do listen to 
their members and they are very good at member engagement events. But did 
they demonstrate that they invest in the members’ money in wisest possible way 
and that’s judge through the right level of profit that they generate at the end of 
the year, the right level of risks for that profit? I think that’s more they can do in 
that area [REG]. 
The analysis showcases that building societies have employed various means such as surveys, 
questionnaires, newsletters, magazines and regular electronic publications to facilitate 
democratic practice and discharge a financial-social dual accountability to members. 
Members are satisfied with the interactions they have with building societies and the 
regulator also agreed that member engagement remained a core agenda in the industry. 
However, the regulator demanded the board of directors’ accountabilities and the internal 
governance practices to be further strengthened in terms of the ways risks are perceived, 
managed and implemented, and the process in which strategic decisions are formulated and 
undertaken.  
C h a p t e r  7   P a g e  | 197 
7.4 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter analyses and discusses the extent to which intermediate governance structures 
assist building societies to achieve financial-social dual accountability to members and to 
foster democratic practices. The chapter found that building societies experience a number of 
challenges to effectively engage their customer-owner-members. Members are not interested 
in governance matters and the day-to-day operations of building societies. Members are 
largely value-for-money driven with regards to the products and services offered by building 
societies. Borrower-members expect lower interest rates for their mortgages and savers 
expect higher returns for their deposits. There were, however, some members who are strong 
supporters of customer-owned business and have more time to engage.  
These findings are consistent with the assertions of Birchall and Simmons (2004), Spear 
(2004) and Birchall (2013) that most members in a customer-owned business have few 
interests in their membership organisations. Birchall (2011) cautioned that in the absence of 
effective member engagement, it is a challenge to ensure that the board of directors can act in 
the long-term interests of its owner-members. In order to build more meaningful relationship 
with members and to modernise the democratic processes, greater efforts and various 
intermediate governance mechanisms have been deployed by building societies. These 
include the usage of Internet and new ‘in-branch technology’ to facilitate members’ turnout 
at AGMs and to improve engagement with members. Directors also visit retail branches and 
attend member forums and roadshows to communicate and engage with members in order to 
obtain feedback and suggestions. However, members feel removed from their building 
societies and less inclined to interact and engage. 
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Engagement with members therefore remains a long-term challenge for the building society 
sector. Building societies may need to continually demonstrate to members the benefits of 
being customer-owner-members of building societies, the quality and value-for-money of the 
products and services, and strengthen their internal governance practices by running proper 
risk management and internal control systems which will enhance the achievement of 
organisation’s mutual accountability and overall mission. The next chapter discusses the state 
of external governance structures in achieving compliance accountability in the building 
society sector. 
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CHAPTER 8: External Aspects of Governance 
and Accountability: An Analysis 
of the Views of Key 
Stakeholders 
 
8.1 Introduction 
While Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the internal and intermediate governance structures in 
achieving accountability, this chapter discusses the final empirical findings: the corporate 
social responsibility and accountability practices in the building society sector, as well as the 
state of external governance structures in achieving compliance accountability. The chapter 
presents key themes emerging from interviews with directors, an auditor and a regulator. The 
interview data are triangulated with evidence from documents and non-participant 
observation.  
The chapter is structured into four main sections. While Section 8.2 explains the state of 
corporate social responsibility and accountability practices in building societies, Section 8.3 
deliberates the role of the external auditor since the 2008 financial crisis. Section 8.4 
discusses the extent to which external governance structures achieve compliance 
accountability, and Section 0 summarises the chapter and reflects upon the evidence 
presented. 
8.2 Community Activities and Social Accountability 
Milton Friedman claimed that the main responsibility of shareholder-owned companies or 
corporations is to maximize the returns of shareholders. Managers elected to run corporations 
on behalf of shareholders are expected to make as much profit as possible for shareholders; 
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and that a corporation does not have a social responsibility or accountability to the 
environment, community and societies (Friedman, 1970). The government is to use its 
legitimate taxing function to raise money to enhance the social welfare of taxpayers and to 
protect the environment (Avi-Yonah, 2008).  
Unlike the ideas of Milton Friedman and the findings of O’Dwyer (1999) who found that 
CSR in most Irish commercial companies exhibited minor concerns to wider stakeholders 
apart from shareholders, the chief executives of building societies are highly aware of the 
benefits of CSR towards the community and societies. CSR is regarded as a commitment to 
the community or being part of the community. It is inherently espoused in the virtues of the 
business: 
I have never even used the expression CSR since I have been here. It is not 
because we don’t do things. We do it because we want to do them. We called it 
being part of community. Not corporate social responsibility [CEO-12]. 
Employees are highly motivated to get involved in community activities and many building 
societies use the skills within their organisations to contribute to local causes: 
If you went to any of our branches, employees get the autonomy to do the events 
that fit in the environment. It is one of these things that are in the DNA of our 
people. I am looking to encourage our people to do more in the community. 
That’s both because people really enjoy doing it and want to do it. It makes 
them feel better and the community also loves it [CEO-10]. 
The majority of CEOs also acknowledged that engaging in community activities enhanced 
business reputation, competitive advantage and created win-win relationships with customer-
members: 
We are a building society and we also think we have got a role to effectively 
build a better society. If the business starts to make more profit than we require, 
we think we could actually do something at society level such investing in the 
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affordable of housing stock [or other community-related activities] which is 
representation for what we stand for. It leaves legacy for not just our members 
but for broader society. If we can become famous for doing things like that and 
that would reinforce our brand and make the society stronger, I think it will 
resonate with members [CEO-5]. 
Another director recognised likewise that community activities help to contribute to its 
organisation profile and enhance engagement with members: 
There’s a very strong ethic about giving something back to the community that 
you are in. And again, that’s the self-fulfilling value because people like to see 
local businesses that are fair and open and co-operative. And they want to be 
part of that. There is a definite spinoff to branding [CEO-14]. 
Community activities in building societies take a number of forms such as charitable giving, 
donations, fund raising, volunteering in communities with environmental-related activities 
such as tree planting, water saving, cleaning and clearing of sites, managing waste of 
landside and reduction in carbon emissions. Building societies also established an affinity 
savings account where part of the interest is paid to charity rather than to members. For 
instance, Ipswich Building Society contributes 1% of the average account balance to 
established charities in Ipswich (Ipswich Building Society, 2016b). Furness Building Society 
makes a cash payment from its financial reserves to members’ chosen charities based on the 
average balance held in the affinity group accounts (Furness Building Society, 2016). 
In order to discharge social responsibility and accountability to community and societies, 
many building societies use social media, websites, newsletters, bulletins and annual reports 
to disseminate on their community programmes. Building societies also involve their 
members and employees when deciding on the community activities and charitable causes. 
Members and employees are asked to nominate and vote for the charitable causes and 
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community-related activities. Charities are also encouraged to apply for donations or support 
from building societies. For instance, Nationwide reported in its website that it accepts: 
…charities and community organisations [to] apply for support from [its] 
country-wide network of Nationwide volunteers in areas such as, but not limited 
to: marketing, public relations and IT support for campaigns; finance and 
employment sessions in schools; team volunteering challenges; trustees or 
governors; mentoring (Nationwide, 2016). 
While employees are highly supportive and participative in community activities, customer 
participation and involvement is often disappointing. A CEO expressed that: 
I can’t put words in members’ mouths but members will look at it and said 
‘that’s nice, but it’s not for me. I like the fact they are giving back to community 
and that make them difference. I like to be part of an organisation that does that 
sort of things. But personally, I don’t want to get involved in the activities’ 
[CEO-7].  
The data suggest that directors are highly aware of the importance of building societies in 
‘building societies’ at community and societal levels. Building societies are motivated to 
engage in community-related activities as being socially responsible and accountable is the 
core essence of a building society’s principles and it aids in strengthening business 
performances. This is consistent with the assertions of Jones (1980) and Frederick (1994) that 
all businesses should voluntarily be socially responsible so as to encourage greater 
responsibility and ethical conduct. 
8.3  The Function of External Audit 
External audit has been regarded as a value-added function that lends credibility to a firm’s 
published financial statement (Claessens, 2006). Sikka (2009, 2015), nonetheless, questioned 
the value of company audits, auditor independence and the quality of auditor works as a 
result of the 2008 financial crisis. Auditors provided a clean bill of health to a number of 
C h a p t e r  8   P a g e  | 203 
financial institutions’ financial management and performances, yet many financial 
institutions such as Northern Rock, Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers still failed during the 
2008 credit crunch. Auditing services which are dependent on auditor fees are considered to 
blight the independence of auditors and the quality of their work as a result.  
The politics residing in auditing practices was also under criticism during the financial crisis. 
Sikka (2009) claims the UK government enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 to formalise the exchange of information between auditors and regulators and to 
promote market confidence in financial institutions. Auditors are expected to communicate 
with regulators in the course of their audit works if they become aware of an issue that would 
materially affect the function of regulators in protecting consumers’ rights. The House of 
Lords alleged that financial institutions’ auditors and regulators were guilty for “dereliction 
of duty” by not sharing information with each other on an informal basis before the crisis 
which partially led to the failure of a number of banks (Financial Times, 30 March 2011). 
A number of financial mutuals and the Co-operative Bank were also issued with unqualified 
audit reports before they were rescued by large building societies and financial institutions. 
Table 8-1 presents a list of distressed building societies which were issued with unqualified 
audit reports before the 2008 financial crisis. Auditors are expected to be responsible and 
accountable to customer-owner-members and members of general public by providing 
reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements or errors 
(Solomon, 2013). However, all failed building societies received unqualified audit opinions 
on their financial performances, leading up to their takeover by other financial institutions.  
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Building 
Society 
Asset Size 
for the 
year 
ended 
(£million) 
Year End Auditor Date of 
Audit 
Report 
Date of 
Transfer 
Takeover 
by 
Type 
of 
Audit 
opinio
n 
Audit 
Fees 
(£’000) 
Non-
Audit 
Fee 
(£’000) 
Manchester  792.3 31 
December 
2007 
Grant 
Thornton 
28 
February 
2008 
Non-
Applicable 
Non-
Applicable 
Unqua
lified 
83 22 
Dunfermline 3,303 31 
December 
2007 
Deloitte 
and 
Touché 
20 
February 
2008 
31 March 
2009 
Nationwide 
and  UK 
Government 
Unqua
lified 
117 - 
Norwich and 
Peterborough 
3,729 31 
December 
2011 
PwC 22 
March 
2011 
01 
November 
2011 
Yorkshire 
Building 
Society 
Unqua
lified 
161 480 
Chelsea 13,413 31 
December 
2009 
PwC 24 
February 
2010 
01 April 
2010 
Yorkshire 
Building 
Society 
Unqua
lified 
168 1,048 
Kent 
Reliance 
2,257 30 
September 
2009 
Ernst & 
Young 
24 
Novemb
er 2009 
01 February 
2011 
JC Flower to 
form One 
Savings 
Bank Plc 
Unqua
lified 
155 - 
Derbyshire 7,094 31 
December 
2007 
KPMG 12 
March 
2008 
01 December 
2008 
Nationwide Unqua
lified 
100 200 
Scarborough 2,852 31 April 
2008 
KPMG 20 June 
2008 
31 March 
2009 
Skipton 
Building 
Society 
Unqua
lified 
69 143 
Cheshire 4,976 31 
December 
2007 
KPMG 26 
February 
2008 
15 December 
2008 
Nationwide Unqua
lified 
100 100 
Table 8-1: List of distressed building societies which were issued with unqualified audit 
reports (Sources: Annual reports for the year ending 2014/2015, analysis by author) 
 
When an audit partner was consulted about the role of external audit in facilitating good 
corporate governance and accountability, the auditor expressed that external auditors “have 
no formal role in that respect. But informally, the auditors make observations, suggestions 
and recommendations to the building societies’ clients” [AUD]. Strategic decisions are in the 
hands of the board of directors and the function of auditor is to provide advice to board 
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members (Cooperative News, 8 April 2014). The audit partner also asserted that limited 
changes occurred in auditing practices due to the 2008 financial crisis:  
I don’t think that the role of auditor changed as a result of the financial crisis…I 
think what the crisis did probably helped to contribute to the evolution of the 
long form audit report. The form of audit report now includes more details, 
what the risks are that we audited and how we audited them. That’s more 
explanation on how we have done now in the audit report. But that’s really a 
shift in how we report and the information that is in the account that 
complement what the board writes in front of the annual accounts [AUD].  
In fact, there is a continuing development and improvement in auditing practices and 
techniques which is policed by the FRC. The FRC has continued “to press for improved 
standards in auditing across not just in the financial sector but across all segment of the 
economy” [AUD]. The 2008 financial crisis mainly “enhanced the gap in expectations 
between what an external audit really does and the fact that regulators, politicians, 
shareholders and members of the public expect auditors to be able to look into the future 
much further and much wider than we were able to look in projecting or predicting what 
would happen in the future and we can only look so far into the future” [AUD].  
8.4 States of External Governance Structures and Practices 
External governance structures are the external parameters within which mutuals operate, 
such as the legislative and regulatory frameworks (Ketilson and Brown, 2011). The following 
sub-sections discuss interviewees’ perspectives with respect to the supervisory roles of the 
PRA and FCA, and the key impacts of 2008 regulatory reforms toward the sector.  
8.4.1 The Supervisory Roles of the FCA and PRA 
The harsh financial climate in 2008 has diminished trust among members of the general 
public towards the banking industry. The FSCS (2015) reported that the financial services 
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and banks in the UK are the second least trusted industries after the media. In order to 
enhance the confidence and trust of investors, consumers and members of the public towards 
the financial services sector, policy makers have reformed banking regulations. The 
supervisory roles and governance structures of regulatory bodies have also been restructured 
and strengthened. For instance, the FSA was abolished and replaced by the PRA and FCA 
under the Financial Service Act 2012 (Casu and Gall, 2016).  
The PRA supervises and regulates the prudential matters of building societies. An annual 
review is conducted by the PRA on building societies’ business models, internal control and 
risk management frameworks, governance and management structures: 
We constantly review them. We would visit them at least once a year and every 
year we write to one of the building societies in [an] area we see good practice 
and [an] area where we see they are not complying. And we expect them to 
address the areas that are non-compliant. And if we they don’t, we have formal 
power to make them to if we want to [REG]. 
On the other hand, the FCA supervises and regulates on conduct matters such as the 
processes by which complaints are handled and managed, and a review on products and 
services-related matters. The FCA conducts thematic reviews on most small and medium-
sized building societies on an average of every three to four years. The conduct matters of 
large building societies such as Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society and Coventry 
Building Society are reviewed by the FCA on a weekly and monthly basis due to their 
diverse product offerings. 
When directors were questioned about the split functions of the PRA and FCA, all 
interviewees unanimously agreed that the roles of both regulatory authorities have been 
strengthened since the 2008 financial crisis. The PRA and FCA are conscientious in their 
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supervision on banks, credit unions, building societies and other financial institutions. A 
CEO expressed that:  
I think it is universal in the regulators’ approach. They are just much more 
stringent now, whether you are a bank or building society. I don’t think their 
attitudes towards mutuals have changed. I think their expectation towards every 
financial institution is they have got much higher hurdles now [CEO-5]. 
Some directors are receptive towards the improvised supervisory approaches of the PRA and 
FCA: 
Do I think the ways the regulators regulate are good approaches? If I were in 
the regulators’ shoes, I would do the same. Because in financial services, 
whether you are a small building society or global bank, it is complex [CEO-13]. 
There was also indignation among a number of interviewees on the competing objectives of 
the PRA and FCA: 
The FCA and PRA have slightly competing agenda. For e.g. for the PRA to be 
sound and secured, you should charge your mortgage customers a nice high 
rates. So that you make lots of profit and be sound and secured. Charging your 
customers fair high rates may not necessarily ideal for the FCA and a good 
thing. In fact actually moving rates is one of those area where they tend to argue. 
So, there are conflicts in the agenda from time to time.  We just sit there and 
sort of think maybe just tell us what you think. And they don’t [CEO-8]. 
The auditor contended that the split functions of the PRA and FCA create duplicate 
workloads and increase the costs for the banking sector and consumers. Directors arguably 
spend more time discussing business risks and governance issues with regulators:  
I am not convinced that the split role of the PRA and FCA was helpful for the 
banking sector. I think there was the element of doubling up and possible 
duplication in divergence of aims and objectives which makes lives more 
complicated. I don’t think overall it was wholly positive development for the 
sector and consumers [AUD]. 
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Building societies also hire more employees to prepare detailed and greater quantities of 
information to the PRA and FCA to discharge their compliance accountability. This, 
according to a chief executive, heightens the operational costs and posits long term business 
challenges to small and medium-sized (or regional) building societies: 
It is becoming increasingly hard to have sustainable business and be small. You 
need to be in a certain size of balance sheet in order to have infrastructures that 
you are able to meet regulatory obligations. So since I have been here, we have 
got from a person in risk to having 3 people now. We have got quite a few more 
people in finance and part of that is to keep filling up forms to send to the 
regulators [CEO-9].  
The commentaries indicate that the 2008 credit crunch has transformed the supervisory roles 
and approaches of the PRA and FCA. Some directors are supportive of the new regulatory 
system. A number of directors were discontented over the competing objectives and roles of 
the PRA and FCA as they increase the regulatory costs and create duplication of workloads 
for building societies to discharge their compliance accountability. 
8.4.2 Compliance with Banking and Mortgage Regulations 
In order to promote sound corporate governance and accountability, policy makers and 
regulators have reformed the legislative and regulatory frameworks in the financial services 
sector since the financial crisis. The following sub-sections reflect directors’ views about the 
implications of Basel III, SM&CR and the bank levy on building societies’ compliance 
accountability processes. 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements 
In the light of the 2008 financial crisis, there have been arguments that the quality and 
quantity of capital issued by international financial institutions was not sufficient to absorb 
losses on the scale seen (BSA, 2010a). The Capital Requirement Directive (CRD), which is 
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approved by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), required the capital for 
financial institutions to be strengthened and increased. The criteria under CRD also apply to 
financial mutuals and co-operative banks around the world in which there are more stringent 
requirements for financial instruments to be classified as non-core Tier 1 capital.26 
Large building societies such as Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society, Coventry Building 
Society, West Bromwich Building Society and Principality Building Society raised their 
capital prior to 2010 through the issuance of Permanent Interest Bearing Shares (PIBS), 
subordinated debt known as Profit Participating Deferred Shares (PPDS) and from retail 
funding (Casu and Gall, 2016). However, the CRD 2 introduced more stringent requirements 
for financial instruments to be classified as core Tier 1 capital. This affected financial 
instruments such as PIBS and PPDS which were regarded as core Tier 1 instruments in 2010 
(BSA, 2010a). In consequence, building societies have to find a new way to issue financial 
instruments which are classified as core Tier 1 capital.  
Nationwide, for instance, has issued a type of financial instrument named Core Capital 
Deferred Shares (CCDS) in 2013. CCDS is a type of debt security which is sold to 
institutional investors, rather than individual customer-members. Institutional investors are 
paid a capped dividend annually. Nationwide (22 November 2013) stated in its prospectus 
that the key features of CCDS include:  
                                                 
26 Under the Basel Accord, financial institutions’ capital mainly consists of core Tier 1 capital and core Tier 2 
capital. Tier 1 capital is a financial institution’s core capital and is the most liquid capital in a financial 
institution. The purpose of Tier 1 capital is to measure a financial institution’s financial health and is used when 
a bank must absorb losses without ceasing business operations. On the other hand, Tier 2 capital is a financial 
institution’s supplementary capital and is less liquidate than Tier 1 capital. 
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• Holders of CCDS will not have proportionate voting rights at meetings of the 
members of the Society, and, like our retail members, will be subject to the "one 
member, one vote" requirement of the Building Societies Act 1986; 
• The maximum discretionary return per CCDS per year is capped, in order to protect 
reserves against over‐distribution; 
• On a winding up, investors would be entitled to a share of any surplus assets 
alongside other qualifying investing members of the Society, such share to be capped 
as described in the terms of the CCDS; 
• Distributions: Fully discretionary, non-cumulative and capped at £15 per CCDS per 
annum (such cap is adjusted for inflation by reference to the UK CPI each year), 
payable from Distributable Items for the Society’s financial year (ending 4 April) in 
respect of which the Distribution is paid; 
• The offer will be made available to certain institutional and professional investors in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere outside the United States in reliance on 
Regulations under the US Securities Act of 1933. 
A director contended that CCDS “imposes upon management and the board a degree of 
profit imperative because a part of [an] organisation’s profit has to distribute to pay the 
dividend to that capital instrument rather than to customer-members” [CEO-11]. The board 
and management may be subjected to the influence of and pressures from institutional 
investors. Specifically, if the building society was in a difficult financial position, and to 
ensure that institutional investors do not withdraw their capital (under the assumption if 
institutional investors withdraw their investments, the organisation is not able to meet 
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regulatory demand and it is likely to go into liquidation), the management of the building 
society may meet the interests of institutional investors over those of customer-members. 
When one of the directors interviewed was consulted, the director agreed that his building 
society issued similar financial instruments like CCDS. However, the director contended that 
such a financial instrument “is a tricky one” [CEO-12], and building societies have no other 
option but to issue the instrument in order to meet regulatory demand: 
It was the regulators who introduced the new measure we have to comply with. 
The board believes that we have got more than enough capital. But because of 
the stipulated regulations, which we obliged to comply with, we have to raise 
more capital…we raised it, just to satisfy the bit over there [the regulator]. We 
don’t actually think we need it. Unfortunately, there is a coupon we have to pay 
on it, as a detrimental impact on our profit, the amount of money we can give to 
our savers and mortgages customers. But at the same time, it is important that 
we are regarded as a safe and secure organisation. If this is the measure that 
regulator decreed as important measure, then we must comply with it. We didn’t 
do it because we actually felt it was necessary or because we wanted to. We did 
it because we have to [CEO-12].  
However, no issue and sale of CCDS has taken place for small and medium-sized building 
societies. A risk director explained that “if building societies intend to launch CCDS, they 
need to evaluate the fixed costs incurred, such as the fixed legal advisory costs would be 
significant. The organisation thus, needs to raise certain amounts of capital to make the 
issuance worthwhile. Nationwide is at a scale where it would be cost-efficient for the 
organisation to do that” [RiskDir-1]. The majority of small and medium-sized building 
societies lack the scale and resources to develop and issue CCDS. Due to that, directors 
contended that regulators are concerned about the ability of small and medium-sized building 
societies to raise capital in the event of crisis:  
So, our flaw is we can’t raise new capital. Now, there is a mechanism by which 
we can raise more capital called CCDS and it is available to the very biggest 
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players like Nationwide. By the time you make something like that work for our 
building society, it is awfully expensive and probably to a point where it is not a 
solution. So, we don’t have an option. That is the big flaw for building societies. 
If you think about it from the regulator’s point of view, if building societies get 
into trouble, they can’t get themselves out of it with more capital. So, a bit like if 
they haven’t got a life belt and probably best not to let them to get too close to 
the water [CEO-8]. 
The regulator interviewed also acknowledged that: 
The weakness in the building societies is they can’t get capital in a financial 
crisis because they only got their retained reserves. They need to demonstrate 
that they don’t need capital. So they need to control their risks and the board 
needs to demonstrate that they are accountable [REG]. 
Regulators are also circumspect on the ways risks are perceived and undertaken by building 
societies. They placed restrictions on the types of products building societies could offer and 
this affected the strategic decisions undertaken by management of small and medium-sized 
building societies. A CEO criticised that: 
The regulator is asking for more capital. But we do not have the scale to 
generate the returns to put into capital because it’s constrained in 
competition…if I’m not allowed to sell certain products because of building 
society sourcebook [BSOCS] or the regulator doesn’t want the building society 
doing that, I’m losing out on the ability to continue to be in business to meet my 
capital requirements. There’s only one outcome there that at some point I’ve 
failed to meet my capital requirements, which means I have to find a new home 
for myself or be resolved to be put into administration by the regulator. There is 
a big cost in that [CEO-14]. 
The commentaries indicate that the rigorous capital and liquidity requirements cause building 
societies to seek new ways to issue financial instruments which could be classified as core 
Tier 1 capital. Nationwide developed and issued CCDS to meet the compliance 
accountability and capital requirements of regulators. Small and medium-sized building 
societies have not issued and sold CCDS due to their limited capital and the lack of skills and 
resources available to develop and sell the financial instrument. Regulators are thus 
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concerned about the ability of small and medium-sized building societies to raise capital in 
the event of financial distress and they have imposed greater regulatory demands on them. 
This arguably curtails the business development of small and medium-sized building 
societies.  
The Enforcement of the Senior Manager and Certification Regime (SM&CR)  
The PCOBS criticised the lack of personal accountability in the banking industry in which no 
individual board member was prosecuted from the failures of failed financial institutions 
during the 2008 banking crisis (HM Treasury, 2013). The Senior Manager Certification 
Regime (SM&CR) was introduced to place clearer accountability on individuals working in 
the financial services industry and it becomes effective on 7 March 2016 (Deloitte and 
Touche, 31st July 2014, FCA, 2015). The PRA asserted that: 
The SM&CR has made people very uncomfortable in the sector because it is 
placing clearer accountability on individuals. Now, one of the things we saw in 
the financial crisis is people on the board would say, ‘it wasn’t my fault’. The 
organisation actually blew up but nobody on the board was to blame…The 
SM&CR will make people more accountable. We think the good building 
societies already have this accountability. Some of the small ones will have to 
adjust [REG]. 
The SM&CR requires financial institutions to set out clearly the responsibilities of all staff 
other than those not involved in the provision of firms’ financial services activities (such as 
reception, security, catering, cleaning). In the event of failure of a firm or a breach of banking 
regulations, enforcement actions may be brought against staff and senior managers who are 
responsible for the business areas the staff operate within. A number of directors are 
supportive of the SM&CR. They stated that it is a good approach by the regulators and policy 
makers to enhance director’s accountability. For instance, an ex-director claimed that: 
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Obviously I met the people at T [a bank that collapsed as result of the financial 
crisis]. What the NED was saying is, ‘no we didn’t do anything wrong. We 
didn’t do anything wrong at all’. We based our judgment and information that 
presented to us and it wasn’t our fault, it was the financial crisis. It was beyond 
our control. So they all said the same things. Instead of saying, you know what, I 
was in charge of audit and therefore the audit has responsibility for the external 
auditors, we should have been looking at the growth, we should have been 
looking at what happen, if this happens, we should be raising questions, we 
should have been saying is our lending too risky [EXDIR-2]. 
However, most CEOs perceived the requirements of the SM&CR is more relevant for large 
and complex financial institutions and less relevant for small building societies that have a 
simple product range and limited number of employees. This was expressed by the following 
CEO that:  
SM&CR is less relevant for building societies because we are smaller and 
simple businesses. If our businesses failed, it’s my fault or one of the three 
executive directors. That’s where the capabilities and responsibilities lie. In big 
organisation, you need it because it is less clear [CEO-11]. 
Directors also argued that the SM&CR would affect the roles and responsibilities of directors, 
managers and employees in discharging their duties, responsibilities and accountabilities: 
It will be interesting to see how SM&CR settled down. Up to now, there are 
great balance and level of understanding in NEDs between strategic and 
operational decision-making. There is a temptation that SM&CR might make 
NEDs become more operational to try to understand more and to make 
themselves feel their personal risk is less [CEO-13]. 
It may also affect the behaviours of employees in terms of the financial services advice offer 
to customers. This according to a CEO may create an adverse relationship between building 
societies and their customer-members:  
Staff will think if there is one in a million chance of being a problem, they are 
going to change their behaviours. So instead of taking the risks and trying to 
explain these products to you as customers, they are going to give customers the 
leaflets about it, and leave them be. They don’t want the risks of having to 
explain that things might go wrong. So, that’s not the relationship I want with 
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customers and I don’t think that serve customers well. I think actually we are in 
danger of creating culture that through SM&CR that are slightly at odds with 
really what we are trying to do. We want to engage with customers, we want to 
sit and talk and understand about their issues and help them through the model 
of financial services [CEO-8].  
Therefore, the interview data indicate that the implementation of the SM&CR causes unease 
among the majority of directors due to the personal accountability, liability and risks that 
individual director and employee have to shoulder. It may also affect the process by which 
financial advice is provided to customers (Hyndman et al., 2002). 
The Enforcement of Bank Surcharges, and Other Banking and Mortgage Regulations 
The UK government imposed a bank levy on financial institutions’ debts in 2011. 27 The bank 
levy was to encourage banks to move into less risky funding or borrowing profiles as well as 
to recompense government for the damage that banks caused to the economy during the 2008 
financial crisis (HM Treasury, 2011). The UK government alleviated the bank levy, which 
will phase out in 2021, and introduced a new 8 per cent surcharge on banks and building 
societies with profits above £25 million per year effective 2016.  
The surcharge imposes an additional regulatory cost to the top six building societies: 
Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society, Coventry Building Society, Skipton Building 
Society, Leeds Building Society and Principality Building Society. The surcharge is 
estimated to cost an additional £1.7 billion to building societies and they may have to forego 
helping more individuals to finance their mortgages (The Telegraph, 6 Sept 2015). A CEO 
                                                 
27 The bank levy on financial institutions’ debts excluded borrowing backed by UK government debts, ordinary 
deposits covered by the UK’s deposit insurance scheme, the first £20bn of any bank’s taxable debts and long-
term debts where financial institutions have already paid half of the tax rate. 
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commented that the bank surcharge represented a missed opportunity by the government to 
support diversity in the financial services sector as promulgated in the coalition manifesto:  
We have to pay the bank levy. We are not a bank. We didn’t cause any of the 
grief. We continued to lend throughout the crisis and yet we are still charged 
with the bank levy and tax surcharge. And actually that net cost of our 
organisation will go up quite significantly rather than down. I think that is a 
missed opportunity by the government [CEO-5].  
The interview data also reflects that regulations for savings and mortgage borrowings under 
European law are not sensitive to financial mutuals in the UK. Banking regulations are ‘one 
size fits all’ and do not take into account the different types and sizes of financial institutions. 
A CEO asserted that: 
So we have this pile of new regulations which basically come in from Europe 
and some are not very proportionate. I understand that we need some 
regulations about European banks and since the UK is in Europe, it is subject to 
some of the European laws. If the regulations don’t really work in the UK, the 
regulators are going to subtly change this. So we are just about to adopt the 
European Liquidity Standard, European Mortgage Regulations and Mortgage 
Credit Directives, which has no use to British lenders or customers [CEO-8]. 
A similar view was expressed by another CEO that: 
We have a new liquidity process that has been brought into the UK during 2010 
and 2012 by the UK regulators. And then in 2015, the EU have come along and 
said we want to impose new liquidity standards on all firms in EU. Well, you are 
about three years late. The UK is actually going ahead of the game and got in 
place stuff that was working. And now the European and Basel Committee are 
not undoing, but they are adding up layers which are late and not helpful. They 
might be helpful to very large banks, but they are not helpful to small building 
societies [CEO-4]. 
When the regulator interviewed was asked about the ‘disproportion of regulations’ in the 
banking sector and that building societies are not on a level playing field with banks, the 
regulator claimed that banking regulations are universal for global financial institutions. 
Some rules and regulations may have “disproportionate effects on smaller banks and 
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building societies. So, this doesn’t just make towards the building societies but it is also 
disproportionate to small banks” [REG]. However, directors argued the intrusiveness of 
regulations and overemphasis of governance by regulators increases the fixed costs of 
business:  
The FSCS levies cost us £72,000 a month. All of these things, internal audit and 
small stuffs cause a lot of money. All of that keep ramping up [CEO-9]. 
A number of CEOs further added that intrusiveness of regulations put small and medium-
sized building societies at a competitive disadvantage with banks: 
I think there is a danger to small banks and building societies. They will be sort 
of forgotten in the regulations. You get to a point sometimes where you look at 
the regulations and you think, ‘you know what, this is going too hard. It just gets 
too hard to do it.’ They got so many constraints on this and that and it becomes 
helpless and difficult. Our mortgage department, I have 12 people that do the 
same work as 8 people did before because of different regulations of one sort or 
another. So how would the building societies do in the long run? I think they 
will gradually and slowly decline [CEO-8]. 
The commentaries indicate that building societies have had to cope with intrusive regulations 
and greater corporate governance arrangements since the 2008 financial crisis. Small and 
medium-sized building societies found it challenging to compete with big financial 
institutions as resources are expensive and hard to secure. 
8.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter analysed and discussed the external aspects of governance and accountability 
practices in the building society sector. More specifically, the chapter examines the external 
parameters within which building societies operate, such as the corporate social 
responsibility and accountability practices, the function and development of an external audit 
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and the reformation in the legislative and regulatory frameworks since the 2008 financial 
crisis.  
The study found that building societies appreciate that their businesses and the interests of 
communities from which their members are drawn are interdependent. Building societies 
engage in social and charitable causes in which their members and staff have an affinity. 
Many building societies also allow their staff to volunteer their time and expertise in local 
charities and good causes such as tree planting and running literacy programmes in schools. 
Building societies are motivated to engage in community-related activities, as being socially 
responsible and accountable are the core essence of building societies’ mutuality values. 
Despite the increasing efforts of building societies to be accountable to members, staff and 
local community, the failure of banks and building societies during the 2008 credit crunch 
has caused the UK government to strengthen the regulatory and legislative frameworks in the 
financial services sector. A number of new regulations were developed and have come into 
effect such as CRD IV, which requires banks and building societies to hold more capital and 
the SM&CR, which required individual directors and employees to be more personally 
accountable for their duties and responsibilities.  
The PRA and FCA are also pushing for more formalized and professional risk management, 
and for controlling and reporting in all UK financial institutions. These governance 
requirements by the PRA and FCA increase building societies’ investment in skilled staff, 
tools and new governance systems. They also heighten building societies’ fixed costs and 
workloads as employees spend greater time discussing risks and governance-related matters 
with regulators and preparing more documentation for regulatory compliance. Small and 
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medium-sized building societies find it onerous to cope and compete in highly competitive 
and regulated environments, as resources are increasingly hard and expensive to secure.  
Although Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) and Spear (2004) contend that regulations are an 
important mechanism to control agency problems in mutual organisations, this chapter found 
that extensive regulations could downplay the values create by mutual organisations to their 
members. The study thus maintains that building societies should ensure that the achievement 
of their compliance accountability do not detract them from the achievement of their 
financial-social dual, personnel and social accountabilities to members, employees, 
community and members of the general public. Overall, the findings and analysis of this 
chapter and the insights discussed in the chapter 7 and chapter 8, have raised some public 
policy issues. These issues are addressed and discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: Theoretical Contribution: Mutual 
Accountability Framework 
 
9.1 Introduction 
While chapter 6, 7 and 8 reported the empirical findings, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss 
the extended mutual accountability framework which is developed based upon the empirical 
findings and academic literature. The mutual accountability framework discusses in this chapter 
is an extension to the skeletal conceptual framework presented in chapter 3. The framework is 
also considered as a normative conceptual framework which reflects multiple accountability 
relationships between customer-owned mutual organisations and their key stakeholders.  
This chapter is structured into three sections. Section 9.2 discusses the internal aspects of 
governance and accountability in mutual organisations and Section 9.3 elaborates on the external 
accountability relationship between mutual organisations and their external stakeholders. Section 
0 provides the concluding remarks of the chapter. 
9.2 Internal Aspects of Governance and Accountability in Mutual Organisations 
While the skeletal framework presented in Figure 3-1 shows the expected key stakeholders in 
mutual organisations include employees, regulators, customer-members, community, society and 
environment; the empirical findings indicate that the internal group of stakeholders include the 
board of directors (or board of trustees), executive directors (EDs), non-executive directors 
(NEDs), board committees and sub-committees. The relationships between these groups are key 
features to building societies’ (and all mutual organisations) governance. 
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9.2.1 Mutual Organisations and Organisations’ Vision and Mission 
This research found that building societies have in place the internal, intermediate and external 
governance structures in achieving the overall accountability (or mutual accountability) and the 
organisation’s objectives and vision. The next sections discuss the internal and intermediate 
governance structures which prevail in building societies and these structures are also deemed 
relevant and applicable to other mutual organisations. 
Board roles, responsibilities and composition  
According to Hyndman et al. (2002), there are three levels of credit unions globally: the nascent, 
transitional and mature stage of credit unions. The nascent stage credit unions are wholly run by 
volunteers and obtain financial aid from local authorities and other bodies. The transitional phase 
credit unions inevitably hire paid employees but retain volunteer directors, and mature credit 
unions are generally operated and run by professional staff and directors. 
Unlike the credit unions, all building societies are at ‘mature phase’ and are run and managed by 
professional directors and staff. The governance of building societies is similar to public listed 
companies, where the directors are members of different committees, such as audit, remuneration, 
risk and nomination committees. The directors are also the customer-members and are subject to 
election or re-election. Members also have the rights to make decisions and express their 
feedbacks and opinions on products and services rendered through various means of intermediate 
governance structures (such as member panel, member forum, retail branches).  
While the governance system in building societies have continuously been reformed and 
strengthened (and at the very least similar to corporations and public listed companies), 
nonetheless, there are limited guides and codes of conduct pertaining to elected representatives 
or a board of directors’ roles and responsibilities in the mutual sector. Even without the clear 
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code of guidance, it is expected that mutuals are run and managed by competent individuals who 
are capable to carry out their duties in a competitive commercial environment and improve the 
organisation’s performance (Ebrahim et al., 2014, Rezaee, 2008). Internal control systems and 
governance structures are expected to be in place to facilitate proper decision-making and 
segregation of duties in mutual organisations. Organisations are also expected to be run and 
managed in the best interests of members, communities, societies and the general public 
(Birchall, 2013a, Birchall, 2011).  
As mutuals are initially incorporated by customers, and to ensure that board of directors may 
better represent customers, it is expected that mutual organisations have in place customers’ 
representation structures (normally described as intermediate/democratic governance structures). 
Various best practice literature suggests the intermediate governance structures in mutuals and 
co-operative include representative and participative structures. Representative structure 
provides elected individuals or a board of directors the authority to make decisions on behalf of 
members, but also to ensure that the appointed representatives are accountable for their actions. 
Most large-scale organisations have the representative structure in place. For instance, the UK 
Co-operative Group has in place the representative structure in which there are eight corporate 
member representatives on the board. At the same time, individual member-customers are 
allowed to be elected onto area committees and regional boards based on the area in which the 
member resides (Cooperative Group, 2007). On the other hand, participatory structures normally 
call upon members to participate in the decision-making process and provide their views and 
opinions on the products and services offering. However, major decisions are in the hands of 
board of directors. 
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Those in favour of participative structure argue that participatory practices could promote 
collaboration and cooperation among different competing groups of stakeholders (Ketilson and 
Brown, 2011). However, it is not the contention of this research to determine which structures 
are better over the others. This is primarily because both representative and participative 
structures have their merits and demerits. It depends upon the complexity, membership diversity 
and size of the mutual organisations when the structures are determined. Based on the empirical 
findings, both of these structures exist side by side. They play an equally important role in 
establishing meaningful opportunities for members to participate in the decision-making process 
and in the governance and accountability of their mutual organisations. Hence, no one control 
structure is inherently superior and each structure emphasises certain values that may or may not 
be important to a particular organisation.  
It is also expected that independent non-executive directors (NEDs) should scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed objectives and monitor the integrity of financial 
information, the internal control systems, and the risk management systems of organisations 
(Solomon, 2013, Mallin, 2011). Birchall (2011, 2013) specifically claimed the roles of NEDs are 
paramount in mutual organisations in terms of monitoring and supervising executive directors. 
As members have a very limited role in monitoring and controlling management, the roles of 
NEDs are to represent members’ interests, lending their skills and to monitor and supervise 
management similar to public listed companies. NEDs are also responsible for determining 
appropriate levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in succession 
planning, in terms of hiring and removing executive directors (UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010). 
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Board Size  
An important element in mutual organisations’ governance is also the number of members on the 
board of directors. Solomon (2013) claimed that the board of directors should consider the way 
to promoting efficiency is by having a balance of both executive and non-executive directors, as 
both groups brings different skills to the board. Diversity in the skills of the directors with 
different personalities and educational and occupational backgrounds could enhance the 
effectiveness of the board. However, boards of directors should not appoint "clones" as this 
would threaten the independence and soundness of board members (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004). In mutual and co-operative literature in Canada, the best practices literature suggests that 
an effective board should comprise between five and fifteen board members. It has been argued 
that a board should not be too big, as it would risk the lack of participation from all members of 
the board. There is also the risk that the board which is too small may lack diverse viewpoints 
and independent ideas. Consequently, there may be a lack of usage of the committees due to a 
lack of board members (Ketilson and Brown, 2011).  
The academic literature and best practice code do not suggest ‘one size fit all’ to the number of 
board members in the mutual sector. This study suggests that to achieve effective governance 
and accountability, mutual organisations should not merely focus on the size of the board of 
directors. Instead, mutual organisations should concentrate on diverse skills, expertise and 
perspectives that can help to drive effective decision-making in the organisation. Size of board 
should depend upon the complexity, size and nature of the businesses. 
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Directors training and development  
Additionally, it is expected that elected representatives and directors should continuously expose 
themselves to education and evaluation in order to enhance their existing knowledge and skills 
(Rezaee, 2008). Directors should generally increase their skills and knowledge through 
attendance of professional workshops, conferences, seminars, in-house training and reference to 
books and magazines among other things (Ketilson and Brown, 2011). Performance evaluation 
should also be performed formally and regularly through self-evaluation, independent committee 
evaluation (e.g. risk committee, audit committee) or appointment of consulting firms (Rezaee, 
2008). Proponents of directors’ evaluations claimed that this practice helps to refresh board 
members’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities, identifies areas for improvement and 
serves as a useful tool for nominating committees in their recruitment efforts (Ketilson and 
Brown, 2011). Specifically, in certain mutual sectors (such as credit unions), some of the elected 
representatives are elected among lay individuals or non-professional individuals. In order to 
ensure that the knowledge and skills of these individuals could be enhanced, it is expected that 
the ‘lay board members’ are continuously exposed to education and evaluations. The top-right 
hexagon in Figure 9-1 depicts the governance and accountability mechanisms which aid to 
achieve mutual organisations’ vision and missions and mutual accountability (in which the thesis 
argues to include financial-social dual accountability, personnel accountability, compliance 
accountability and social accountability). 
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Figure 9-1: Mutual accountability framework and governance and accounting mechanisms (Source: Author) 
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9.2.2 Mutual Organisations and Employees 
It has been found that building societies are run and managed by professional individuals from 
diverse background such as banking, accounting and surveying. In order to attract and maintain 
competence individuals in the industry, building societies provided personal and professional 
development courses, engage with employees to obtain employees’ feedback and provide 
workplace pension schemes, holidays, bonuses and health care benefits. All building societies 
also recognise diversity, ethnicity and different sexual orientation. Consideration is given to 
applications for employment from a range of backgrounds and diversities. 
With respect to this, all mutual organisations are expected to ensure the expectations of 
employees are satisfied and employees are well trained so that they are knowledgeable enough to 
provide new ideas, new projects and new innovations to compete with other businesses. Mutual 
organisation is expected to achieve personnel accountability by providing employees with 
minimum wage rates, a safe and healthy working environment, an equal opportunity working 
environment and there should be processes in place to foster whistle blowing. Alternatively, 
mutuals may have employee representatives’ structure to share their professionals’ and 
members’ welfare (as some branch staff have greater contact with the customers). Employees are 
also expected to be held accountable for the jobs and work for which they are responsible. If 
employees fail in meeting their expected job performance, employees can be reprimanded and 
employees will be terminated. Internal performance appraisal is a common mechanism to gauge 
employee progress, development towards and accountability to the organisations’ core vision 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, Fairbairn, 2003). 
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9.3 Mutual Organisations and External Stakeholders 
The above sections have outlined the internal accountability relationship between mutual 
organisations and their internal stakeholders as well as the internal aspects of governance 
structures. The next sub-sections discuss three possible groups of external stakeholders—
member-owner-customers, the community, society and environment, and regulators—which 
each of these individuals can be classified as being part of a specific stakeholders group with 
relatively similar interests and expectations regarding the organisations (although not all 
relationships are defined).  
9.3.1 Mutual Organisations and Member-Customer-Owners 
The empirical findings reflect that mutual organisations have dual economic and social goals to 
their customers. Individuals invest capital and time, and become members of such organisations 
for social purposes, financial purposes, or a mixture of both. In term of financial objective, 
customers support building societies mainly because the enterprises’ help makes them better off, 
by fulfilling their needs and providing greater returns to them in terms of a better rate of products 
and services (Mook et al., 2007, Fairbairn, 2003). More specifically, some customers obtain 
loans from building societies mainly because the organisations provide better savings rates and 
mortgage rates than mainstream banking like Lloyds Bank, NatWest and Santander (Michie and 
Blay, 2004, Michie, 2005).  
Apart from the ‘economic goal’, there are less opportunistic and more collective reasons which 
led some customers to support mutual organisations. The study found that members share 
‘common bonds’ among themselves. In some ways, members are aware that they are connected 
to their building societies and communities, and the building societies and communities have a 
connection to each other. Local pride, local identity and competitive prices (but not necessarily 
C h a p t e r  9   P a g e  | 229 
the lowest price) are important matters to customers. This is similar to the findings by Birchall 
and Simmons (2005) and Simmons and Birchall (2004) who also found that one of the reasons 
75 per cent out of 448 members of the UK Co-operative Group participated in their co-
operative’s operational activities is primarily because they believed that their participation in the 
firms activities “benefits the [UK Co-Operative Group] group as a whole”. Most of these 
member-participants considered that collectivist thinking of other members was vital. 
“Individualistic incentive was not necessarily unimportant, but it was secondary” (Birchall, 
2013a, p.177).  
With respect to this, mutual organisations generally have dual objectives or two types of 
accountabilities to customers. This research concludes that financial-social dual accountability 
as a form of accountability which is expected from customer-owners. Financial-social dual 
accountability is defined as an accountability in which the achievement of mutual organisations’ 
financial and social objectives to customer-members arises side by side. This means that mutuals 
are expected not diverge away from their social purposes and mutual aids to their customer-
members while they are in their pursuit of profits.  
In order to discharge financial-social dual accountability, proper mechanisms should be in place 
to measure the quantitative performances, output and outcomes such as accounting measures 
(budgetary accounting, sales, profit, return on investment and any other formal accounting 
mechanisms that would measure and quantify the achievement of the financial performances and 
outcomes) and market measures (e.g. market value, share price, return on equity). This is 
primarily because the identity of customers is similar to investors in investor-owned firms. 
Mutual organisations are, therefore, expected to transparently provide financial and non-financial 
information to customers, engaging with customers and allowing customers to provide feedback 
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to the business (Ebrahim, 2003a). This is to ensure that customers cum investors have the 
opportunity to continuously evaluate the firm’s performance and to hold management 
accountable for its actions and decisions.  
While mutual organisations may have instruments in place to quantify their financial 
accountability, however, they may experience challenges in calculating and measuring the 
achievement of the social dimension of the financial-social dual accountability. The study has 
found that it is difficult to compute and assess social performances in building societies. Some 
building societies utilised disclosures of non-financial information to enable these individuals to 
evaluate a firm’s non-financial performances or engagement with customer-members to 
discharge their social accountability. 
Therefore, the establishment of social indicators and benchmarks for computing social 
performance is still in its infancy in most hybrid organisations such as mutual organisations 
(Mook et al., 2003). Fairbairn (2003) argues that, it is paramount for mutual organisations to 
have in place mechanisms which would enable the organisations to convey the achievement of 
their social purposes and mutual aids. If customers and the general public perceive that mutual 
organisations achieve the organisations’ inherent mission and mutual aids, they would 
continuously support and trust the organisations (Fairbairn, 2003, Fonteyne, 2007). A mutual 
organisation is arguably more successful when customers are able to trust it and when they 
perceive that it is an effective agent for themselves (Birchall, 2002, Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  
The study maintains that while mutual organisations are able to compute their financial 
performances and discharge their financial accountability through accounting measures, 
intermediate or democratic governance structures could facilitate the achievement of financial-
social dual accountability. These include the representative and/or participative structures and 
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mediums to receive feedback about products and provision of services from customers. The 
annual general meeting (AGM) is also considered an important means in which mutual 
organisations can discharge and facilitate the achievement of accountabilities to members 
(Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Cooperative Group, 2007, Leadbeater and Christie, 1999). Apart 
from the AGM, mutual organisations should employ a number of means to facilitate 
communication with their members. These include members’ meetings (i.e. other than the AGM), 
focus groups, questionnaire surveys, road shows, site visits, newsletters, complaint letters and 
websites and retail branches among others (Leadbeater and Christie, 1999). Communication 
between directors, managers, staff and members is to build a relationship between elected 
representatives and members, promote democracy and arguably, strong communication to 
“facilitate and maintain members’ loyalty and identification” with their mutual organisation 
(Ketilson and Brown, 2011, p. 20).The downward hexagon in Figure 9-1 reflects the financial 
and social dual accountability expected by member-customers of mutual organisation and the 
accounting mechanisms in achieving the accountability. 
9.3.2 Mutual Organisations and Community, Society and Environment 
In the corporate social responsibility literature, there has been the argument that private firms do 
not have any responsibility to other stakeholders apart from shareholders. This perspective is 
based on Milton Friedman's notion that individuals elected to run the corporation on behalf of the 
owners are “to make as much money as possible” for the owners (Friedman, 1970, p.173). The 
corporation does not have to be socially and environmentally responsible and accountable, but 
the state is supposed to use its legitimate taxing function to raise money to fulfil these duties. The 
increases in a corporation's economic wealth are also perceived to be the increases in society’s 
wealth (Avi-Yonah, 2008).  
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Nevertheless, Banerjee (2008) and Gray (2010) argue that corporations should think beyond 
financial accountability and pay attention to social and environmental issues, act ethically and 
demonstrate the highest level of integrity and transparency in all their operations. Corporations 
should contribute to the community in which they operate in terms of enhancing social welfare 
and providing community support through philanthropy or other social means (Carroll, 1991, 
Carroll and Shabana, 2010). This is chiefly because the state creates corporations by granting the 
royal charters for the incorporation of a corporation (see e.g. Banerjee, 2008, Bakan, 2005). 
When a corporation is created, an implicit contract is formed between corporation and state. The 
state has granted a corporation with particular privileges, such as a legal personality and rights to 
own properties. The corporation, in return, is to utilise the privileges granted to them to fulfil 
certain objectives that the state would like to achieve. This includes engaging in activities which 
would help to mitigate social and environmental harms that the corporation is responsible for, 
even when the corporation has no direct legal responsibilities or when the activities do not 
benefit the shareholders (Avi-Yonah, 2008). 
In this study, it has been found that building societies are responsible and accountable to wider 
constituents, apart from their customer-owners. Most regional building societies are generally 
incorporated in local communities to support and help out individuals who are in need of their 
services. Being socially responsible and accountable to local communities and the environment 
are ingrained in the ethos of building societies. Building societies discharge their social 
accountability through CSR practices, disclosure of social responsibility information, and 
engagement with community and societies in order to understand desire community activities.  
The thesis maintains that similar to private firms, it is critical for mutual organisation to be 
socially responsible and accountable to community, society and environment. The mechanisms 
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which could be utilised by mutuals to achieve social accountability include sound governance 
system, engaging in CSR practices, disclosures and assurance of social responsibility 
information, and engagement with community and members to identify possible charitable 
causes and community related activities. The left hexagon in Figure 9-1 reflects the 
accountability mechanisms which could be utilise to achieve and discharge social accountability 
to community and societies. 
9.3.3 Mutual Organisations and Regulators 
Similar to any business, all mutual organisations are subjected to varying degrees of regulations 
and they are expected to comply with all rules and regulations. Regulations are considered to 
ensure mutuals achieve effective governance and accountability (Hyndman and McDonnell, 
2009). It has been found in this study that most members cum owners of building societies have 
a very limited role in monitoring and controlling the elected board of directors. Members 
generally withdraw from the membership if they are dissatisfied with the way building societies 
operate. The consequences of limited monitoring and control from members could lead elected 
representatives to have greater freedom of actions in running the organisation at their own 
discretion (Spear, 2004). In this regard, regulations are an important governance instrument to 
control the behaviours and actions of management and to enhance the confidence of multiple 
stakeholders (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). If individuals such as customers and members of 
the public believe that government is supervising the organisations effectively, they will perceive 
the chances of management opportunism to be reduced. This will ultimately increase the 
members’ level of confidence, as well as other stakeholders, on the safety and soundness of 
mutual organisations (Fonteyne, 2007).  
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It is maintained in this thesis that external governance mechanisms, such as laws and codes of 
conduct, are the mechanisms to foster the achievement of compliance accountability. The 
discharge of compliance accountability entails mutuals to account for how rules are adhered to, 
through disclosure and submission of detailed information to regulatory authorities.  
Mutual organisations in the UK are subjected to ‘comply or explain’ with the UK Code of 
Corporate Governance and comply with industry and trade regulations (e.g. the Building 
Societies Act 1986 and the Credit Union Act 1979), accounting standards and regulations (e.g. 
IFRS, UK GAAP), competition laws, and European Union regulations (e.g. Basel III). 
Compliance with rules and regulations (or compliance accountability) requires mutuals to file 
annual returns and information to the FCA, PRA, Inland Revenue and other authority bodies. 
Compliance accountability is the most unambiguous type of accountability and can be quite 
invasive. It may potentially threaten to dominate and reorient the underlying operations and 
objectives of mutuals (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009, O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).  
9.4 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the mutual accountability framework which developed from the empirical 
findings and academic literature. The mutual accountability framework discusses in this chapter 
is considered as a normative conceptual framework that are deemed relevant in understanding 
and evaluating the governance and accountability practices in mutual organisations.
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CHAPTER 10: Summary, Reflections and 
Conclusion 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises and discusses the empirical findings of the thesis and provides a 
conclusion to the study. The chapter is structured into eight main sections. Following the 
introduction, Section 10.2 reflects on the key findings of the thesis. Section 10.3 and Section 
10.4 provide reflections on the methodological issues and reflections on conducting this 
academic research respectively. Section 10.5 highlights the contributions of the thesis and 
Section 10.6 discusses the implications of the study. Section 10.7 delineates the limitations of the 
study and proposes recommendations for future research. Concluding remarks are discussed in 
Section 0. 
10.2 Reflection on the Governance and Accountability Issues in UK Building Societies 
This research concludes by considering the research objectives and aims of the thesis. First, the 
research seeks to examine the current governance systems in achieving accountability in UK 
building societies. More specifically, the thesis investigates the responsibilities of the board of 
directors, the processes by which members and other stakeholders are accounted for, the roles of 
regulators and auditors, and key governance and business challenges encountered by building 
societies since the 2008 financial crisis. 
The findings reveal that the industry’s internal, intermediate (or democratic) and external 
governance structures have positively transformed since the 2008 financial crisis with a positive 
impact on mutual accountability. Coercive pressure and the desire to be more accountable have 
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led building societies to strengthen their internal governance systems. The majority of building 
societies have improved on the composition, diversity and skills of their board members with 
individuals who have knowledge in IT, financial services, risk management and treasury. All 
building societies are using formal means to recruit directors through advertisements, consulting 
firms, accounting firms and headhunters. The customary appointment of NEDs from close 
friends of executives, which perversely existed before 2008, has been reduced. NEDs are 
considered more independent, accountable and knowledgeable. Furthermore, the building society 
sector has strengthened its risk management models by establishing the best practices risk 
management framework—the three lines of defence model—in achieving sound governance. 
Directors’ remunerations and NEDs’ fees are also more thoroughly reviewed, determined and 
approved by the board of directors.  
Member engagement also remains at the forefront of the governance agenda in building societies. 
Intermediate governance structure, which is a unique governance mechanism for mutual 
organisations in achieving democracy and mutual accountability, is mobilised by building 
societies in order to enhance interactions with members. Among these include the use of member 
forums, member councils, retail branch networks, newsletters and roadshows, among others. 
Members interviewed stated that they were satisfied with the communications and interactions 
they had with their building societies. However, similar to the findings of Birchall and Simmons 
(2004), Spear (2004) and Birchall (2013), most of the customer-members have limited interests 
in the day-to-day operations and governance matters of their mutual organisations. Most 
members are largely value-for-money driven, with regards to the products and services offered 
by building societies.  
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Despite building societies’ increasing efforts to enhance their mutual accountability and 
developing more meaningful relationships with the members, recent regulatory reforms in the 
banking sector have continued to pose challenges in the governance and long-term performances 
of regional building societies. Evaluations of the regulatory and legislative frameworks suggest 
that the improvements in banking regulations such as CRD IV and SM&CR do not distinguish 
between different types and sizes of financial institutions and they are ‘one size fits all’. The 
FCA and PRA also require more formalized and professional risk management frameworks, and 
greater reporting from all UK financial institutions. These, therefore, increase the costs and 
workload for many regional building societies, because managers and employees have to prepare 
more documentation for regulatory compliance and to discuss business risk and governance-
related matters with regulators. Regional building societies specifically found it onerous to cope 
with and to remain competitive in what is already a highly competitive and regulated 
environment, as resources are increasingly hard and expensive to secure.  
While the majority of building societies responded positively to the additional regulatory 
requirements to improve their accountability, a few building societies took it as a box ticking 
exercise without due regard to the actual substance of compliance. The study found that board 
committee structures in some regional building societies are created to meet superficial 
requirements of the regulators, and the best practice risk management framework—the three 
lines of defence model—was not implemented with the essence of sound governance. The 
disclosure of voluntary information in the annual reports of the building societies (such as reports 
by chairperson and CEO, the CSR and corporate governance statements) were also inconsistent 
across the sector. Some building societies did not provide in-depth information in the reports and 
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mainly disclosed limited information with short statements. These are mostly due to size of 
building societies. 
Moreover, the building societies are exposed to the challenges of finance technology in financial 
services. It can be seen that the demographic of building societies’ customers is predominantly 
from the older generation and the majority of ‘younger and technology-savvy’ customers have 
opted for virtual banking. Regional building societies are experiencing greater hurdles in 
converting their distributions channels to finance technology.  
An assessment into the current structures of the financial services industry shows that the 2008 
financial crisis had prompted the UK government to promote diversity and competition in the 
banking sector. We witness an increasing number of banking licenses being issued to new 
financial institutions (The Telegraph, 9 August 2016). Long-established banks such as Natwest, 
HSBC, Lloyds, RBS and Santander have priced their savings and mortgage products more 
aggressively in response to that. Building societies are, however, exposed to undertake more risk 
lending and to force up their risk curve in order to operate and compete with banks. Overall, the 
reform in financial services sector post-2008 financial crisis has led building societies to be more 
accountable and of responsible to their members and other stakeholders. 
10.3 Reflection on the Methodological Issues 
This research adopts the methodological approach introduced by Richard Laughlin, middle-range 
thinking (MRT) (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2014, Laughlin, 2004, Laughlin, 1995). MRT 
maintains the hybridised ontological and epistemological assumptions of interpretivist and 
positivist. Laughlin (1995) contends that the approach to engage with social phenomenon cannot 
be operated with a minimal intrusion of subjectivity (as in positivist) or a very individualistic set 
of subjective processes (as in interpretivist). Instead, MRT argues the significance of structures 
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around a subjective process of discovery. ‘Skeletal’ theory provides a scope to the qualitative 
researcher to explore the social world (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2014). 
This study considers the governance and accountability practices are socially constructed and 
influenced by the key players. Knowledge and truth are obtained by studying and understanding 
key players’ contexts, meanings, narratives and accounts about their governance and 
accountability processes (Willis, 2007, Hallebone and Priest, 2009). The mutual accountability 
framework serves as the conceptual framework of this research. The mutual accountability 
framework has been developed based on ideas from studies by Hyndman and McDonnell (2009), 
O’Dwyer (2005), O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007), O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) and O’Dwyer 
and Boomsma (2015) and Najam (1996), who, based on nascent charities and NGOs’ literature, 
have developed the theoretical framework of their research. The mutual accountability 
framework aims to explain and explore the governance and accountability matters in emerging 
literature in mutuals and building societies. The framework also affords scope and structure to 
the research in terms of themes and issues to be explored and investigated (Llewelyn, 2003). The 
framework defines all major accountability relationships between mutual organisations and their 
stakeholders and the accounting mechanisms used to achieve these accountabilities. Examining 
all the accountability relationships based on the framework aids in understanding the holistic 
governance and accountabilities issues in the building society sector (Najam, 1996). 
Furthermore, the research interviewed directors of building societies. It is recognised that 
directors may give particular accounts on issues which may not be shared by other stakeholders, 
due to their social positions. Interviews were therefore conducted with other stakeholders: ex-
directors, an auditor, a regulator and customers. The interview data are also triangulated with 
evidence from documentary analysis and non-participant observation. Although this research 
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intended to interview a greater number of regulators and auditors, the researcher experienced 
difficulties in securing more interviews with these key actors. The analysis on all interview data 
shows that no major discrepancies exist in the accounts provided by different interviewees. 
10.4 Personal Reflection in Conducting This Academic Research 
I was initially skeptical of the relevance of the customer-owned ownership model of building 
societies. Professional reports, HM Treasury reports and newspapers indicated that building 
societies are similar to banks. They were subjected to board mismanagement, engaging in 
accounting fraud and failed during the 2008 financial crisis (see e.g.  HM Treasury, 2009, 2014). 
I was therefore motivated by these reasons to examine the governance and accountability 
practices and issues in UK building societies. It has been found that building societies 
continuously strengthened their governance and accountability systems. The industry creates 
employment and social benefits and impacts to customers, communities and members of general 
public. I was indeed surprise by these findings as my prior conceptions about the building 
societies were that the sector was not democratically-owned and accountable to their members 
and other stakeholders, and directors and senior managers were accountable to themselves. 
Moreover, conducting this academic research is challenging, yet rewarding. At the beginning of 
this doctoral study, it is challenging for me to understand the historical movement of building 
societies, as I have limited background and understanding on the context. The whole research 
process is rewarding when it changes and develops my intellectual thinking and personal skills. 
This doctoral study has also taught me that carrying out academic research requires the desire to 
seek new knowledge, patience, perseverance, openness to criticisms and sacrifice of personal 
time. It is common for researchers to encounter rejections and criticisms from the scholarly and 
professional communities. I found that the research process is exhilarating and fruitful when I am 
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open to new possibilities and knowledge, and believe in the ideas that I am advocating. Overall, 
this academic process has developed my intellectual thinking and personal perspectives about 
social phenomena and academia. 
10.5 Contributions of the Thesis 
This research makes a number of empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature, which 
are outlined in detail in this section. 
10.5.1 Empirical Contributions 
This thesis adds to the limited but much needed research in the governance and accountability of 
mutual organisations and building societies (see e.g. Shaw, 2006, Gray et al., 2014a, Solomon, 
2013, Spear, 2004, Cornforth, 2004, Cornforth, 2002, Brennan and Solomon, 2008, Gray et al., 
2014b). As far as the researcher is aware, no study has been conducted on governance and 
accountability issues in mutual organisations in the UK. There are a few government reports, 
white papers, and professional reports which have reported on the topic in failed financial 
institutions and insurance companies. This is, therefore, the first comprehensive research 
examining and analysing the practice of governance and accountability in building societies 
since the 2008 banking crisis. Such analysis contributes to the literature by providing empirical 
insights from a mutual organisation in an advanced economy country, which can be used for 
other comparative studies. 
This research also provides another empirical contribution in terms of the views provided by— 
and issues discussed with—executives, non-executives, ex-directors, an auditor, a regulator and 
customers of building societies. A number of previous studies have focused on examining the 
effectiveness of the governance and accountability practices in credit unions from the 
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perspectives of managers and/or regulators (see e.g. Hyndman et al., 2004, Hyndman and 
McKillop, 2004, Hyndman et al., 2002, Ketilson and Brown, 2011). To the knowledge of the 
researcher, no research has been conducted regarding the views of multiple stakeholders such as 
executives, non-executives, an auditor, a regulator and customer-members, when evaluating the 
holistic governance issues in mutual organisations. This is the gap in the literature which this study 
has comprehensively examined. 
10.5.2 Theoretical Contribution 
A number of scholars have used agency theory, stewardship theory and democratic theory to 
explain the governance and accountability issues in mutual organisations and co-operatives (see 
e.g. Adam and Armitage, 2004, Spear, 2004, Cornforth, 2004, Cornforth, 2002). However, these 
theories examine one dimension of the accountability relationship between the board of directors 
and customers cum members (Cornforth, 2002, 2004). This study revealed that all types of 
economic entities have responsibilities and accountabilities to a wider group of stakeholders who 
are directly and indirectly affected by the organisation’s actions and activities (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008, Gray et al., 2006). Accountability is a dynamic and multifaceted concept and 
consists of various forms (Stewart, 1984, Sinclair, 1995, O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015, 
Messner, 2009). Due to a lack of empirical works on mutual organisations, this research 
develops a normative mutual accountability framework in exploring and examining the 
governance and accountability issues in mutual organisations. The framework conceptualises 
multiple forms of accountabilities—financial-social dual, compliance, personnel and social 
accountabilities—the processes, rationales (i.e. for what, to whom, how and why) and how 
internal, intermediate and external governance structures foster the achievement of 
accountability (Ketilson and Brown, 2011, Pellervo, 2000). Thus, the framework is useful to 
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study issues in context that are emerging but not well theorised, and also to provide a holistic 
overview on the governance and accountability disciplines in mutuals (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008, Najam, 1996).  
10.6 Implications of the Study for Practitioners and Policymakers 
This study sought the views of multiple stakeholders in the building society sector pertaining to 
its current governance and accountability practices. The findings of this research may therefore 
be of interest to directors, governmental agencies and regulators.  
It is suggested to policy makers and Members of Parliament that the benefits of the existence of 
building societies outweigh their non-existence to consumers. The government should recognise 
the benefits created by mutuals and ensure that policies, rules and regulations which are 
developed are sensitive to financial mutuals and to different sizes of financial institutions. 
Disproportionate regulations reduce the potential benefits that building societies create for their 
members, as increasing efforts have to be invested for regulatory compliance (Hyndman and 
McDonnell, 2009, Birchall, 2013a). 
Furthermore, it is suggested to the directors and practitioners in the building society sector that in 
any businesses, good leadership and management are the pinnacle of success within the 
organisation. The findings show that building societies which failed during the 2008 financial 
crisis were due to weak board of directors, business strategies, risk management and internal 
control systems. Although the current directors who were interviewed understand their roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities, the majority of owner-members have a limited 
understanding of, interest in and control of the business. Directors of building societies may 
therefore have greater opportunities to manage the businesses for their personal interests. It is 
suggested that directors of building societies should ensure that decisions they make are in the 
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interests and long-term benefit of members. Boards should undertake risks that are within the 
remit of their expertise and understanding. NEDs should also properly play out their roles in 
monitoring, controlling, challenging and providing constructive feedback to management as well 
as engaging with members in order to understand their needs and demands.  
This study also suggest that building societies should continuously be transparent in their 
conduct by presenting truthful information to members, regulators, societies and members of the 
general public (Koppell, 2005), and have in place structures which facilitate members’ 
evaluation of and enquiry into the performance and operations of the business. It is convenient 
for members to take their mutual organisation for granted and lose sight of the reason for their 
being, after a period of time (Fairbairn, 2003). In order to succeed, it is necessary for building 
societies to continuously develop and maintain their members’ loyalty and trust against growing 
competition. This could be done by understanding the needs of members, delivering products 
which meet their expectation and being transparent to members in terms of business conduct and 
operations (Koppell, 2005, Fonteyne, 2007, Fairbairn, 2003). Fairbairn (2003) also suggests that 
building societies should continue to leverage their roots of mutuality by highlighting the 
difference between themselves and banks, assisting local communities and customers, and 
ensuring that customers consider the relevance of building societies operating in the financial 
services sector.  
10.7 Limitations of the Study and Suggested Areas for Future Research 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. Interviews with customers cum members have 
shown that members are not interested in the day-to-day operations of building societies. Most 
members are mainly interested in forming a customer and saving-and-mortgage-provider 
relationship with their building societies. Ineffective member engagement may cause the board 
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of directors to be self-perpetuating (Birchall, 2013a). Future research may survey and seek a 
large number of members’ perceptions on approaches that building societies could undertake to 
improve members’ participation and to empirically examine the conceptual construct of Birchall 
and Simmon (2004) and Birchall (2013) on the factors that could enhance members to participate 
in their co-operatives and mutuals. 
Furthermore, this study is context specific and mainly focuses on the governance and 
accountability issues in the UK building society industry. The findings of the study may not 
necessarily be applicable to another type, size or nature of mutual organisation, or to consumer 
co-operatives such as credit unions, friendly societies and the UK Co-operative Group. Future 
research may investigate different types and sizes of mutuals or co-operatives in developed or 
developing countries, as different mutual organisations and co-operatives have different 
historical movements, governance and accountability issues to be investigated (Michie, 2013, 
Gray et al., 2014a, Birchall, 2013a). 
In addition, the study has found that there are differences in the organisational governance 
practice linked to size and geographical area. It is recommended that future studies use case 
study approach to compare and examine in detail the governance and accountability practices 
between small and large, and/or regional and national building societies. It is cautioned that this 
may subject to the accessibility of the data, as the researcher has experienced difficulties in 
gaining access to any building society to conduct a case study.  
Of particular interest, the study also recommends that future research to examine how different 
forms of accountability manifest themselves in the building society sector and other mutual 
organisations. As building society and mutual sector has long-established-history, examination 
on the emergence, development and effects of different forms of accountability would enhance 
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our understanding of how accountability processes operate in this important and influential 
context. 
10.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This thesis has examined the development of building societies and the extent of their current 
governance system in achieving accountability. The evidence shows that the state of building 
societies’ governance and accountability practices have been strengthened since the 2008 
banking crisis. Building societies are aware of the importance of the bilateral relationship 
between governance and accountability, in which governance affects the achievement of 
accountability and accountability bolsters governance. Many initiatives have been undertaken by 
the sector to improve their internal governance structures, such as the development of directors’ 
skills and education, risk management and internal control structures, directors’ remunerations 
and the level of disclosure and transparency. Members’ engagement also remained significant for 
many building societies in which intermediate (or democratic) governance structures, such as 
retail branches, member forums, member panels and roadshows are in place to discharge 
financial-social dual accountabilities to members. Nevertheless, new capital and liquidity 
requirements under CRD IV and banking regulations such as BSOCS and SM&CR increase the 
workload and operational costs of regional building societies. These pose challenges for the 
governance and longer-term performance of these building societies.  
In order to maintain confidence in the building society movement, improvement in governance 
seems essential. Indeed, such improvements could be viewed as necessary for the stability and 
growth of the sector. However, support and guidance by Members of Parliament, policy makers 
and the PRA and FCA are likely to encourage better growth, governance and accountability in 
the sector—and overall, a stronger legacy. This thesis urges future research to investigate the 
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governance and accountability disciplines in different mutual and co-operative sectors in 
different countries, as the subject seems emerging, yet still very much under research. 
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Appendix 1: Invitation Letter 
16 October 2017 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Invitation for PhD Research Participation 
My name is Sue Chern Ooi. I am a PhD student from Essex Business School, University of Essex. I 
would like to request the opportunity to carry out an interview with yourself on the subject of governance 
and accountability practices within mutual organisation, with specific focus on the building societies in 
the UK. I am conducting a series of interviews with key informants drawn from various building societies, 
government, regulatory bodies, and members with the hope to gather insights on governance and 
accountability issues that are not available via other sources.  
The purpose of the interview would allow me to collect qualitative information for my PhD research that 
focuses on how governance, accountability and mutuality is constituted in the UK building society sector. 
This is a very significant area of research, especially given that prior to the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
there was doubt and scepticism towards the building society sector. Nevertheless, most of the building 
societies weathered the credit crunch better than the shareholder-owned banks. The adverse risk approach 
and mutuality model of the building societies are claimed to have prevented the building societies from 
diversifying and expanding their operations into risky financial activities. Therefore, I believe that by 
discussing such matters with yourself and other managers, I will be able to obtain a comprehensive 
assessment of your views on the subjects. Without your participation, a crucial input to my PhD research 
would be missing with adverse consequences for its credibility.   
I envisage taking about 60 minutes for an interview. All material gathered will be treated as confidential 
and references anonymised so that the sources are protected. If there are other restrictions, I am more than 
happy to discuss them with you.  
I really appreciate it if you could spare me some time in order to share your knowledge and expertise. As 
you might expect, I am flexible to meet.  However, I am planning to carry out all the interviews between 
August 2015 and October 2015.  
Should you need any further information or clarification prior to making arrangements, please do not 
hesitate to contact me via email (scooi@essex.ac.uk), or my supervisor’s email, Dr Pik Liew 
(pliew@essex.ac.uk).  
Your contribution is vital to the success of this study and would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for 
taking the time to consider my request. I look forward to hearing from you.    
Yours sincerely, 
 
Sue Chern Ooi 
PhD Candidate 
Email: scooi@essex.ac.uk 
Mobile no:  
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Appendix 2: Initiation Email 
Dear XXX 
Hope this email finds you well.  
My name is Sue Chern Ooi, a PhD student from Essex Business School, University of Essex. I am writing 
to invite you to participate in my PhD research entitled “Corporate Governance, Accountability and 
Mutuality within a Financial Mutual : The UK Building Societies”.   
For your information, I have reviewed and analysed the building societies documents which are available 
online and other academic documents relating to them. As part of my PhD research now, it is important 
for me to seek some opinions and views on the corporate governance and accountability practices and 
matters within the UK Building Societies. This is a very significant area of research given that prior to the 
2007/2008 financial crisis, there were doubts and skepticism towards the building societies sector. 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the credit crunch, this school of thoughts was challenged as most building 
societies survived the crunch better than the shareholder-owned banks.  
Due to its increasing importance and little is known about the building societies, I would really appreciate 
it if you could spare me some time to share your views and knowledge regarding some of the governance 
and accountability practices and issues in this sector. The discussion shall be guided by an interview 
guide, and is expected to last for about 45 minutes to one hour. I can assure you that there is no right or 
wrong answers, and you are free not to answer questions that are not relevant.  
Ethically, it is my responsibility to keep your name and your organisation anonymous. I assure you that 
all the information provided will be kept strictly confidential and secured, and would only be accessible 
by me or my supervisors. In return for your support, a copy of the information which we record about you 
will be provided on request. 
I fully understand that you may have a very tight schedule and therefore, I am happy to meet you 
whenever you are available, anytime from Aug 2016 to September 2016. However, if you are not 
available, I shall be happy to meet you after this time frame.  If you are happy to meet, please let me 
know the person whom I can liaise with, to arrange for our mutually convenient time and date. 
Should you need any further information or clarification prior to making arrangements, please do not 
hesitate to contact me via email (scooi@essex.ac.uk), or my supervisor’s email, Dr Pik Liew 
(pliew@essex.ac.uk). 
Your contribution is vital to the success of this study and would be greatly appreciated. My apologies if 
this request causes any inconvenience  
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Warm regards, 
Sue 
PhD Candidate 
University of Essex 
Mobile no:  
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Appendix 3:Informed Consent Form 
By signing this form I am attesting that I have read and understand the information below and I 
freely give my consent to participate in the research entitle Governance, Accountability and 
Mutuality Within A Financial Mutual: The Case of UK Building Societies, conducted by 
Sue Chern Ooi.  
 
I understand that:  
 
1. The aims, methods, anticipated benefits, and possible risks of the research study, have 
been explained to me. 
2. My participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw and discontinue participation 
at any time without (or with) reasons.  
3. The researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained 
from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain 
secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies 
which protect the anonymity of individuals.   
4. Neither the names of my colleagues nor the names of any organization mentioned during 
this interview would be made public.  
5. The findings of the research will be used for research purposes and may be reported in 
academic journal. 
6. I have the right to allow the interview to be audio recorded and to request for the 
interview transcript, if necessary. 
 
I agree that [*Please delete as appropriate] 
 
7. I DO/ DO NOT* require an opportunity to check the factual accuracy of the research 
findings related to the organisation. 
8. I EXPECT/DO NOT EXPECT* to receive a copy of the interview transcript 
 
I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the explanation provided to me and 
voluntarily give permission to participate in this study. 
   
 
 
 
 
_______________________      ________________      ____________________ 
              Name of Participant                          Date                Signature 
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Appendix 4: Template of Interview Guide 
 
Themes Questions Insights Expected 
Demographic Details 
1. What motivated you to run for the board of the building 
societies? (CEO/ED, Ex-ED, NED, BSA) 
 
2. Why don’t we get started with you telling me some 
background information about yourself as the member 
of the UKBS? (MB) 
➢ What type of account do you hold? 
➢ How long have you been a member of the UKBS? 
• To conform the demographic 
details of the interviewees. 
The role of the UKBS, 
conceptualization of 
mutuality and core 
principles of the UKBS 
(CEO/ED, NED BSA) 
 
 
 
1. What does mutuality mean to you?  How has it changed 
over the years? 
2. How is value being created for members? 
3. Do you think the idea building societies for societies 
are still applicable and relevant in the society? Why do 
you say so? 
4. What are your organizational philosophies toward 
profit and commitment to communities/social 
responsibilities? 
5. What motivates your organization to get involved in the 
social responsibilities activities? 
• To understand the role the UKBS 
plays in the societies 
• To understand the way mutuality is 
being conceptualized and why it is 
being perceived in such way 
• To understand the underlying 
reason for social responsibilities in 
the building societies 
 
 
Conceptions of governance 
1. What do you understand of the term governance and • To understand the nature of 
governance practices in the 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
and 
accountability practices 
(CEO/ED, NED) 
accountability? 
2. How important is governance and accountability in 
your organisation? Why do you say so? 
3. What aspect of governance is important in your 
organisation? 
4. How would you characterize the relationship between 
the non-executives and the management (executive 
directors)? Why would you say so? (To probe further 
about issues of transparency and independence, if 
necessary) 
5. What is the difference between corporate governance in 
the building societies and bank?  
6. Does your organisation face any problem complying 
with the UK Code of Corporate Governance? 
7. How are the NED selected and appointed in the 
building societies? 
8. What are your views about the skills and capabilities of 
the NED in the building societies? How about in the 
past? 
9. Do you think members govern/monitor/control the 
building societies? 
10. What mechanisms are commonly used to discharge 
building societies 
• To understand the implication of 
2007/2008 financial crisis toward 
corporate governance in the 
building societies 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
accountability to members? 
11. What are your views about NED serving more than 9 
years on the BOD of the building societies? 
12. Do you think the UKBS are doing enough to discharge 
accountability? 
13. How important is disclosure of information by the 
UKBS? 
14. In what ways has corporate governance and 
accountability in your organisation changed as a result 
of the 2008 financial crisis? 
15. If given some flexibility, what would your organisation 
do differently? Why would you say so? 
The role of Non-Executive 
Directors (NED) 
1. How do you play out your role as a NED? 
2. In what ways do the non-executives work with the 
management? (Do they work together? If so, on what? 
Is this useful and productive?) 
3. How is the clarity of roles and responsibilities or clear 
lines of accountability and responsibility between non-
executives and management determined? 
4. What are the purposes of member engagement? 
• To understand the roles and 
accountabilities of the non-
executives 
• To understand how the 
independent directors held the 
management accountable for their 
actions 
• To understand if the non-
executives protect the interests of 
the members 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
5. What should be done to improve member engagement? 
6. What do the non-executives do to protect the members’ 
rights? 
7. What are the steps taken to improve the skills and 
expertise of the NEDs? 
8. In what ways do the non-executives and members 
communicate with one another? (Probes: kinds of 
communication, how frequent, to whom and from 
whom and why communication between non-
executives and members are important.) 
9. What improvements have the building societies made 
toward their corporate governance practices? 
10. What challenges do you think building societies face in 
implementing better corporate governance? 
11. What should be done to improve corporate governance 
in the BS? 
• To understand governance 
practices from the perspective of 
the non-executives 
The role of the UKBS  and 
the conceptualization of 
mutuality(MB) 
1. Why would you save or open an account with the 
UKBS?  
2. What roles do the UK Building Societies (UKBS) play 
in our society?  
• To understand the role the UKBS 
plays in the societies; 
• To understand how mutuality is 
being conceptualized and 
perceived by members 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
3. Have the roles of UKBS changed over the years?  
4. In your own experience, what differences do you think 
exist between the UKBS as compared to other high 
street banks? Why would you say so? 
5. Would you consider the UKBS to be profit-making 
financial institutions rather than mutual banks (value-
oriented banks)? Why would you say so? 
6. What does mutuality mean to you?  
7. To what extent do you think mutuality is still in 
existence? Why would you say so? 
 
Members’ Right (MB) 
1. What would you consider to be your rights as a 
member? How do you influence the activities of the 
UKBS (or how do you exercise your rights)? 
2. Would you expect any changes/impacts to occur in the 
UKBS after you have exercised your rights as a 
member? Yes/No. Why would you say so? 
3. To what extent do you think your rights as a member 
are being protected?  Do you think members are being 
treated equitably? Why would you say so? 
4. How well do you think your rights as a member are 
protected by the law? How far are you satisfied? What 
• To understand how members 
perceive  and exercise their rights; 
• To understand the extent in which 
members are involved in the day to 
day operation of the building 
societies; 
• To understand the nature of 
democracy practice in the UKBS 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
should be done to improve it? 
5. Have you ever been involved in the day to day 
operation and governance activities of the building 
societies? Why and why not?  
The role of the BOD (MB) 
1. Do you consider the management of UKBS runs the 
organisation to the interests of the members? Why 
would you say so? 
2. As a member, what do you expect from the BOD? Why 
would you say so? 
3. Do you think the management of the UKBS are doing 
enough to discharge their accountabilities? Why would 
you say so? 
4. Would you consider the non-executive directors to 
have represented your rights equitably? Why would 
you say so? 
5. Do you engage with the directors of the building 
societies? If no, how do you get involved with your 
building societies? 
 
• To understand how members 
perceive the role of the BOD and 
attempt to hold them accountable 
• To understand the extent in which 
members involved in the day to 
day operation of the building 
societies. 
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Themes Questions Insights Expected 
Governance Practices 
(REG/AUD) 
1. What aspects of corporate governance are important in 
the building societies? Why do you say so? 
2. What are your views about the corporate governance 
performance of the building societies? 
a) Before the 2008 financial crisis 
b) After the 2008 financial crisis 
 
3. What are your views about the ____of the building 
societies? 
a) Skills, knowledge and diversity of the board of 
directors 
b) Risk management framework  
4. Do you think the building societies face any challenges 
in recruiting NED/employees with the right skills and 
capabilities? 
5. What improvements have building societies made 
toward their corporate governance practices? 
6. What other improvements should BS make toward their 
CG? 
7. What are your views about the NED and Chairman 
serving more than 9 years on the board of the BS?  
8. What challenges do you think building societies face in 
• To understand regulator’s views 
toward governance and 
accountability practices in the 
building societies and initiatives 
for further improvement. 
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implementing better corporate governance? 
9. Building Societies ED commented that there are 
disproportionate regulations in place now (e.g. BSOCS 
and SMR). These regulations in fact put them in a 
position where they are not at a level playing field with 
banks. What are your views? 
General Governance and 
Accountabilities Issues 
(CEO/ED, NED, REG, 
AUD, Ex-ED, BSA) 
 
1. Some of the building societies (e.g. Scarborough, 
Chelsea) failed during the financial crisis. What are 
your views about that? Do you consider their failure 
because of failure of governance? 
2. The government seems to support the idea of mutual as 
a result of the 2008 financial crisis. Have there been 
any changes in the UKBS sector? 
3. All the demutualised building societies failed during 
the financial crisis? What are your views about that?  
4. Why do most building societies demutualised in the 
1990s? In your view, what benefits does 
demutualisation bring? 
5. Do you think with the current regulations in place, the 
building societies are at a level playing field with 
banks? 
6. What challenges do you think building societies are 
 
P a g e  | 279 
 
Appendix 4: Template of Interview Guide 
 
Themes Questions Insights Expected 
experiencing? 
7. What are your views about the future of the industry? 
8. What are your views about the reasons the number of 
building societies has been diminishing over the years? 
9. What should be done to maintain the legacy of the 
building societies? 
General Question 
1. Is there anything else you wish to add? 
2. Can I still be in touch with you in the event of follow 
up? 
 
MB: Member      Ex-ED: Ex directors 
NED: Non-Executive Director   REG: Regulator 
CEO/ED: CEO/Executive Director   AUD: Auditor 
BSA: BSA representative 
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